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About the Journal
The Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration (FJEM) is devoted to the high quality study of ethnic relations and international migration. Published biannually by the Society for the Study of Ethnic Relations and International Migration (ETMU), this peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary, open-access journal provides a forum for discussion and the refinement of key ideas and concepts in the fields of ethnicity and international population movement. Although international in its scope of interests and range of contributors, the journal focuses particularly on research conducted in Finland and other Nordic countries. Opinions expressed in the FJEM articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ETMU.
Reshaping Europe: Migration and Its Contexts in Austria and Finland

Introduction

Peter A. Kraus and Petteri Pietikäinen

In September 2008, the Academy of Finland and the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research co-organised a seminar on the topic ‘Reshaping Europe: Migration and Its Contexts’. There had already been some previous collaboration between the two institutions with regard to their respective research programmes on power and democracy. When the idea of a joint seminar came under discussion, migration emerged as a theme that both parties considered to be of central importance for Austria and Finland, as well as for the European Union (EU) as a whole.

The starting point for the organisers was the fact that Finland and Austria, as affluent EU-countries, are increasingly dependent on foreign labour. Whereas the influx of migrant workers to Finland is a recent phenomenon, Austria, located in the heart of central Europe, has a record of protracted immigration over the last decades. The seminar addressed the following key questions: What are the specific approaches different social and political actors, including the media, adopt when they deal with issues related to immigration in the context of the two countries? And what is the impact of immigration as a phenomenon that is reshaping the EU in general on two relatively small EU member states?

Immigration has become a shared West European experience. Since 1990, Ireland, Greece and Spain, former emigration countries, have attracted numbers of immigrants in proportions that used to be characteristic of traditional immigration societies, such as the USA and Australia. Albeit hesitantly, and to a much more modest degree, Finland seems to be joining the trend. In most cases, the last wave of migration to Europe reflects economic motives: those who move from poor to rich countries can expect to see their income rise by 500 percent or more. This poses a problem to low- and middle-income countries, as they face chronic shortages of skilled workers. In a sample drawn from 52 million migrants in 20 rich countries, the World Bank found that more than one third (36 %) of them had a college education.

Some economies would simply collapse without foreign workers. In the United Arab Emirates, for instance, about 85% of the resident population are migrants. While becoming more ubiquitous, migration is also becoming more fluid, producing increasing numbers of ‘pendulum migrants’, who split their time between two different countries (e.g. Estonia and Finland, or Poland and the UK).

Men and women do not only move for economic reasons. We also have to take into account the large groups of asylum-seekers and refugees, who by definition are escaping from persecution. According to the refugee agency of the United Nations, around 10 million people fell under this category in 2006. Asylum has become a disputed policy issue all over Europe. In contrast with some of their neighbours in the EU, neither Finland nor Austria are characterized by having developed particularly generous asylum regimes. All in all, migration is becoming more and more complex everywhere, and there is an increasing demand for in-depth comparative studies. As the landscape of migration is continuously changing, researchers, policy-makers, NGO activists and citizens all need up-to-date information as well as dispassionate analyses of what is actually going on in different parts of Europe, where people move from one place to another in search of relative security, work and a better life (that may also be represented by the sunshine that pulls Northern pensioners to the Mediterranean area).

It is our assumption that casting a comparative perspective on immigration issues in Austria and Finland makes additional sense because of the interesting commonalities in the political development of the two countries. Both are, although in quite different ways, ‘products’ of World War I and of the breakdown of imperial rule the conflict entailed. Both countries experienced high levels of political polarization and a civil war. After 1945, they developed as Western style democracies, yet maintained a status of neutrality between East and West. For a long time, consensus played a
central role in their internal politics and was seen as a constitutive element of their political culture. While this still largely holds for the case of Finland, the consensus period has come to an end in Austria.

One can now speculate to what extent such common features are relevant when it comes to dealing with immigration. There is certainly not a one to one correspondence between the two countries. As already mentioned, in Austria we find the high levels of immigration that are nowadays typical of most West European democracies. In this respect, Finland, with its low immigration figures, is a striking exception. At the same time, immigration is a heavily politicized issue in the Austrian context, and right-wing populists have been relying on an anti-immigration discourse to mobilize political support. Thus far, the populist response to immigration has been far less salient in the Finnish case; it is still surprising, however, how immigration, in spite of its rather modest dimensions, has become a matter of intense public debate in Finland too. Finally, we should be aware of the geo-political factors that may make for some Austro-Finnish commonalities regarding immigration: being situated on the corridor between Eastern and Western Europe, the two countries are highly interesting laboratories for assessing the magnitude and impact of intra-European migration flows.

Five thematic areas were covered by the presentations at the seminar: memories and realities of migration; integration and participation; immigration and the labour market; family, health and well-being; and images of migration in the media. The topics discussed in the sessions ranged from the status of migration in the construction of collective memory to the role of immigration associations, precarious labour markets, the economic integration and political participation of immigrants. A selection of the papers discussed in the seminar is offered in this volume.

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Migration and Memory in Austria: Representations of Migration in a Reluctant Immigration Country

Abstract

Migration and memory are both topics that attract a great deal of scientific interest. However, bringing the two aspects together in one research approach is still very much a minority concern. Questions such as ‘Is migration history part of the post World War II narratives in Europe?’ or ‘How is the rich migration history of Europe remembered in the national histories of different European countries?’ are rarely raised by the scientific community and do not play any role in public and political debates on migration and integration issues.

A central question in this article is how immigration societies narrate their (im)migration history, how they (re)construct and negotiate their (im)migration past. In the first part of the paper I give a more theoretical introduction to the interrelations of migration, memory and history. In the second part the approach will be exemplified by presenting results from a study on the representations of (im)migration history and immigrants in Austrian textbooks since the 1970s.

Points of departure

Europe has been a migration continent for centuries. Most European societies today are pluralistic, heterogeneous immigration societies. Populations differ not only in terms of ethnic and cultural background, religious affiliation or country of origin but also in terms of their individual and family biographies and their transmitted historical and political experiences. Migrants bring their own individual “histories” with them and are also bearers of group narratives. Despite all the past and present migration experiences and the emerging multiethnic societies, Europe’s self image is still very much centred on national paradigms and narratives, as public debates on immigration and integration clearly show. Not to be an immigration country is for example still the prevailing leitmotif in Austria. The debates rather highlight the exclusiveness of “national clubs” than signalize plurality and diversity. National paradigms also prevail when it comes to the shaping of historical consciousness and memory by institutions like museums, media or schools.

Generally speaking, the very rich migration history has not yet found entrance into historiography and the collective memories of European nation states. Immigrants and their histories live on the fringes of our historical consciousness. Motte and Ohliger even claim with regard to labour migration to Germany since the 1950s that immigrants are invisible in the collective memory and the historical and cultural organisation of public space (2004: 21). From what can be seen in the research on the topic it would be fair to say that historiography has taken little interest in immigrants and their history or their stories. Taking the example of Pierre Nora’s Lieux de mémoire – a benchmark and a standard work in European memory research – the French historian and sociologist Philippe Noiriel points out that “immigrants are completely absent in the sixty-six essays devoted to the ‘places of memory’ of the Republic and the Nation” (1999: 41f). Noiriel comments further that “in his [Nora’s] book immigration is a non-lieu de mémoire, a denial of memory” (ibid). Noiriel’s diagnosis provokes the question whether the same is true in the Austrian context. Is migration a non-lieu de mémoire in Aus-
tria as well, or is it an integrated part of the main narratives of the country? The empirical analysis confronts us with the concomitance of integration and marginalization. Even though the country’s migration history is a neglected topic in historiography and unacknowledged and contradicted in the political discourse, it slowly and warily entered our school curricula and textbooks. I will discuss this in more detail below.

I do not proceed from the assumption that immigrants are per se discriminated against in the construction of memory. There are historical examples of immigrant groups that do not only assume their place in history but have also got the means to preserve their cultural differences. The German example shows that there seems to be a need for a clear distinction between different immigrant groups. The integration of ethnic German refugees and expellees in Germany after World War Two, their history and the conditions in which they lived have not only been scientifically documented and analysed, they and their histories are also an undisputed part of collective remembrance and memory (Motte and Ohliger 2004). Together with the Aussiedler, the ethnic German refugees and expellees are also organised in one strong representative body – the Bund der Vertriebenen – with more than two million members. However, if there are exceptions to the rule that immigration history and the history or the stories of immigrants are not taken into account by the official historiography of a country, the question must be addressed what causes these differences from a historical perspective and what factors are responsible for the difference in treatment. The German case suggests that ethnic homogeneity might be such a factor.

Concerning the possible modes of representation of immigrants (but also ethnic and other minority groups) in the national and also transnational historiography, König and Ohliger argue that there are basically five models in the European and US/Canadian context: ethnification, assimilation, ‘distinctive’ integration, non-representation and multiculturalisation (2006: 14-16). According to the authors, ethnification and multiculturalisation refer to the situation in the USA and Canada, respectively. Separation and specific representation are the characteristics of the ethnification of migration history, which has to be put in the context of the so-called ethnic revival in the 1960s in the USA and the debate on political correctness and the politics of recognition put forward by authors like Charles Taylor (König and Ohliger 2006: 14). Each immigrant group and ethnic minority writes its own history as a part of national history, but a part that is separate and not essential to the whole. Consequently, each group constructs a special collective memory – a process that could eventually lead to a strong fragmentation of national history, allowing also for different competing narratives and endangering the coherence of a society, as critics argue.

According to König and Ohliger, the multicultural model is best represented in Canada, where the social and ethnic diversity of the country is seen as a constitutive element of the national past and national self-understanding. Contrary to the ethnification model, the multicultural mode of representation “provides (at least in theory) for an overall idea of society, holding it together and providing a coherent picture of the past” (ibid: 15). Crucial to this model is that majority and minority groups get equal support by the state in their remembrance activities and their endeavours to be represented in national historiography. Still, Harzig has pointed out that also in the case of Canada immigration was not a natural part of the historical representation per se. Quite on the contrary, the “big Canadian narrative” (2004: 87) did not include immigration for a long time. It was only with the policy of multiculturalism which was introduced at the beginning of the 1970s that “the master narrative has been scrutinized critically” (ibid: 91) and that money has been provided to finance research and publications on the topic. This resulted among other things in the situation that today “there is enough historical research to rewrite the national history, and reconceptualise the master narrative in a way that the history of immigrants appears not only as an addendum but make it possible to redefine the outlines of the master narrative, the breaks and the identity shaping events” (ibid: 92).

“Active assimilation” can best be observed in France (at least until recently and in theory). In the republican model of France immigrants and ethnic minorities are an essential, but not a distinctive part of the politically defined nation. The goal is to make ethnically blind nationals with a common shared history. The transmission of specific migrant or minority historical narratives would not be supported by state institutions.

With “distinctive integration” König and Ohliger describe a model of representation that refers to privileged migrant groups such as co-ethnics; the case of ethnic Germans as described above might be the best example of this model. They and their history are integrated as an essential but distinctive part of the national history. As has been pointed out before, not only were they accepted into national historiography but they also got the means to establish institutions and as a consequence, a better chance to preserve cultural differences. French Pieds-Noirs from Algeria or Dutch-Indonesians immigrating to France or the Netherlands after decolonisation are other examples. König and Ohliger assume that it might be the “real or ascribed status of victim” prior to the immigration and corresponding narratives that influence the integration of specific group narratives into national history (2006: 15).

The last model is rather a non-model but nevertheless, the prevailing approach in the European context, at least in countries like Austria that do not consider themselves countries of immigration: the non-representation. Within this approach the history of immigrant and minority groups is widely ignored, or judged as irrelevant for national historiography. Migrants and their histories just do not belong to the national narratives; they are accidentally overlooked or deliberately forgotten and excluded. The attitude towards labour migrants that were mainly recruited during the 1950s and the 1960s in many Western European countries and their histories exemplifies this approach. König and Ohliger argue that also “the approach of Central and Eastern European nation-states towards the history of indigenous minorities matches this model” (2006: 15). The German example, again, can be
taken as evidence for the concomitance of two modes of representation: distinctive integration on the one hand and non-representation on the other.

Above I suggested that the model of non-representation applies best to the Austrian situation. How can this assumption be justified? About ten percent of the Austrian population have another citizenship than the Austrian. More than 17% have a so-called “immigrant background”, meaning in statistical terms that they either immigrated themselves or were born in Austria as children of foreign parents. In total, this amounts to almost 1.5 million inhabitants. The respective figure for Vienna is even more significant: every third Viennese either migrated to Vienna him- or herself or has foreign parents. Despite these numbers which clearly show that Austria de facto is an immigration country and has been so for a rather long time – not to mention the situation at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, when Vienna was one of the European immigration cities – the Austrian self-conception contradicts the obvious fact. As a consequence, national history is not perceived as a history of (im)migration but rather as a history without (im)migration. One example of the nation’s reluctance to acknowledge itself as a plural immigration society is the Austrian citizenship policy. Who has access to nationality is of high historical and symbolic meaning. Austria’s citizenship and naturalisation regulations are among the most restrictive within the European Union. Citizenship is based on the principle of *ius sanguinis* and a legal claim to Austrian citizenship arises only after 30 years of residence in the country. Minimum requirements for naturalisation are ten years’ residence, a defined knowledge of the German language and since the amendment to the citizenship law in 2005, a basic knowledge of the history and the political system of Austria and the federal province where the applicant lives. Foreigners have to pass a written examination in the form of a multiple-choice-test. Similar tests have been introduced in other EU-countries as well, including Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Great Britain (Çinar 2007: 45-46). In Austria, naturalisation is not assessed as prerequisite of or facilitator for integration but as the last step of a successful integration process.

Another fact supporting the claim that non-representation is the model that applies best to the Austrian situation is that there are hardly any symbolic places connected to the history of migration. One that might be mentioned is the bridge at Andau (*Brücke von Andau*). Andau is a small Austrian village at the border to Hungary. In the course of the Hungarian Uprising more than 70,000 Hungarians crossed the bridge over the so-called *Einserkanal* to Austria. After the bridge was destroyed in November 1956 by Hungarian soldiers it took 40 years to re-erect it. It was only in 1996 that the ‘new bridge at Andau’ was built in order “to commemorate the events of 1956 and to symbolise helpfulness and tolerance in a free Europe” (commemorative plaque at the bridge). It is indicative for the Austrian self-representation that it is not the refugee migration as such that is commemorated but the helpful nation. The bridge is “a symbol for the Austrian aid towards refugees” and not a symbol for the Hungarian Uprising or the individual and collective stories of flight and refuge (Liebhart and Pribersky 2005: 420). The bridge is not only a memorial site as such but is also remembered in films and literature. It plays a central role in a well-known Austrian film (*Bockwerer III – Die Brücke von Andau*) which premiered in 2000. It also gave the title to a novel published in 1957 by James A. Michener, an American author who lived in Austria in the 1950s and based his book on interviews with refugees (*The Bridge at Andau*). In general, it is a fruitless task to look for migration memorials, street names with a relation to immigration or other memory sites visualising the importance of migration processes for Austrian history. These symbolic places which are, of course, indicators of the recognition of groups and their history in society are more or less absent. Immigrants and their descendants have not left their mark in Austrian public space so far.

**Migration, politics of memory, politics of identity**

The question as to the representations of migration processes and migrants’ histories is obviously not without political implications. The memory space is hotly contested territory with strict gatekeepers. Different social groups with their respective (competing) memories seek to gain admission. Maurice Halbwachs introduced the concept of ‘social memory’ into social sciences when he elaborated on the connections between a social group and collective memory. He argued that every group develops a memory of its own and every collective memory is ‘socially framed’ as it is the group that decides what is memorable and how it is to be remembered (1966). The distinctive group memories are as divided or comprehensive as the various groups in society. Different ideas and constructions of the past might be in conflict with each other and also with the public history of a respective community.

Questions like ‘Who has the power to interpret history? Which groups are powerful, which groups of the population are powerless? Who talks about whom? Who is the subject and who is the object?’ gain even more importance when it comes to the interpretation of the (im)migration history of a country, because immigrants (and their descendants) have in general less power to intervene in the process of memory formation and have less stake in the construction of the dominant and identity shaping narratives of a community than the majority. The stakeholders who are active in the field of politics of memory and politics of memory are as a rule part of the majority in the society. Hence, the integration and representation of ‘minority narratives’ is an exception to the rule, especially in a country like Austria which does not perceive itself as a country of immigration and where immigrants and their children are still mostly engaged in jobs and positions without any or much normative power.

But although minority groups do not have equal access to the means of memory production they do challenge and oppose hegemonic narratives. From his research on the pro-
struction of California history Walton concludes that “[h]istory making has been democratized” (2000: 29) and that counter-memories and also “silenced voices […] are at least heard” (ibid).

With respect to (labour) migration to Europe, the silenced voices slowly begin to be heard and also to speak out. Social power relations are shifting and more and more members of the so called second and third generation immigrants demand not only equal opportunities and rights in society but also claim their position in the narratives of the immigration societies. This goes hand in hand with discussions about the establishment of migration museums in some countries and/or the initiation of migration exhibitions in others, and also has to be interpreted in connection with preceding discussions and critique on museums’ roles in the non/representation of minorities in general (cf. Macdonald 1996; Sandell 2007). France, for example, opened a national museum of immigration – the Cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration – in October 2007. In the UK, the Migration Museum Working Group was established in 2006 “to discuss what more could be done to represent migration issues within the UK museum and heritage sector” (ippr 2009: 4). Also in the UK a big research project – situated at Tate Britain and called Tate Encounters4 – has been funded by the British Arts and Humanities Council. The project “set out to provide greater understanding of how Tate Britain is situated within the discourses of Britishness and cultural diversity through its museological practices” (Dewdney 2008: 1-2) and “emerged out of the recognition that there had been no demonstrable change in the demographic representation of audiences at Tate Britain, which continues to attract only 3% from ethnic minorities” (Walsh 2008: 1).

The fact that the claims for historical representation from the side of immigrant communities did not turn up earlier is not only due to the hegemonic attitudes of the majority. It might also be interpreted as a consequence of the self-concept of early immigrants themselves. The myth of the temporary, short-term stay has been a frequent leitmotif shared by immigration societies and the immigrants themselves. It is therefore no surprise that the question of inclusion into collective memories usually does not turn up before the emergence of a second or third generation of immigrants.

The role of majority actors and institutions as gatekeepers and their superiority with regard to the interpretation of historical and political developments as it has been described above is also decisive for the definition of membership and for identity constructions. With the simultaneous mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of groups, with their narratives and histories, the dominant society defines membership and identity and constructs a ‘we’ and the ‘others’. The strategies of construction policies are manifold. Legal regulations play a crucial role in the definition of membership criteria: Who is an alien subject according to the provisions of the applicable law? Who has access to the labour market and under what conditions? Who is considered a citizen of a country? Who is entitled to obtain citizenship and what criteria have to be met in order to do so? Is access to citizenship based on ius soli or on ius sanguinis? An excellent example of the legal construction of alien-ness, of ‘the others’, is the pertinent legislation that applies to the member states of the European Union. The most privileged citizens are still the nationals of their respective states, followed by the citizens of EU member states who are on a par in many respects with nationals; in some EU-countries a division is still drawn between citizens of ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states with regard to the free movement of labour; the bottom rung is assigned to the category of ‘third-country-nationals’, whose ‘otherness’ is obviously more evident than that of ‘old’ or ‘new’ EU citizens and who are least entitled to claim the rights accorded to citizens. This constructs a hierarchy along the dimension of legal ‘otherness’. Legislation is of course not the only authority that is active in the construction of ‘us-groups’ and ‘them-groups’. The media and their reporting play a very important role. Nor must the importance of politicians or of the trade unions’ contributions to the debate be underestimated, particularly as regards labour migration. NGOs that are active also on an international or global level are steadily gaining in importance and are garnering more and more social as well as direct political clout. Important for my analysis is the assumption that historical perceptions and coherent frames of meaning influence construction policies regarding groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The insistence on the self-image and constant re-iteration of the narrative of Europe not being an immigration continent or of diverse European nations not being countries of immigration is such a possible coherent frame of meaning.

**Immigration history and immigrants in Austrian textbooks: selected findings from a research project**

After having introduced the theoretical framework I will now present results of a research project on the interrelations of migration processes and the construction of national memory.5 What we are focusing on when we are talking about the interrelations of migration and memory not on an individual but a societal level is the question of how societies construct, reconstruct and negotiate their past. More specifically: How do European immigration societies represent and narrate their migration history? In the above mentioned project we are questioning the representations of (im)migration history and the history of (im)migrants in two European countries: Austria and Sweden.6 We are concentrating on labour immigration from the 1960s onwards but are very aware of the fact that it is not always possible and not always wise to draw clear distinctions between labour and refugee migration. Moreover, it turned out to be sensible to focus not only on the time period mentioned but to integrate also older immigration and emigration processes to the study. The sources we are deploying are textbooks on the one hand and migration exhibitions on the other. In the following I will concentrate on the textbook analysis for Austria. Textbooks are in this context interpreted as manifestations of the cultural memory of a country.
Our research is based upon three central research questions:

1. In which ways are the history of labour (im)migration as well as the (im)migrants themselves, and their histories collectively remembered and represented in textbooks and museums/migration exhibitions of Austria and Sweden?

2. In which ways are the (labour) (im)migrants written into national memories? Are they discursively constructed as part of the national or European self, or as the outsiders/the others?

3. Did these various representations change over time?

Textbooks which are used in Austrian schools have to undergo an authorisation procedure headed by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture which is different for example from the situation in Great Britain or France where there is no such official procedure. Textbooks reflect a publicly and socially accepted knowledge, “hegemonic representational knowledge” (Höhne 2000: 2). Processes of inclusion and exclusion are at work when it comes to the selection of topics and the way they are depicted. These decisions are made deliberately and are the outcome of a negotiation process between different stakeholders (the authors, the publishing houses, the educational authorities) framed by special socio-political conditions. Textbooks are, as Soysal et al. argue (with reference to Goodson, Meyer et al. and Young) “representative of officially selected, organized, and transmitted knowledge. They are products of contestation and consensus” (2005: 14). Textbook knowledge has the aura of objectivity, it is learned, memorised, and tested and rarely questioned.

### Sampling and methodological approach

The subjects that have been chosen for the analysis are history (history and social studies/education for democratic citizenship) and geography (geography and economics). Basis of the sampling is the so-called Austrian Schulbuchliste (list of textbooks) edited every school year by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture. All textbooks included in this list have been approbated by an expert committee. The members of the committee examine whether a textbook corresponds to the aims, educational and didactical principles of the curricula and whether it contains any topical mistakes.

Textbooks re-approbated every school year. Since I am following a diachronic perspective the sample is not limited to present day textbooks but comprises books that have been published and used during the last four decades. Due to this comparative approach it is possible to trace the first appearances of migration issues in the textbooks, but also to look at changes and variations in the representations over time. The oldest textbook in the sample dates back to 1970, while the most recent was published in 2007.

It would have been impossible to analyse all textbooks in the two subjects that have been published during the last four decades. To make the work manageable I reduced the number of books to the two or three bestsellers for history as well as geography for one given school year per decade. The whole sample now comprises 46 books that have been used in the four years of upper secondary school during the last 40 years, 27 geography textbooks and 19 history textbooks. All the books in the sample that discussed the topic of migration in some way or other were retained, i.e. not only those referring to the situation in Austria but also books containing depictions of migrants in general or describing global migration processes or immigrations to Europe. However, the focus of the analysis was on the ‘Austrian stories’. The quantitative dimension is very different from case to case. Sometimes a whole chapter is dedicated to migration and integration issues, and sometimes only a table relating to the number of immigrants or emigrants is featured.

The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Pages have been counted in order to see how much space is dedicated to the topic (compare e.g. tables 1+2). Moreover, it has been asked which events of the Austrian migration history are covered, which stories are narrated and which material (pictures, graphs, caricatures) have been chosen for illustration. On the other hand, texts and pictures have also been analysed as “discourse fragments” (Jäger 2002: 47), as part of the national migration discourse in order to investigate how authors of textbooks refer to the topic and which lines of reasoning they use.

### Little and late – overall findings of the analysis

Already after a first review of the textbooks three findings stood out quite clearly. Firstly and generally speaking, migration issues did not play a very prominent role in the textbooks during the last 40 years. This is especially true for history textbooks. Secondly, stories of migration (be it emigration or immigration) entered the Austrian textbooks rather late. And thirdly, there are big differences between the two subjects of history and geography. To begin with, I would like to shed some light on the quantitative dimension. The following tables show how much space current history and geography textbooks dedicate to migration issues and also give an idea in which contexts migration is dealt with. For exemplification and because it is not possible to include this information for all analysed books, I chose the one of the three best-selling series of the newest textbooks in both subjects in which
migration issues are mentioned most frequently. This means
that all other books that have been analysed and which are
not included in the tables dedicate less space to the topic. It
also has to be added that in principle the most recently pub-
lished books give the most attention to questions of migra-
tion and integration. It is evident of course that the sole num-
ber of pages does not give any evidence on the quality of the
content. Neither does it give us any information on the lessons
and what really happens in the classroom. But if we follow
the assumption that textbooks can be interpreted as socially
accepted and representative hegemonic knowledge, it might
act as an indicator for the importance of a topic in the national self-understanding.

Twelve out of 644 pages (1.9%) in the selected series of
history textbooks and 25 out of 778 (3.2%) pages in the four
geography textbooks Durchblick deal with migration and inte-
gration issues. What can be seen from this overview and what
will be elaborated more thoroughly later on are the differences
between the two subjects, not only in quantitative terms but
also with regard to contents. From the titles of the chapters in
the geography textbooks the structure of the curricula for the
years of upper secondary education can be derived. It is the
world in the first year, Europe in the second and Austria in the
third. Migration is discussed with reference to these different
spatial levels. Looking at the history textbooks on the other
hand it is not so obvious that migration is the topic in question.

“Religious communities” must not necessarily be discussed
with a reference to migration. The same might be said about
“right wing extremism today” or “change of society” (implaus-
ible though it may be). It is the ‘additive perspective’ which
is characteristic of many history textbooks and which I will
explicate later on in more detail.

The second general finding is the very late entry of migra-
tion issues into Austrian textbooks, especially history text-
books. But what exactly does very late mean? There is not
a single word on migration concerning Austria (or any other
country) – neither emigration nor immigration – in the his-
tory textbooks in the sample until the 1980s. It was only in
1986 that the Zeitgeschichte in its third edition referred to the
topic and it can be interpreted as indicative of the Austrian
way of acknowledging or rather not acknowledging its migra-
tion past and presence that this first sentence on contemporary
migration movements in a history textbook refers to the ‘guest
workers’ in Germany and not to those in Austria. In a chap-
ter on the “Two German States” pupils learn that “[a]pprox-
imately 3 million guest workers [bold in the original] found
a well paid job in the Federal Republic of Germany” and that
“they would have been unemployed in their native country”
(Göhring and Hasenmayr 1986: 119). 1986 is exactly twenty
years after Austria signed its recruitment agreement with
former Yugoslavia. At the time, about 360 000 of its inhab-
itants had another citizenship than the Austrian. During the

Table 1: Migration issues in a current Austrian history textbook used in the school year 2007/08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book and year of publication*</th>
<th>Headline(s)</th>
<th>Total number of pages**</th>
<th>In % of all pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gestern – heute – morgen.</td>
<td>New problem: language of migrants</td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestern – heute – morgen.</td>
<td>The labour emigrants (19th century)</td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aus Geschichte lernen 6 (2005)</td>
<td>Migration today</td>
<td>2 pages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestern – heute – morgen.</td>
<td>Right-wing extremism today Problems of immigration</td>
<td>2 pages</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aus Geschichte lernen 7 (2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gestern – heute – morgen.</td>
<td>Religious communities The richest and the poorest countries in the world Change of society Multicultural Austria</td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aus Geschichte lernen 8 (2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The books are all from one series used in 4 consecutive grades.
** Please note that “1 page” is not always equivalent to a whole page.

Table 2: Migration issues in a current Austrian geography textbook used in the school year 2007/08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book and year of publication*</th>
<th>Headline(s)</th>
<th>Total number of pages**</th>
<th>In % of all pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Durchblick 5 (2005)</td>
<td>Worldwide migration Majority and minorities living together</td>
<td>4 pages</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 pages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchblick 6 (2005)</td>
<td>Europe – a desired immigration destination</td>
<td>7 pages</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchblick 7 (2006)</td>
<td>Austria – population structure and development Risk factors for poverty in Austria Austria and the EU-enlargement</td>
<td>8 pages (5 pages on “The ‘other’ Austrians”)</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 pages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durchblick 8 (2007)</td>
<td>Migration becomes female in a globalized world</td>
<td>1 page</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The books are all from one series used in 4 consecutive grades.
** Please note that “1 page” is not always equivalent to a whole page.
1990s migration became a topic in Austrian history textbooks, be it with reference to Austria, Europe or global refugee and labour migration movements. Ten out of twelve history textbooks predominantly used in the school year 1997/98 pick up the topic in one or the other context. Today almost all history textbooks usually used devote some space to the issue.

Geography textbooks give much more attention to questions of migration, not only today but also during the last forty years. This is not so surprising taking into account that population structures and changes in the population structure of a country are an integral part of population geography and thereafter of the curricula. Already the SEYDLITZ – a very popular geography textbook until the 1980s – published in 1970 contains a table on the number and percentages of foreign workers (then called Fremdarbeiter) in Austria and the branches in which they were employed as part of a chapter on the industrial development after the 2nd World War. The textbook on Europe in the same series, published in 1971, also refers to the fact that Europe is a continent of migration. The authors refer to flight and expulsion as a consequence of World War II as well as to remigration from the colonies, recruitment migration and flight from former Eastern Europe. Also geography textbooks published in the 1980s include migration issues, be it emigration from Europe to the United States or immigration to Europe in general or to Austria in particular. Unsere Erde 2 published in 1985 contains for the first time a chapter on ‘guest workers’ in Europe, titled “Guestworker problems in Europe” (Ebner and Hauser 1985: 157-158). This integration of the topic continues during the 1990s and today there is no ‘migration-free’ geography textbook in usage. Based on a change of the geography curricula in 1989 a new development for the last year of upper secondary education was the inclusion of a chapter on “the world in people’s minds”. National self-perception, the perception of ‘the other’ have been picked as central themes under this heading in books published during the 1990s as well as concepts of the enemy and prejudices against foreigners or ‘the foreign’.

This example shows that the appearance of a certain issue in a textbook can of course not only be interpreted as the result of a decision by the authors. Their writing is framed by an official curriculum that pre-structures the content of a textbook. Bearing this in mind it is not surprising that migration (immigration and emigration) has not been a constitutive part of Austrian textbooks, especially history textbooks for a long time.10 Still today the content of the history curriculum for the four years of upper secondary school which has been effective since 2004, almost completely omits the topic. This is very different from the situation in geography where migration is positioned as an important issue in the curriculum of 2004. “Causes and effects of spatial and social mobility in different societies” is one of the topics in the 9th school year. In the next higher level – the year that is dedicated to European questions in the geography curriculum – one topic deals with diversity and unity in Europe. One of the declared aims of this school year is to “[f]ind out that Europe became a continent of immigration”. When Austria (its space, society and economy) is the overall subject in the following year (11th year of education) migration is embedded in two topics and two educational objectives are explicitly stated: “[t]o understand the different forms of the political borders of Austria since the 20th century and their effects on traffic, economy and migration” as well as “[t]o be able to analyse and evaluate the situation of selected population groups with respect to the phenomenon ‘Fremd-sein’” and “to comprehend the socio-political challenges of an aging and multicultural society”.

The fact that there are rather big differences between the two subjects is the third important and overall finding of the comparative analysis.12 Differences concerning the attention they give to the topic in general but also differences in how narratives about immigration are constructed and which approach is chosen. While history textbooks describe immigration as one of many narratives of the last century and depict immigration as a “supplementary” (Lozic: forthcoming), a story that can be told but not necessarily has to be told, geography textbooks follow a more integrated perspective when it comes to immigration and use a more analytical and social scientific approach. At least since the 1980s migration and population issues in general are presented by the authors as a theme of study, they discuss and problematise the issue from different angles. Much more diversified material, like cartoons, graphs or newspaper articles is used and questions and recommendations for discussions and exercises are given. The additive perspective on the other hand is very explicit in one current series of Austrian history textbooks where the topic is put forward under the rubric “Specials” or the rubric “Politics” (Achs et al. 2005: 5).

A third difference between the historical and the geographical eye refers to the fact that different aspects of the immigration history are emphasised. Labour (im)migration plays a more prominent role in geography textbooks, whereas flight and expulsion are given more space in history textbooks. Spuren der Zeit 8 refers to the 20th century as “The century of refugees” (Schröckenfuchs et al. 1992: 70) and Zeitbilder 8 asks whether being “[d]isplaced and on the run [is] the fate of our century?” (Wald et al. 1997: 39). Immigration in history textbooks is frequently represented as a phenomenon related to wars or political crises, like flight and expulsion in the aftermath of World War II, the Hungarian Uprising, the Prague Spring or the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, and not as part of everyday life and normality. This is again different in geography textbooks, which use a broader conception of migration and include not only international migration but also internal migration with the possible effect that migration loses its ‘extraordinary’ status and becomes a common experience of everyman and everywoman. In a chapter on “Spatial mobility – people on the move” in the book Raum – Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft 5 the authors explain for instance what spatial mobility means. In a table they summarize the different forms of spatial mobility, building a bridge from permanent emigration to another country on the one end of the scale to daily commuting on the other. And they make it clear that migration is not only a strategy used by people in poor coun-

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tries but also in the so-called industrialised world when they write: “In the industrialised countries many people move at the beginning or the end of a certain life period: Young people leave their homes, families with children move to the country, older people sometimes return to their home village” (Hitz et al. 2004: 38).

Narratives of immigration

As it is not possible to present all the results from the analysis in this article I will restrict myself to two central findings concerning the immigration stories and how they are narrated in the textbooks. First of all I will investigate the question if Austria is presented as an immigration country at all. Secondly, I am going to argue that the narration of immigration to Austria is strongly connected to an economic discourse of benefits and problems.

I already pointed to the fact that Austria can be described as a reluctant immigration country. The term Einwanderungsland itself is hardly ever used in the public discourse and in political statements in an affirmative way.13 Politicians choose the term Zuwanderungsland instead, a softer version of immigration country.14 Compared to this, current Austrian history and geography textbooks acknowledge reality and integrate scientific arguments in their representations. The main narrative today is that Austria underwent a change from an emigration to an immigration country during the second half of the 20th century as the almost identical wording in one history and one geography textbook – both published in 2006 – shows: “Thirdly, Austria transformed from an emigration to an immigration country. Since the beginning of the 1960s the number of foreign immigrants is on average higher than the number of Austrian emigrants and foreign remigrants. 1 million or 12 percent of the just more than 8 million inhabitants were born abroad, which also constitutes a historical peak” (Achs et al. 2006: 117; c.f. also Wohlschlägl et al. 2006b: 45). This development is described as one of the three major demographic changes in Austria in the 20th century. Referring to Europe in general it has become rather common to depict it as “migrating continent” in both subjects again. The more general meta-narrative that is passed on in the newest books represents migration as a ubiquitous process that is nothing new and, on an individual level, definitely no easy decision. This is made explicit for example in the geography book Durchblick 5 in which the authors write in a chapter on global migration: “Migrations take place all over the world. [...] Migration is a characteristic feature of the history of humanity; migration as well as sedentary societies belong to the human way of life. [...] Not all population groups are able to migrate because they do not possess the financial means to do so. Poor groups of the population are thus not able to move to another continent at all or only by making big sacrifices. They can usually not afford journeys or human smugglers. Because they are particularly flexible and take risks more easily, young adults are most probable to migrate. Those who have families or pos-

sessions are more strongly bound to their home regions. And in the destination country people have to get along with a foreign environment and a foreign language” (Wohlschlägl et al. 2005: 34).15

While labour immigration only inhabits a very small spot in the cultural memory of the country, the story of Austria as an asylum country is an uncontested part of the historical consciousness.16 This self-perception originates in the time of the Cold War when Austria was one of the major receiving countries for refugees from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. That many of these refugees did not settle in Austria but used it only as a transit country is another story, seldom told. Textbooks in the sample refer to the refugee immigration of that time rather matter-of-factly, but with a proud undertone. It is a story of numbers and of naturally provided help. Spuren der Zeit 8 gives one example: “Austria received approximately 160 000 [sic] Hungarian refugees and provided the help that was needed” (Schröckenfuchs et al. 1992: 105).17

It has been explicated before that there are a number of differences between geography and history textbooks when it comes to the representations of migration in general and immigration to Austria in particular. Despite these differences they have a lot in common as well, when it comes to the construction of immigration narratives and processes of defining immigrant subjects. One common feature is the depiction of immigration and immigrants as a problem. This representation can be found in the textbooks already in the 1970s when the authors of SEYDLITZ summarized with reference to the situation in Germany that “the growing need for labour and the immigration of foreign workers [Fremdarbeiter in the original] gave rise to many social and settlement problems” (Scheidl et al. 1971: 42-43), but it becomes much stronger later on. In the 1980s, geography textbooks refer directly to ‘guest workers’ as a problem. Ebner and Hauser write in 1985 that “[a]nyhow, in the long run guest workers brought a number of problems for the countries that had called them” (1985: 157).

Especially since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the problem discourse has been strongly connected to refugee migration, undocumented migration and how the nation state but also Europe can respond to so-called asylum abuse. It is the narrative of the nation state that has to react on outer developments in order to maintain stability and order. One of the most explicit political reactions to this perceived endangering of the nation state in Austria is the so-called Assistenzeinsatz (border security deployment) of the Austrian military to support the border control of the eastern borders recently prolonged until the end of 2009, despite all the neighbouring countries having joined the Schengen system. The main reason for the approval of this Assistenzeinsatz was to cut down the number of asylum seekers and so-called economic refugees (Bauböck and Perching 2006: 733). These political developments and the public discourse around them are reflected in the textbooks as well, when for example the authors of the history textbook Zeitbilder 8 let us know that the Austrian government was not prepared for the “new and increasingly difficult situation with
respect to foreigners.” But “[s]ince 1990 they have tried to better regulate the problems of immigration by means of several new laws” (Wald et al. 1997: 156). This can be interpreted as an indication of what Thomas Höhne concluded as a central point for their textbook study in Germany; that discourses in textbooks and public discourses on migration clearly interact and strengthen each other (2000: 40).

However, Austrian immigration and asylum regulations as well as their counterparts at the level of the European Union are not undisputed in the textbooks. Some are rather critical of the respective laws and policies. But this is again something that has changed considerably during the last three decades. In the 1980s, the story of the ‘guest worker’ recruitment as told in the textbooks had nothing to do with politics (compare e.g. Ebner and Hauser 1985: 157, Ebner and Hauser 1986: 87). Current textbooks refer to immigration as a highly contested policy field in Austria as well as at the level of the European Union and do not only inform the readers about regulations and policies but also include critical positions. Some abandon the neutral position completely and even take the side of the immigrants. This is the case for example when the authors of Durchblick 6 critically mention that “[t]he foreclosure of the EU against unwelcome refugees has the effect that migrants ever more often use people smugglers” (Wohlschlägl et al. 2006: 84). It is not the migrants who are criminalised here; what is being questioned are the strategies of the European Union and the member countries. This position is quite different from the public mainstream discourse in Austria where the depiction of asylum seekers as criminals is very frequent. Here, the authors introduce a counter narrative to the mainstream narrative on immigration, a counter narrative which is usually mainly constructed by NGOs and critical migration researchers.

However, immigration is not only portrayed as problematic and threatening but also as beneficial. Especially geography textbooks tell the story of (mutual) benefits, like Ebner and Hauser in the 1980s: “Guest workers had a significant share in the resurgence of the European industry, the development of tourism businesses and the expansion of public infrastructure. […] On the other hand, many guest workers were able to build houses with their savings, secure their livelihoods in their countries of origin or provide better living conditions for their families” (1985: 157). A positive depiction of immigration goes hand in hand with economic argumentation. It is the national (or the EU) economy that needs immigrants as labourers. A very new development that can be traced in the textbooks is the depiction of refugees and asylum seekers as a possible asset for the immigration societies. Also, deskilling processes and brain waste are newly introduced, pertinent topics. “It is very often forgotten that many refugees from Asia or Africa are among the elites of their nations and might be very useful for the labour market of the receiving countries – after the necessary language education and integration. Hence, immigration can often be a chance for the stimulation of the economic and social wealth of the receiving country” (Wohlschlägl et al. 2006a: 86). In addition to the economy there is another field of society where immigration to Austria is not portrayed as a problem but as beneficial or even as a problem solver – the demographic development. ‘We’ (the Austrian society) need immigrants to balance ‘our’ aging population, to ensure ‘our’ welfare system, to finance ‘our’ future pensions.

The construction of immigrants in textbooks

Let me continue with a short investigation of the question how immigrants are discursively constructed in the textbooks I have analysed. Central to the discussion on immigration in Austrian textbooks – and also, more generally in Austria – is the term fremd. Even if the name Fremdarbeiter completely vanished as a discursive representation for immigrants in the course of the 1970s, the terms fremd/fremde/diefremde are still used and meaningful. In a chapter on prejudices in a geography textbook in which the authors clearly make an effort to challenge stereotypes and clichés they nevertheless abundantly use the expression Fremde/r. “Did you ever ask yourself the question how you treat foreigners [Fremde] in your environment or how foreigners [Fremde] are generally treated in Austria? And who actually is a foreigner [Fremder] in your conception? Can you think of more positive or more negative examples in connection with foreigners [Fremden]? Are their foreigners [Fremde] in your class?” (Klappacher/Lieb 2006: 39).

What constitutes ‘the foreign’ is made clear for example in the geography textbook Planquadrat Erde, published in 1994. The foreigners (who can be “refugees, asylum seekers, guest workers, and so on”) are “people who look different, dress different, talk different and behave different” (Fischer et al. 1994: 81). It is a cultural difference that is constructed, depicting autochthonous Austrians as the norm and immigrants as deviating from this norm. Fischer et al. continue on the next page with the question “Will we [the national ‘we’] be able to tolerate that they [the immigrants] dress differently, eat, live, think differently?” (ibid: 83). Various constructions are at work here. Firstly, immigrants are defined as culturally different. Secondly, they are also represented as a homogenous group without individual biographies. Immigrants themselves are very seldom given a name and a voice, for example by using interviews. Thirdly, not only immigrants but also Austrians are depicted as a homogenous group, and last but not least, we see the “smallest” words at work that are crucial for the “daily flagging of the nation,” according to Michael Billig (1995: 94).

It still seems to be inevitable to use the dichotomous discourse of ‘we’ and ‘the others’ when it comes to the representation of immigrants and Austrians in contemporary textbooks. Even a rather critical, reflective and scientifically up-to-date geography book like Durchblick 7 introduces its chapter on immigration to Austria with the headline “The ‘other’ Austrians” (Wohlschlägl et al. 2006b: 54). The quotation marks might signal a critical usage of the term, but as there is no fur-
ther discussion on the topic in the whole chapter this is merely an interpretation. The authors distance themselves from their own construction, however, and the question of whether the memorable headline is more important than the message conveyed, or whether the headline is the actual message remains open. Looking at the three pictures which are integrated in the four pages of the same chapter we get a deeper knowledge of who these “other Austrians” supposedly are. In the first picture we see two male workers in overalls, standing in front of a Turkish supermarket during a break, both of them of Turkish origin. The picture is labelled “guest workers in Austria” (Wohlschlägl et al. 2006b: 55). In the centre of the second photograph is a signpost promoting a restaurant in a popular recreation area in Vienna with the words “Döner Kebab. Oriental cuisine.” (ibid: 56). In their description of the picture the authors interpret the Turkish restaurant which the picture shows as a sign of a multicultural society. The third photo on the same page features immigrant families (mainly women and small children) sitting on a lawn in a park or another public area. All women with migrant background – there is only one man in the group – are wearing headscarves. Intentionally or not, stereotypical pictures of Turkish immigrants (and their descendants) have been chosen to represent the “other Austrians”: the Turkish ‘guest workers’ who are employed in un- or less qualified jobs and their wives who supposedly adhere to obsolete traditions and outdated and patriarchal family models. This depiction also corresponds to the public discourse in Austria in which Turkish immigrants and their families are frequently used as example of a group of immigrants who have “difficulties” in integrating into the Austrian society.

What is rather common in the textbooks is on the one hand the depiction of pupils with a migrant background as typical representatives of ‘the foreign’ and using them as teaching material to exemplify topics introduced in the text. On the other hand, they are frequently ignored and excluded not only from the Austrian ‘we’ but also from the community of their autochthonous classmates like an example from the history textbook Zeitbilder 8 shows. The authors did apparently not even think of the possibility that migrant children might be part of their audience when they address a class in the following way: “Foreign pupils in our schools – obstacle or enrichment? What is your opinion on that point and on the integration of foreign pupils?”(Wald et al. 1997: 157; my italics). The book has been approbated and published in 1997. The subjects they speak to are clearly autochthonous Austrians who are asked to discuss whether their fellow classmates – the objects – are an enrichment or a problem.

Concluding remarks

I began the discussion in this paper by stating that the very rich (im)migration history of Europe has not yet found entrance into historiography and the collective memories of European nation states. I further argued that non-representation might be the model that applies best to the Austrian situation. Textbooks which are interpreted as one manifestation of the cultural memory of a country and as publicly and socially accepted knowledge have been chosen for the empirical investigation.

The analysis clearly shows that the Austrian migration history and migration issues in general have not played a very prominent role in the curricula and the textbooks for a long time. Non-representation has been the prevalent model. It can be argued that this prolonged marginalization of the topic in the education material corresponds to its exclusion from the constitutive narratives of post World War II Austria in general. The story of the common effort to rehabilitate Austria, the myth of the consensual republic in which controversial policy issues have been settled between social partners (mainly the Austrian federation of trade unions and the Chamber of Commerce) and governments, the perpetual neutrality – all of them are narratives that are centring on reconciliation, consensus and the homogeneity of the young nation state. A national consciousness developed only slowly after the World War II. (Im)migration on the other hand challenges this construction of homogeneity and a heterogeneous society is easily interpreted as a threat to a young nation. Moreover, Austria has a long tradition of marginalizing and excluding multiculti- nism and multiple identities. To a certain extent, this tradition lives on also in the textbooks in which concepts like multiculturalism or diversity have hardly ever been mentioned during the last four decades, or they are only slowly finding their way into the curricula.

Since the 1990s, migration issues have been integrated into the teaching canon and gained importance. Today, virtually all geography and history textbooks make some reference to migration. The pertinent question is no longer whether migration history is part of textbook knowledge but which migration histories are narrated and how migrants are represented. A central finding of the analysis in this respect concerns the similarities between discourses on migration in textbooks and public discourses on the topic in Austria. This pertains especially to the depiction of immigration as a problem and the construction of immigrants as a problem group. This ‘problem discourse’ is not only a long-time characteristic of public and political debates on the topic in Austria but also frequently encountered in the textbooks. Another similarity between the public and the textbook discourse is the depiction of immigrants as ‘the others’ [Fremde] who are not included in the national ‘we’ (of autochthonous Austrians), even if they are naturalized citizens or have been born in the country.

Even though the public discourse or the discourse in the textbooks can no longer be described as uniform or one-sided, but as multilayered, immigration in general is still a topic with negative connotations in the Austrian context, frequently connected to criminality and security issues. A more positive (re) interpretation of immigration and an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous society requires the recognition of the long and rich migration history of the country and the fact that Austria has been an immigration country for the last centuries. Equally important is the integration of the Austrian emigration
history in historiography and the official memory landscape. The inclusion of these emigration stories which are largely missing in the textbooks as well, might also help to interpret migrations as a constant feature of human lives, a strategy not only utilised by ‘the others’ who want to immigrate to ‘our’ country but also by the average man and woman we meet in the street day by day.

Bibliography


Soysal, Yasemin N. et al. (2005) ‘Projections of Identity in French and German History and Civics Textbooks’, in

Cited Textbooks

Notes
1 In the following the general term migration (immigration and emigration) includes labour migration as well as refugee/forced migration. This broad understanding also comprises expellees like ethnic Germans even if they would not define themselves as migrants. For a discussion of possible reasons for the integration of flight and expulsion in the German migration history see e.g. Ohliger 2005.
2 From a historical perspective it should be mentioned that the negative interpretation of the principle of ius sanguinis prevalent in today’s literature has to be evaluated a bit different for periods in the past (c.f. Gosewinkel 2005, Mommsen 2001). I would also like to point to the fact that the dominance of ius sanguinis over ius soli in Germany as well as Austria “only” developed during the 19th century.
3 All translations from German by the author.
4 http://www.tate.org.uk/research/tatere-search/majorprojects/tate-encounters/
5 The project “Migration & Memory: Representations of Migration in Europe since 1960” was developed at the Ludwig Boltzmann-
Institute for European History and Public Spheres in Vienna (http://ehp.lbg.ac.at) and carried out together with the Democracy Centre Vienna in Austria and Malmö University in Sweden. An anthology comprising Austrian and Swedish articles as well as contributions from an international conference that has been organised in November 2008 in Malmö is due to be published in autumn 2009.

Another focus of the overall project which is not included in this contribution is the analysis of discourses and narratives on the topics of migration and integration dominant in the majority societies in a historic perspective.

Curricula in Austria are national curricula; they are effective for the individual school types and school years for the whole country. Basically every student of a special school type should learn the same. Note however that curricula for upper secondary schools are organised as so-called framing curricula (Rahmenlehrpläne) which distinguish between compulsory and optional topics.

Since the school year 1995/96 parents have had to pay 10 percent of the costs themselves.

The selected school years are 1977/78, 1987/88, 1997/98 and 2007/2008. I added the year 1973/74 as this is the year when the list of textbooks (Schulbuchliste) was introduced.


There are considerable differences between the textbooks of the two subjects is not only true for Austria as the analysis of my colleague Vanja Lozic from the University of Malmö for Sweden shows. He investigated history and civic textbooks.

One exception is the Green Party that is making it very clear that “Austria is an immigration country and needs immigration” (http://www.gruene.at/uploads/media/Migrationsfolder_2006.pdf). The freedom party on the other hand still argues that “Austria is no immigration country” (http://vivahc.fpoe.at/Handbuch-freiheitlicher-Politik_web.pdf).

During the last election campaign in September 2008 Wilhelm Molterer, the then vice chancellor and leader of the Austrian people’s party made the point that “We are no unrestricted Zuwanderungsland” during a TV-confrontation with the leader of the Green Party Alexander Van der Bellen (http://www.orf.at/080918-9641/?href=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.orf.at%2F080918-29641%2FEF%2FEF%2F29642txt_story.html).


A publication of the federal news service in 1981 refers for instance to Austria as one of “the biggest and most important relay station of refugee and emigration movements since the end of World War II” (1981: 5, cited after Heiss/Rathkolb 1995). Sedlak refers in her study on the ethnic discourse in the Austrian parliament in the 1990s to the “myth of the ‘Austrian golden heart’” (2000: 118) which is put forward in parliamentary speeches in the context of Austrian asylum policy. She gives one example of a speech by Franz Vranitzky, the Austrian chancellor at that time: “Whenever and wherever people have been in need or had to fly from wars, Austria and the Austrian population proved to be helpful, liberal and generous; in the case of the Hungarian Uprising in the 1950s as well as after the invasion of the Soviet Troops in the Czech Republic in the 1960s” (2000: 118).


During the last election campaign for the Austrian Parliament in 2008 the Freedom Party for instance used the slogan “Asylbetrug heißt Heimatflug” on their election posters, implying that asylum seekers are no ‘real refugees’ but frauds who have to be deported.


Bold by the author.

Teppo Kröger & Minna Zechner

Migration and Care: Giving and Needing Care across National Borders

Introduction: the close connections between migration and care

Emigration and immigration are phenomena as old as history but the accelerating globalisation has made international migration visibly present in practically all nations and regions, bringing with it global and local social transformations as well as novel challenges for national welfare states. While both migration and welfare states have been popular research topics for a long time, the same cannot be said about their intersection (Timonen & Doyle 2009: 157). In particular, discussions concerning patterns of migration in connection to patterns of care have gained researchers’ attention only within the last ten years. Care refers here to activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional requirements of children and adults (Daly & Lewis 2000: 285). These activities are mainly understood as responsibilities of families and welfare states. This article aims to outline the different ways how the two major social issues of migration and care are, particularly under the ongoing worldwide ageing of the population, closely interrelated and argue for an analysis that focuses simultaneously on both.

According to Penninx et al. (2008: 3), the categories and channels of immigration are nowadays extremely diverse and as a result ‘a new geography of migration’ has developed. It is not only colonial, labour and refugee migration that takes place, people who are moving are characterised above all by their heterogeneity and ‘super-diversity’. For example, Europe or the Western world is not the sole target of immigration; huge numbers of people are moving, for example, from one African country to another or between Asia and Africa and South America for diverse reasons. However, the European debate on migration tends to focus on African and Asian people or people from the former socialist countries moving into western parts of Europe and on the social consequences of their entrance for European nation states. This discussion is often focused on whether or not European economies need the labour force of foreign-born people, seen as commodified labour market objects. One part of the labour market in Western societies that has increasingly sought after migrant workforce during the last decades is care work. Public and private employers as well as private households are looking abroad in their search for employees to provide care in particular for children and older people. The movement of female care workers from less wealthy parts of the world to more affluent countries has become a remarkable element of global migration (e.g. Hochschild 2000, 2003; Yeates 2009).

However, migrating people are not just labour force. They have lives and families of their own. Migration touches more and more families all over the globe and all of them are faced by questions concerning care: when migration separates family members geographically from one another, how can care and support be provided and maintained for those who need it, that is, children as well as older and/or disabled family members? It has even been said that care is a pivotal issue in both affecting the decision to migrate and in shaping transnational life (Ackers 2004: 374). Skilled migrating professionals are often better resourced to arrange care for their family members than less skilled labour migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (e.g. Kofman 2000; Salaff & Greve 2004). Many families find themselves in situations where, despite of difficulties, it is necessary to provide ‘transnational care’, that is, care for family members across national borders (see e.g. Baldassar et al. 2007; Lunt 2009; Zechner 2008). Absence of the members of working age generations is especially problematic in societies where the care of children, disabled and
older persons depends mainly on the family and public systems for care are not available (van der Geest et al. 2004: 444).

Even if families move together, the care needs of family members may prove difficult to satisfy within the new social setting of the country of immigration. The availability of care services depends fundamentally on the welfare regime of the country; for example, it makes a major difference whether public services are available for all residents free of charge or if every family needs to purchase their services from the private market. Even if services are available for the native population, this does not necessarily guarantee that they are there also for the migrant population. Care-giving within the family itself faces new challenges when it is performed in a new cultural context and within different parameters of the welfare state.

This article explores recent literature addressing the various connections between migration and care. This body of work has only emerged during the 2000s, as research on migration and research on care have traditionally been separate from each other. The former has concentrated primarily on the movement of people and on the integration and/or exclusion of migrant populations within receiving Western societies, while the latter has focused mostly on national, formal and informal care systems and on the care needs of native populations. It is only during this decade that new kinds of perspectives have emerged, addressing both of these major social phenomena of contemporary societies at the same time. The article focuses particularly on research on care for older people, but as childcare faces many similar issues and is also otherwise intertwined with other kinds of care giving, it is not excluded from the discussion.

Table 1 aims to collect together a range of connections between migration and care. Formal care is given and received within social services and to some extent also health services, which are organised by public bodies, private companies or non-governmental actors. The possible roles that migrant populations may have within formal care systems include working in the sector, using care services and organising them for family members. Grey market care resembles both informal and formal care as it may be informal by its character but it can take place also within the formal care sector. Grey market care is characterised by unofficial arrangements and payments that take place outside the taxation system as well as by the need to hide the arrangement from the public eye. Migrants may provide, use or arrange the services in the grey market. Informal family care refers to care given and received in the familial context. It is given to family members close to the caregiver, mostly without pay, but compensation in cash or in kind is sometimes offered. On the other hand, informal care can also be seen as a form of (mostly unpaid) work and intertwined with the productive economic sphere. Migrants give, receive or organise also this kind of assistance, both in the country of immigration and in the country of origin.

Most of the recent literature that addresses both migration and care focuses on migrant care workers in the formal sector (cell 1) and in the grey market (cell 2) and increasingly also on transnational family care (cell 9). Fewer studies have looked into migrants as people who need and receive care (cells 4, 5 and 6). While this article concentrates on the most researched interconnections between care and migration, we try, however, to say a few words about other possible care roles within migrant populations.

### Giving formal care in the country of immigration

Care work is labour-intensive and due to demographic changes, the demand for formal care services is currently increasing. A large number of countries are facing difficulties in recruiting staff in particular for care work with older people, because care work is generally undervalued, low-paid and physically as well as mentally demanding (see e.g. Kröger et al. 2009). As one strategy, many countries have started to recruit personnel from abroad to work in the formal care work sector. It has been estimated, for example, that the National Health Service in England would collapse without immigrant nurses and doctors. In welfare states where the role of public social care services remains small, like in the United States, migrant care workers are employed mostly by private companies. In welfare states where public services play a more important role in the long-term care system, like in the Nordic countries, migrants may be attracted primarily to work within the public care services. Nevertheless, the growing private social care sector is recruiting new staff also in these countries.

| Table 1. Connections between migration and care and different care roles of migrant populations. |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Giving care in the country**                               | **Needing care in the country**                               | **Arranging care in the country**                             |
| **of immigration**                                           | **of immigration**                                           | **of origin (transnational care)**                            |
| Formal care                                                  | care workers                                                 | care service users                                            |
| Grey market care                                            | grey market care workers                                     | grey market care users                                        |
| Informal family care                                         | family carers                                                | family care receivers                                         |
|                                                            | (1)                                                         | (4)                                                         |
|                                                            | (2)                                                         | (5)                                                         |
|                                                            | (3)                                                         | (6)                                                         |
|                                                            | (7)                                                         | (8)                                                         |
|                                                            | (9)                                                         |                                                             |
On a global scale, Elizabetta Zontini (2007) investigates the connection between the emergence of today’s transnational families and the growing demand for care for ‘first world’ families. These care jobs tend to be filled by ‘third world’ women who provide cheap and flexible care services. Migrant women often need to leave their own families behind and thus the care patterns of Western and Eastern/Southern families become closely linked with each other. Arlie Russell Hochschild (2000 & 2003) has famously coined this phenomenon as ‘global care chains’, drawing attention to the global transfer of care work, which moves to rich countries from poorer countries that are left to face ‘care drain’. In this case, work is moving from the third to the first world – unlike in industrial production – as ‘while factories can be relocated abroad, the personal nature of care services requires that labour be imported to the site of service delivery’ (Yeates 2004: 93).

There are countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka that openly promote the export of care and domestic workers. A few years ago the Philippines, called also ‘the migrant nursery’ or ‘empire of care’, alone provided domestic workers to about 160 countries all over the world – including not just the United States and many European nations but also wealthy Asian countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Arab Emirates (Hillman 2005: 93.) In addition to South (East) Asia, sending states include many countries in South and Central America (like Ecuador) and Eastern Europe (like Bulgaria and Romania). These countries are all characterised by high levels of unemployment and a weak general economic situation. Their wage levels are so low that even grey market domestic work abroad brings a more generous income than local employment. In such a situation care workers have become an export good enhancing local economies through substantive amounts of remittances sent back home by the migrating women (Choy 2006). For receiving countries, using migrant labour in the care sector has resulted in a ‘more efficient’ way of providing care – as social, educational and emotional costs of this kind of provision have been left to the countries of origin and to the migrants themselves (Hillman 2005: 107).

Martha Doyle and Virpi Timonen (2009: 338) have recently done a study on the experiences of care workers who have moved to Ireland from Europe, Africa and South Asia. In Ireland, the employment of foreign care workers is a rather new phenomenon, but in a short time migrant carers are said to have contributed to “a rapid transformation of the long-term care workforce” (ibid, 339). As a result, immigration has now become “a core component of Ireland’s social care policy” (Timonen & Doyle 2009: 159). According to Doyle and Timonen, negative experiences of care work are common especially among African care workers who have faced higher levels of prejudice, racism and discrimination at their workplace than other migrant groups. Their findings thus resemble those of Joann McGregor (2007) who found that people who migrate from Zimbabwe to Britain often end in low-status and poorly paid care work in strongly feminised and racialised workplaces, facing abuse and labour exploitation. Also Jean Pyle (2006) has shown how women who migrate from lower income regions and countries to provide domestic services, childcare and health services to households in higher income areas encounter a range of economic, social and political abuses that involve discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality, class, religion and age. Pyle calls this ‘the flip side of globalisation’.

In the Irish study also South East Asian carers had confronted different obstacles and discriminatory or exploitative work practices, while care workers who had migrated from European countries were quite satisfied with and optimistic about their working conditions. All migrant care workers were satisfied with having secure employment and a regular income. The authors conclude that in the future, a growing demand for migrant women who are willing to work at the minimum wage level (or for less) is likely to be generated in Europe for several reasons, including the greater emphasis placed on ageing at home, community care services and the introduction of cash-for-care benefits. They state that the emergence of a more unequal and segmented long-term care workforce is “virtually inevitable” (Doyle & Timonen 2009; Timonen & Doyle 2009.)

Jeannette Laurén and Sirpa Wrede (2008) have been among the first researchers in Finland to raise questions about the recruitment of foreign care workers as a solution to the threatening labour shortage. In the Finnish context this development is currently at an early phase and the number of migrant workers within care work remains low. However, the first incomers have already experienced ethnic hierarchies and unequal treatment at the workplace. It is common that tasks considered as “dirty work” are delegated downwards in the occupational hierarchy, ending up at migrant care workers (Twigg 2000: 145). Like Doyle and Timonen in Ireland, also Laurén and Wrede forecast unwelcome ethnic hierarchies within the care workforce and a development where work tasks as well as opportunities in care work are assigned along ethnic lines.

Yet, Zontini (2007) has warned that speaking about global care chains may stigmatisate transnational families in general and migrant women in particular. She has also argued that children of transnational families are actually not abandoned as mothers continue to provide emotional and financial support and have arranged some other close person to care for the children. Instead of stigmatising these arrangements, new policies should be invented to support them. Nicola Yeates (2009: 7) has criticised the global care chain concept of portraying migrant women as victims of circumstances beyond their control. She argues that instead of being mere victims, migrant care workers have choices in their lives because they possess an international tradable skill in which there is a global shortage and which provides them a ‘passport’ to a wide number of countries around the world (ibid: 3). On the other hand, not all migrants working in the care sector have migrated for this specific purpose. Care work is a low-paid and low-valued occupation (England 2005: 382; Isaksen 2003: 190) and for many it represents only an entrance job.
Giving grey market care in the country of immigration

Grey market care refers to care work which is paid outside the formal economy thus avoiding taxes and social insurance fees. It also means that none of the parties involved are insured against unexpected events like accidents, illnesses, mistreatment or unemployment. In those welfare states where care for older people rests mainly on families and where public services are scarcely available, grey market care often blooms. This arrangement is common for example in Italy and Austria. In these countries formal services are few and most support to those needing care is given as cash benefits. When there is little monitoring linked to the use of these cash benefits and an available pool of migrant care workers, benefits are used to buy care from the grey market (Da Roit 2007; Egger de Campo 2007; Gori & Da Roit 2007).

The arrangement may be seen as benefiting both parties. The person in need of care benefits of getting 24-hour care at her or his home for the price that no company can beat. On the other hand, informal grey market employment may also be compatible with migrant networks and the strategies of migrant groups. Migrating women receive jobs that pay better than the ones in their countries of origin and living with the older person solves the problem of accommodation. Employment in the formal sector involves lengthy and bureaucratic procedures that are avoided when taking up grey market care work. Some migrating women are looking only for a temporary job and informal contracts are more flexible concerning the length of stay. Furthermore, if there already are ties between the local level of departure and the local level of arrival, migration and employment may take place rather smoothly (Hillman 2005: 106-107).

There are, however, many risks involved. The care worker receives no protection against occupational risks or against abusive behaviour from the older person or from other members of the employer family. There is no employment security either, no pensions accumulate, the job may be lost in an instant and the salary may just not arrive. There are also risks for the older person: a risk of abusive behaviour from the care worker and the possibility to lose the carer if she simply decides not to continue in her job. A rapidly growing body of research has been done recent years on this specific type of care work (e.g. Anderson 2001; Andall 2003; Bettio et al. 2006; Degiuli 2007; Hillman 2005; Lutz 2008; von Kondratowitz 2005).

As an example, Timonen and Doyle (2008) have interviewed eight migrants working in Ireland in “the informal care sector,” in other words, grey market domiciliary care. These care workers had arrived mostly from South East Asia (predominantly from the Philippines) and had loosely defined employment contracts, often no written contract at all. However, these live-in workers were expected to be flexible with respect to working hours and work tasks, to the extent that they felt obliged to provide care round-the-clock. There were no standards for their working conditions and the care workers were prone to be exploited, partly because they did not have a work permit or because of their illegal status as immigrants. Doyle and Timonen call for regulation and standard-setting within this live-in care work sector.

Another, an even more archetypical case of using grey market migrant care work on a grand scale is Italy. Francesca Degiuli (2007) has stated that Italian women are no longer capable or willing to offer assistance to older people but at the same time, they are reluctant to send their relatives to institutional care. As the Italian welfare state has not constructed an extensive home-based care service system, families have started to employ foreign home-care workers (badanti or colf) on a massive scale. It has been estimated that already in 2002 there were around half a million migrants working for Italian families (Bettio et al. 2006: 279). The question is mostly of undeclared grey market care work where working conditions and remuneration levels are not regulated. As a result, wage levels vary greatly, between 450 € and 1500 € per month (Degiuli 2007: 194). Those with the lowest wages have often entered the country illegally and as soon as they receive a residence permit, they will try to find a better job. Barbara Da Roit (2007) argues that grey market employment relations in Italy are characterised by low pay, conflicts and underprotection as there is very little regulation or formalisation of this sector. Working times tend to extend far beyond regular schedules and little privacy is granted to live-in carers. Some migrant women Da Roit interviewed described their position simply as “slavery”.

Francesca Bettio and her colleagues (2006: 281) highlight that the Italian attendance allowance (indennità di accompagnamento) has encouraged middle and even working class families to use migrant care labour. Combined with the traditional family-centred care model and a widespread aversion to institutionalisation, migrant carers have become the answer for families with older members, particularly in Northern and Central Italy and in large metropolitan areas. Families now provide the coordination but the actual care work is entrusted to female migrants. Migrant carers have arrived to Italy from the Philippines and Sri Lanka as well as from Peru but more recently there have been increasing flows of women also from Eastern European countries like Romania and Ukraine. Bettio et al. (2006: 282-283) conclude that the long-term sustainability of the model is conditional on the continuous flow of inexpensive female migrant labour that is caused by a lack of work opportunities in the countries of origin. On the other hand, there are alternative views on the case of Italy. Asher D. Colombo (2007: 209-211) claims that most of the paid domestic workers in Italy are not foreigners at all. In any case, there is a certain sector of domestic service where migrant workers dominate: live-in carers for older or disabled people (ibid. 212).

Needing care in the country of immigration

Migrant people, like others, do age and face illnesses and impairments which can lead to a need for care. Refugee and asylum seeker groups also include many older and disabled
people (Strumpf et al. 2001). In the United Kingdom it has been noticed that for South Asian migrants the likelihood to face occupational hazards and illnesses and to get injured actually increases faster with age than for the native population (Arber & Ginn 1992: 620–622; Ingebretsen & Eriksen 2004). However, in several countries like Sweden and Norway it has been found that migrants use public care services more seldom than the native population. This may be caused by discrepancies in the understanding of care and need between migrants and those working in the formal care services (Ekman et al. 1998; Moen 2002 & 2003). The norms of the migrants and those working in the formal care services discrepancies in the understanding of care and need between seldom than the native population. This may be caused by discrepancies in the understanding of care and need between migrants and those working in the formal care services (Ekman et al. 1998; Moen 2002 & 2003). The norms of the new country are often in contradiction with the culture and ways of thinking of older migrants, and these conflicts become visible when applying for or using formal services. It seems that the more integrated the migrant person is in the country of immigration, the more willing and able s/he is to use care services (Forssell 2003 & 2004; Mortensen 2003). On the other hand, access to formal care services depends on the legal status of migrant groups. Furthermore, compared with the native population migrant families have usually less cultural capital and language skills that are needed to get services to help with informal caring (Braun et al. 1996; Jones et al. 2002; Kröger 2004). As a result, among migrant groups, there is often an increased prevalence of family care (Arber & Ginn 1992: 620–622; Ingebretsen & Eriksen 2004).

One of the very few studies on family care arrangements among the migrant population in Finland is Hilkka Linderborg’s (2008) analysis of the experiences of those carers who have moved to the country from the former Soviet Union. All of the twelve Russian-speaking family carers interviewed provided assistance to a family member with dementia. The carers lived on meagre incomes and it was found out that due to language difficulties, migrant carers had not received adequate information about available services. They felt that local authorities were offering this information to migrants only sparingly.

In another study from Finland, Minna Zechner (2002) interviewed Estonian and Chinese working families who live in Finland about the ways they organise care for their children and older family members. She noticed the same as Linderborg: finding out about existing services and benefits is a complicated task as information in English is scarce (not to speak of other non-native languages). However, child care proved out to be mostly unproblematic, arranged within the publicly organised and universally available day-care system in the same way as native Finnish families. Caring for older family members was more complicated, as the services were not easily available and many had their parents in the country of origin. In a few cases migrant people provided extensive family care in Finland and this was made possible by cutting down working hours or using flexible work hours. Zechner emphasises that in order to receive care services, gaining information about them is not enough, it is also necessary to know how to explain one’s own needs to those who allocate services.

On the other hand, Neil Lunt (2009: 248–249) has noticed in New Zealand that if families reunite and the ageing parents follow their children, moving to the country of their immigration, they may end up being isolated and depending solely on their children who, on the other hand, may be working long hours. As a result, the parents’ care expectations may not match those of their children. Furthermore, culturally sensitive care services are often not available for older migrants, which limits the options of migrant families making care arrangements.

There is plenty of research about family care-giving among different ethnic groups in the US. For example, Patricia Jones and her colleagues (2002) have interviewed Asian American women who are carers of their family members. They found that providing family care in a foreign environment involves many difficulties. Commitment to Asian values, in particular to filial piety, while living in the US creates conflicting world-views and competing role demands, resulting multiple paradoxes for the care-givers. On the other hand, Pei-Chia Lan (2002: 816) has found that power dynamics between Chinese immigrant adult children and their older parents change, not only due to caregiving but also as a result of immigration. The parental authority is weakening since in a new country parents need assistance with daily affairs as they have little language knowledge and they may not drive. Also the material base of parental authority has diminished in the context of immigration.

Families may experience cultural, financial and language barriers to use community care services, and as a consequence many of them end up providing care entirely on their own. At the same time, many carers have to work full-time in order to secure financial support for the family. Nevertheless, the study by Jones et al. concludes that in spite of the difficulties associated with balancing between two cultures and combining caring and working, the interviewed care-givers were able to find ways to manage their situations and to integrate the care-giving role into their lives (Jones et al. 2002). Those with sufficient resources may maintain the strong norm of filial piety by recruiting home care workers as fictive kin. Instead, placing a parent in a nursing home may be seen as a violation of the filial norm (Lan 2002: 813, 831).

Less researched than family care are the grey market care arrangements that migrant families themselves may have. This is an obvious gap in research. It may be assumed that older migrants rely on informal grey market care work especially if they for some reason do not have access to family care and if welfare services are not available or they do not match with the migrant’s cultural background or understanding of proper care. If the older migrant belongs to a strong ethnic community, grey market care services may be easily available through the networks of the community. However, research knowledge available on this matter is very limited.

One specific issue that also connects care and migration is the emerging phenomenon of retirement migration and, its more short term version, care tourism. Retirement migration has increased in scale both in Europe and in the United States as relatively healthy and wealthy couples migrate in their fifties and sixties in search for more attractive weather, social
activities, for financial reasons, or to maintain contacts with relatives (Casado-Diaz et al. 2004: 360). Many of these retiree migrants do however return to their country of origin after bereavement or at the onset of chronic or severe illness or disability. Lack of family support and health and social care services in the country of immigration are most likely reasons for the return migration in these cases (Gustafson 2001; Legido-Quigley & La Parra 2007; Warnes et al. 1999).

On the other hand, there is also some indication of specific migration for reasons related to social care. For example, overseas nursing homes have been established in Spain for retired Norwegians or Britons. In Kenya, some hotels have been converted into care homes for Africans, retiring and returning from the United Kingdom, and there are also examples in Thailand and the Philippines of care apartments that are marketed to older people in Japan. Need for care and especially for health care may also evoke temporary international mobility in the form of medical tourism, which typically refers to patients travelling abroad for surgical operations. Popular destinations for medical tourism include countries like Thailand, Singapore, India and South Africa. The direction of movement in care migration and medical tourism is from more to less affluent countries (Connell 2006).

**Giving and arranging care across borders**

In any kind of society, with a less or more developed welfare state, informal family care is the main form and source of care (Wiener 2003). Family responsibilities are present in all societies and they do not fade away with geographical distance or when crossing the borders of nation states. Older relatives who reside in the country of origin may need help and care and in order to fill this need, people may become involved in transnational caring activities which take place across national borders. Transnational caring activities are especially necessary and prevalent when the older person lives in a country where welfare state structures are weak. Since a great deal of migrant people do come from less developed countries, this kind of a setting is not unusual. Migrant families are aware that there are only few services and cash benefits available for their older relatives and therefore they provide economical and practical support across national borders (Baldassar et al. 2007; Zechner 2007; 2008).

Zontini (2007) traces research on transnational care back to an interest on transnational motherhood in the late 1990s, followed by studies on transnational childhood, transnational fatherhood and transnational partnering. These studies have highlighted the pain of family separations and the following feelings of helplessness and loneliness. Separation due to migration has been showed to be a painful process particularly for children who long for absent parents. Female migration has also brought about difficult negotiations surrounding changing gender roles and family structures. (Dreby 2006; Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2002; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila 1997; Orellana et. al. 2001; Parreñas 2001).

Attention on transnational care for older people is even more recent. According to Zontini (2007), a new scholarship is currently emerging on transnational care-giving, focusing on how caring practices are achieved in spite of geographical distance. This new research is growing in different parts of the world. Intergenerational care relations between older people, their adult children and grandchildren as well as intragenerational care relations among siblings are being addressed by ongoing studies. The main part of this research activity on transnational care comes from immigration societies like the US, Canada and Australia (see Baldassar et al. 2007; Baldock 2005; Landolt & Wei Wei 2005; Treas & Mazumdar 2004; Wilding 2006).

One of the largest studies of this new stream of research is by Loretta Baldassar, Cora Baldock Vellekoop and Raelene Wilding (2007). Focusing on Australia, their study included migrants from Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Singapore as well as refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. Baldassar et al. compared their transnational family lives and analysed the roles of family members as a source of financial, emotional, moral and practical support across geographical distance and national borders. Their study found clear differences between the refugee populations on the one hand and the other migrant groups on the other hand, but it also noticed wide gender, age and class differences. The authors emphasise that the type and frequency of transnational care is affected by a number of factors including kin relationships and family histories, cultural understandings of family obligations and, finally, actual capacities of time, money and visiting possibilities.

New Zealand is another society that is structured by large-scale migration flows both into and out of the country. Lunt (2009) has analysed the consequences of continuous migration on old age policies. The adult children of many middle-aged and third age parents prefer to live and work overseas and, consequently, many people in New Zealand end up lacking close family support in their old age. In this situation social service staff may have to communicate with relatives outside national borders in order to keep them informed and involved. Lunt (2009: 249) states that wealth makes a difference to the opportunities of children to make regular extended visits to their parents. Visiting is further constrained by possible limitations imposed by governments and employers.

Zechner (2008) has studied situations where a migrant living in Finland is helping an older person living in another country. Her findings point out to geographical distance, caring resources of the care-giver and circumstances of the older person as determining elements of transnational care settings. She has also noticed the importance of differing cultures of care, referring to norms and social structures that shape the organisation of care, and of national social policies that can either enable or hinder transnational caring activities. The cultural dimension becomes actualised in situations where the migrant her/himself or the older person has difficulties in accepting some aspects of the foreign culture of care. On the other hand, social policies that could help the older person to cope in the
country of origin may simply not exist or are not known or available. Moreover, those migrants who are receiving welfare benefits may face restrictions for travelling. Thus, current welfare policies may act as a hindrance for transnational caring.

Tracey Reynolds and Elisabetta Zontini (2006) have compared caring in Caribbean and Italian families living in Britain. They found a number of similarities between the two groups, concerning for example visits to the country of origin and regular long distance telephone calls. In both Italian and Caribbean families care was an everyday activity in which all the people interviewed were involved in some way or another. The ways in which care was allocated within families proved out to be more openly negotiated among Caribbean families, whereas in Italian families the allocation was done in a more implicit and prescribed way. Geographical distance did not necessarily influence the decision to care but it did affect the negotiation of moral boundaries and care obligations. In organising care for their family members, Caribbean and Italian migrants relied also on extensive networks of community groups and associations, extending their care arrangements beyond the family.

Bettio et al. (2006: 280) have brought up a specific form of migration which makes it possible for some people to combine (grey market) care work in the country of immigration with family care responsibilities in the country of origin: rotational migration. In this form of migration, a migrant woman enters the receiving country often with a temporary tourist visa, works as a carer in an older person’s home for a few months and then returns back to her home to care for her own family members while somebody else takes over the care work in the immigration country. After a period, the same cycle starts again as the woman leaves again, most typically from an Eastern European country to a Western European one (see also Hillman 2005; Kindler 2008; Lutz 2008; Morokvasic & de Tinguy 1993).

Yet another way in which families may try to organise assistance for their members in the country of origin is to arrange or purchase public or private formal care services. However, this is possible only when such services do exist in these countries and if the family is entitled, able and can afford to use them. The main flows of migration come from less wealthy nations where neither public nor private formal care services are very widely available. Many emigration countries lack a strong service structure and less formal arrangements are being used instead. For a number of families, grey market care or arranging non-migrating family members or other close persons to provide informal care are actually the only feasible solutions in a situation where the older generation stays in the country of origin. However, studies on such arrangements are very rare.

Conclusions

This article has aimed to address the multiple intersections that exist between migration and care. These connections have become highlighted by research only very recently, mostly not before the 2000s. This is rather amazing, as understanding the character and features of present-day migration is actually impossible without a conception of the way how care is organised in affluent countries. Hillmann (2005: 108) argues that care work, especially migrant care work, is at the centre of the fragmenting globalisation process and of the growing feminisation of global migration and that these indicate new forms of global governance. Recent literature on migrant care workers has shown the importance of care services to the international division of labour and international economic integration (Yeates 2004: 80). On the other hand, the ways in which care is organised in both native and migrant populations are increasingly and fundamentally influenced by flows of migration. Care work in Europe is increasingly and rapidly becoming migrant care work (Hillman 2005: 93).

The article argues that there are multiple ways in which care and migration intertwine and that current research has not addressed all of these intersections. Migrant people are active in formal and grey market care as well as in family care and in addition to providing care they are also using it and arranging it for their family members. Different kinds of care giving take place in countries of immigration as well as in countries of origin and there is often a transnational dimension involved.

Recent research has focused on migrant women as care workers within formal care services and grey care markets of affluent nations. Taking up such work is economically rational for women coming from countries that lack good job opportunities, but the arrangement involves many risks of abuse and exploitation. Studies one after another show how many migrant women have experienced discrimination and prejudice and sometimes even racist acts in their care workplaces. It is obvious that in particular grey market live-in care work includes significant risks for migrant carers, and sometimes even for the older persons receiving care. Minimum standards for working conditions and wage levels are clearly needed. An open question is also how to support these migrant women in their own family care responsibilities, that is, how policies could make transnational motherhood and transnational caregiving a less problematic way of life. Transnational care is a reality affecting not only migrant care workers but a major part of all migrant populations and their non-migrant family members. Enabling transnational care and making it smoother is thus a critical policy question for the future.

On the other hand, formal care systems of Western countries seem not to be responsive and sensitive enough for the needs and cultures of migrant populations. A number of studies from different European countries give a very uniform description how information about available services does not reach migrant families. Information is often available only in the native language and it may be shared sparingly. Stereotypical images of migrants who always prefer family care-giving to formal services guide the thinking of some social and health care professionals. A question worth asking is whether not just the information but also services should be available in the languages of major migrant groups. The increasing employ-
ment of migrant people within care services would make it rather easy to make these services more culturally diverse—and is such a development taking place?

A question that is not often raised is whether migrant care workers are encouraged to take their families along. When migrant care workers are recruited, is it possible for them to migrate together with their spouses, children and parents? Currently, many children and older relatives are left behind in the countries of origin and supporting their co-migration would considerably reduce the risk of them ending up without adequate care. Family reunification generally only refers to young children (Kofman 2004) but for example Spain allows access also to parents of adult migrants from former Spanish colonies (Escriva & Skinner 2008).

Finally, what are the roles of welfare policies and the implications of different welfare regimes on care migration? Welfare states are national systems, but their designs have manifold consequences on the directions, forms and outcomes of global migration flows. The migration of care workers as well as the migration of care users can have a significant influence on the service and benefit systems in both receiving and sending countries. However, we do not yet have much comparative welfare state research that would address this issue (see however e.g. Lutz 2008).

The connections between care and migration have been brought up in a number of studies but almost all of them are very recent, published during this decade. They are mostly case studies focusing on one particular country and/or migrant group, being limited to only some specific parts of the whole interrelationship. We do not yet have a full picture of the multidimensional interrelations between migration and care; there is an obvious need for more research and a deeper theoretical understanding of the intersection.

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Europe is My Oyster: Experiences of Finns Working Abroad

Abstract

Mobility of the young and educated from Finland to Europe has been on the rise. This article looks at the experiences of Finns working in other EU countries, based on the Working in Europe online survey conducted in 2008. When moving abroad, the loss of cultural capital may worsen the migrants’ labour market situation. However, the majority of the 364 survey respondents rate their experiences as positive and they succeed well in negotiating the value of their cultural capital. This article outlines four explanations to this happiness. Firstly, Finns have a good standing compared with some other mobile groups and their embodied cultural capital seems to hold its value abroad. Secondly, they work in international environments and thirdly, many are employed because of their language skills, especially in the Finnish and Swedish languages; which indicates that institutionalised cultural capital is also recognised. Fourthly, it is asked whether a ‘happiness barrier’ could cause this overwhelmingly positive result. Yet some respondents, who had treaded off the beaten track leading to a metropolis such as London, did describe their negative experiences in detail. To supplement this picture a set of more thorough qualitative interviews is envisioned as a continuation of the study.

1. Labour mobility in Europe and migration from Finland

Migration from Finland has approximately doubled since the beginning of the 1990s. In 1990–1993 around 6,200 persons moved abroad each year, while in 2003–2006 the number had risen to 12,600 per year (+102%). The main destination countries of this mobility are large European Union countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain, even though Sweden – the traditional destination for Finns abroad – still holds the top position. In the past 20 years over 132,000 Finns moved to the EU15 countries and 54 per cent chose Sweden as their destination. Transnational mobility has increased most with young adults in the age group of 25–34 year olds. Between 1990 and 1993 people of that age made an average of 1,900 moves abroad per year, but in 2005–2008 already 4,200 per year (+119%) (Statistics Finland online database 2009). Of course not all of those who move abroad are necessarily Finnish, as all persons who have held a permanent residence in Finland are recorded in these statistics. This article, however, focuses on data collected on Finns only, even though the mobility of skilled migrants of other nationalities would also be an interesting topic of study.

The 1990s has been called the first decade of internationalisation of education in Finland (Garam 2003: 4). Thanks to increased student mobility, we at least in theory now have an international generation of Finns, who should possess the necessary language skills and educational qualifications to succeed in an international job market. Many of those who have exercised their free movement rights could be classified as ‘highly skilled’, as between the years 1995 and 2006 a total of 12,000 persons who were born in Finland and had completed a higher education degree moved to the EU15 countries (see Graph 1 below). A study of 2,630 individuals who graduated in 2000 revealed that over one third of university and one quarter of polytechnic graduates had international experience, either from student exchange or from working abroad. Three per cent of them worked abroad when
The study was conducted in 2005 (Kivinen & Nurmi 2008: 51–52, 116).

The increased mobility of the young and the educated can be seen also in other European countries. In the Eurobarometer mobility survey of 2005 it was noted that as the level of education increases, the percentage of people who have experienced long-distance moves outside their own region or country also increases. About 7 per cent of the highly educated (measured by the number of years in schooling) have moved within the EU, in contrast to 4 per cent of the lower educated. The Eurobarometer data confirms that younger, higher educated cohorts are more internationally oriented than the older cohorts: for them crossing borders, thinking globally and experiencing different cultures seems to be part of the way they advance their career, skills and expertise (Mobility in Europe 2006: 15–16).

EU movers are nowadays a positively selected population in terms of education as the education levels of transnationally mobile Europeans have improved in the past 15 years. In 1995, 14.3 per cent and in 2005, already almost 25 per cent of them had completed a tertiary level degree (Recchi 2008: 208). These individuals are among the main beneficiaries of the European project, as described by Neil Fligstein in his book Euroclash (2008). He argues that economic integration has offered a large but significant minority of managers, professionals, the young, the educated and those with higher income with opportunities for interaction. They have benefited materially and culturally from this interaction and feel ‘more European’ than the average EU citizens (Fligstein 2008: 210–211, 249).

Mobility from Finland to Europe has therefore been on the rise, as was expected when free movement within the European Union area became possible after the Finnish accession to the European Economic Area in 1994 and the EU in 1995. These movers, who have left since the Finnish EU membership, constitute a ‘third category’ of Finns abroad. They are not ‘migrants’ in the sense that the Finnish word siirtolainen has traditionally conveyed, often in reference to early 20th century emigrants to Sweden and North America, or even to women who moved abroad for love, work or adventure in the 1960s and 1970s (Björklund 2008, 13). During the Finnish membership negotiations fears of brain drain and mass mobility of the ‘best and the brightest’ were expressed. Yet no thorough account has been written on whether this has been the case. This article presents one view to the kinds of lives and careers that mobile Finns have had abroad.

This article is based on the Working in Europe online survey of 364 Finns currently living in EU15 countries. The aim of the survey was to find answers to questions such as: is moving abroad a turning point in the career of the transnationally mobile? Does the country-specific cultural capital form a barrier for employment abroad in regard to degrees and previous job experience? I look at one section of the survey in more detail: labour market success as described by the respondents in the open-ended questions of the survey. Focusing on the real life experiences of a group of migrants who could be classified either as ‘highly skilled’ or ‘highly qualified’ due to their tertiary education, this research is in line with the research agenda outlined by Adrian Favell, Miriam Feldblum and Michael Peter Smith in their introductory chapter in The Human Face of Global Mobility (2006, see also Favell 2008b). I examine the survey results in light of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of social and cultural capital in the con-

Figure 1: Mobility of highly educated Finns to EU-15 countries, 1995-2006 (Statistics Finland)
text of transnational mobility. I am also going to address the question of why the majority of respondents are satisfied with their labour market position abroad.

2. Skilled mobility and social and cultural capital

Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984, 1985) concepts of cultural and social capital have been used in relation to migration to explain the problems of transferring skills from one society or cultural environment to another. Bourdieu defined three different types of capital: economic, social and cultural. Economic capital refers to a command over economic or monetary resources. Social capital refers to resources based on membership of certain networks or groups, such as influence and support. Cultural capital refers to skills, education and knowledge acquired through education and through the socialisation process (Bourdieu 1985: 242–243).

Bourdieu divides cultural capital into three subtypes: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Embodied cultural capital includes properties, which are embodied on the habitus of an individual, such as a set of habits or traditions learned from one’s family. Objectified cultural capital refers to things that can be owned. Possessing these exact cultural objects, such as works of art, signifies certain embodied cultural capital. The institutionalised type of cultural capital refers to academic qualifications, which can be assigned a monetary value in the labour market (Bourdieu 1985: 242–243).

Social capital, according to Bourdieu, is the grand total of actual or potential resources that one can mobilise within one’s network, group or collective. The volume of an individual’s social capital thus depends on the size of this network and the volume of (economic, cultural or symbolic) capital possessed by the individuals in that network, which s/he can utilise on the basis of solidarity (Bourdieu 1985: 248–249).

For Bourdieu, these social networks are not a natural given, but must be constructed through investment strategies that aim at institutionalising group relations as a source of benefits (Portes 1998: 3).

Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas form a theory of reproduction of social classes and power relations (e.g. Calhoun 1993: 69–72). The playing field is not level for all players, because certain groups (or classes) of the society have better access to cultural and social resources, to the best schools and universities, networks of future employers, and the necessary economic means. These privileges are passed on from parents to children. In this respect, taking the concepts of cultural and social capital as the starting point of analysing skilled migration is highly interesting: leaving one’s resources and networks behind the transnationally mobile individual has to recreate those resources, renegotiate the value of ones’ own capital or find ways in which the loss of this symbolic capital does not signify a loss of status in the working life.

One application of the concept of cultural capital in relation to migration can be found in the work of Nohl, Schительman, Schmidtke & Weiss (2006). During migration, the form and the particular characteristics of one’s cultural capital, such as degrees and language proficiency, are of significance. The recognition of institutional cultural capital, such as educational titles can be regulated. Incorporated or embodied cultural capital, such as mental schemes and action orientation, language, value, and competences are tied to a particular person who acquires these through a long socialization and education process. Institutionalised cultural capital is usually applied in national contexts and its value or relevance diminishes through migration. Nevertheless, there are some fields of specialization where a transnational labour market exists and cultural capital can be utilised, regardless of where it was obtained (Nohl et al. 2006: paragraphs 15–16).

The individual needs to present his/her cultural capital in the best possible way in the process of trying to find employment. Nohl & al (2006: paragraphs 18–19) call the negotiations that individuals undertake in trying to gain employment symbolic struggles over the assessment of capital between migrants and the native population. These struggles can also take place with recognition of knowledge and abilities that may not have been utilized in the migrants’ country of origin, and have become valuable during the migration process. They argue that empirical research should not only focus on formal, professional titles, but also look at the incorporated components of cultural capital: which of them are valuable and can be transferred from one country to another? What binds cultural capital to specific places so that it becomes devalued during migration? Is new cultural capital developing under the conditions of migration?

Krisztina Csedö (2008) also sees the act of employment as a situation where the job applicant has to negotiate the best possible value for his/her credentials and cultural capital. She has studied Hungarian and Romanian professionals and graduates who were working in London and her research highlights the importance of social context and immigrant agency in the assessment of skills and human capital. She draws a distinction between ‘highly skilled’ and ‘highly qualified’ immigrants and tries to find out how the tertiary-educated migrants’ human capital and skills are transferable from Eastern Europe to London. In her view, social aspects of immigrants’ skills are essential components of skill construction, so that the value set to specific skills and credentials is negotiated with the prospective employee and employer.

According to Csedö, only those highly qualified migrants who successfully transfer their specific skills from previous employment into the destination country labour market can be considered highly skilled. The mobile Europeans’ success not only depends on their internationally competitive human (and economic and social) capital, but also on their ability to communicate its value to potential employers. In her study, only those tertiary educated migrants, who on top of their high qualifications also had globally valuable and transferable social and work experience, were successful in transferring their skills (Csedö 2008: 819).

It can be argued therefore, that in a new country the transnationally mobile individuals have to negotiate the value of
their cultural capital and present their skills, experiences and credentials in a way that is understandable to the employer. Some forms of cultural capital can be transnationally recognised, as Anja Weiss (2004) who has researched the social positions of highly skilled migrants, explains. Members of this ‘transnational upper class’ are typically characterised by having internationally valued education, right (western) habitus, and labour market skills that are not country-specific. They have considerable spatial autonomy, as they can move globally after better career prospects. For them, migration can be a way of upward social mobility (Weiss 2004: 712–716). As will be presented in the following chapters, most of the mobile Finns that took part in the Working in Europe survey are content with their labour market position, and have, perhaps due to possessing at least some of the qualities that Weiss identifies, found satisfactory employment.

3. Working in Europe survey

Relatively small and scattered migrant groups are a challenging population to study with survey methodology. Creating a random and statistically representative sample is not possible, as there are no updated registers of current addresses of Finns abroad, for example. I conducted The Working in Europe survey (hereafter survey) in 2008. The respondents of the survey were found via a method of snowball contact. A request to take part in the survey and encourage friends to do the same was sent to discussion forums of Finns living abroad as well as posted on various websites that service Finns living abroad, such as www.expatrium.fi and www.ulkosuomalainen.com. The survey was conducted in Finnish only, so the choice of language may have discouraged participation by the Swedish-speaking minority, which forms around 5 per cent of Finland’s population.

Promoting the survey via the networks of Finns living abroad was effective: within a week of the posting of the first messages concerning the survey 264 responses had been submitted and nine weeks later, over 400. The rest of the completed answers were submitted during the summer months of the year 2008. A total number of 553 respondents started the survey and 477, i.e. 86.3 per cent of them completed the whole survey and submitted their responses. The survey had 27 questions about the personal and educational background of the respondents, their international experiences, and reasons for moving abroad as well as their labour market experiences both in Finland and abroad. Most of the questions were structured multiple-choice questions but there were also four open-ended questions. Time required for the completion of the survey was approximately 15 minutes and the language used was Finnish. Respondents were asked for their e-mail address, should they be interested in participating in an interview later. Submitting the e-mail address was voluntary.

The basic characteristics of the respondents of the survey are listed in Table 1 below. The sample includes 364 respondents who are 23–44 years old, live in EU15 countries and have completed a university or polytechnic degree either abroad or in Finland. The respondents from Sweden were omitted from further analysis because the long history of migration and geographical proximity and shared (Swedish) language between the two countries make Sweden a special case that would require a separate analysis. In addition, there were only 8 relevant respondents from Sweden so considerably more replies would have been required to make comparisons between these cases worthwhile. Migration flows between Finland and Sweden have also been studied quite a lot compared with migration to other European countries (see, for example Helander 2007; Korkiasaari & Tarkkainen 2000; Piippola 2007).

The survey was conducted before the global financial crisis began in the autumn months of 2008. It is therefore good to note that the labour market expectations and future plans of the respondents might be considerably more pessimistic if the data was collected now, just one year later. As the survey was based on participant self-selection and it is thus a nonprobability sample, the results of the survey cannot be generalised to represent the situation or views of the whole population of Finns abroad (de Leeuw 2008: 126–127, Manfreda & Vehovar 2008: 266–268). However, the group is large enough to give an interesting perspective on the kinds of lives at least some relatively young and educated Finns were leading abroad at a time when the economy was flourishing and unemployment was low.

According to Ettore Recchi there are three main forms of cross-state mobility for EU movers of the largest Western European member states: work-driven mobility, mobility motivated by personal and affective relationships, and quality of life motivated mobility (Recchi 2008: 217–218). In the survey, respondents could choose several reasons for mobility and they chose an average of four each. The most commonly stated reasons were “to see the world” (202), “to better my language skills” (159), and “for adventure” (172 responses). In comparison to Recchi’s classification, 186 respondents replied that they moved abroad because of work, either “to look for work”, “to a job they already got while in Finland”, or “as an employee sent abroad by a Finnish employer,” 139 respondents state that they moved “because their partner was foreign” or “to accompany their partner abroad” and 66 respondents moved “to get a better quality of life”. Another important motivator was education, as 104 respondents said they “moved abroad to study”.

There were as many different stories about how they actually got a job, as there were people taking part in the survey. Some described having to send 10–15 job applications as a very hard process, while others wrote that sending 20 applications and going to 10 interviews was a relatively easy, yet educating process. Nearly half of the respondents who replied to the open-ended questions (299) describe the process of finding employment in positive terms. The easiest transition to the destination country labour market was experienced by respondents who were headhunted directly from a previous job, those who applied for a transfer within their own company, and those who got the information about a possible vacancy through a friend or a colleague.
The respondents have university degrees from a variety of fields ranging from architecture to theoretical physics and from nursing to engineering. The most common fields of study were business, social sciences and humanities. It was anticipated that some factors that make one more likely to succeed in the destination country labour market could be identified.

Would respondents with a degree in such fields as business or law be more satisfied about their situation than those with a degree in a field that could be perceived more national, as teacher education, for example? Or would the level of the education matter: would the situation of those with a polytechnic bachelor’s degree differ from those who have a university level master’s degree? Also gender differences could be foreseen, as prior research has shown that transnational mobility even within Europe can be a career risk for women (PIO-NEUR 2006: 4).

Yet the possibilities of making such comparisons from the survey material proved challenging. 75 per cent of the respondents were engaged in full-time employment and 76 per cent of those who replied to the open-ended question on whether “moving abroad was a good decision for their career” regarded the move abroad as beneficial. Only a clear minority of respondents reflected on the negative issues that the move away from Finland had meant for their career: some had experienced discrimination, failed to find a job that would match their education, or felt that they were “committing a career suicide” (France, female aged 31). A far more common reply to the question about whether moving abroad was a good decision was simply: “Absolutely yes!”

The respondents were also asked to evaluate their situation in the destination country in relation to certain statements, such as: In the country where I now live… “I have a higher salary”, “I have a job that fits my qualifications”, “my degree is recognised”, “my work experience is recognised” and “my language skills are sufficient.”

The responses were given in a 5-point Likert scale. In a preliminary statistical analysis these five questions were grouped to form a sum variable. Also the results thus gained show high level of satisfaction in the des-
tination country labour market: 92.6 per cent of “Completely agree” and “Slightly agree” versus a mere 0.6 per cent of “Completely disagree” and “Slightly disagree”.

It may be that the composition of respondents was too similar for any major differences to emerge. Or perhaps some common denominators could be found that would explain this almost universally shared experience of labour market success – or at least a need to report one’s career development in positive light? In the following chapters, four possible explanations for this phenomenon are outlined based on the open-ended responses of the survey. Quotations from the survey responses are also included.

Firstly, it is argued that Finns in general have a good standing among the expatriate community compared with some other transnationally mobile groups and their education seems to hold its value abroad. Secondly, it is noted that the respondents have found employment in international organisations, companies or with international clients. Thirdly, surprisingly many of the respondents have found jobs because of their good language skills, and especially because they speak Finnish and Swedish. Fourthly, it is asked whether a bias of the sample could be the cause of this satisfaction: perhaps only those who are happy responded?

4. Explanation 1: Finns as first class migrants

Many respondents of the Working in Europe survey reply to the questions “what is it like to be a foreign employee” and “have you been discriminated against” that Finns are perceived to have a good work ethic, high quality education and good language skills. As a result of this reputation, the respondents feel that Finnish workers are a valued group among the applicants competing for the same jobs.

Several respondents in Germany, for example, write that “Finns are first-class migrants”. The Finnish educational system is valued, as the good results gained by Finnish pupils in the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment PISA evaluations are well known (OECD 2007). Statements like “To be foreign is generally a disadvantage in Germany, but being a Finn almost qualifies as an advantage” and “The Finn is a curiosity that everyone here wants to learn to know” (Germany, male aged 38), reveal that the respondents have found ways of making use of this good reputation.

Presenting yourself in the best possible light might also include stressing the fact that you are foreign. One respondent with a psychology degree tells about her job-interview experiences in London: “The fact that I am Finnish has been seen as a very positive and interesting thing. At a job interview I am frequently asked about my accent, and when I say that I am from Lapland we usually have a conversation about cold weather, snow and Santa Claus, so they definitely remember me” (United Kingdom, female aged 28).

The United Kingdom has attracted workers to its health sector also from Finland as well as from many other countries. Some Finns working as nurses, physiotherapists and dental hygienists, for example, took part in the survey. They have also noticed that in the health sector being Finnish is an advantage: “Our expertise, moral attitude and good professional skills are well known” (United Kingdom, female aged 30) and “Patients are positively surprised to hear that I am from Finland as it creates easy topics for small-talk” (United Kingdom, female aged 33).

Yet Finland is a sparsely populated country that lies in the Northern European periphery, so not all employers know what to expect from a Finnish job applicant. If being Finnish does not do the trick, there is an alternative way of identifying with a region that has a positive image: “People here do not know much about Finland, but being Scandinavian helps,” writes a female marketing executive, 25, working in London. “Scandinavians are appreciated in France” explain two female respondents aged 41 and 33, working in media and IT-sector in France.

Roland Verwiebe and Klaus Eder (2006) analysed migrant labour market integration by looking at the relative income levels of Europeans from the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Poland in Berlin. They conclude that transnationally mobile Europeans do not automatically occupy positions in the lower classes of German social structure, even though traditional migration research has often found that a ‘sub-stratification’ process is common in the destination country. In the labour market, social-structural qualities like age, gender, education, work experience, and position in the occupational structure can be more important than national origin. Discrimination with regard to national background scarcely exists in the context of intra-European mobility (Verwiebe & Eder 2006: 158). Following this line of argument, finding many stories of discrimination from the Finnish respondents would be more of a surprise than the current situation, where the well-educated and skilful respondents do not see their nationality as a barrier for employment.

Quite a few of the survey respondents, however, regularly compare their situation to that of other migrants that they perceive to be in a more difficult situation. “Finns here are appreciated for their language skills, luckily we are not classified in the same group with the Polish workers or other arrivals from the new member states. They have faced opposition because there are so many of them here,” writes a female respondent, 26, who is just graduating from a UK university. Their self-evaluation has also an ethnic undertone, suggesting that they are aware of the existence of discrimination based on nationality or race: “I have not faced discrimination as I do not look any different from the main population and my English is good” (United Kingdom, male, aged 31) and “To be Scandinavian in London does not give you any preferential nor discriminatory treatment; it would be different if I were from India and had a heavy accent” (United Kingdom, female aged 29).

Nationality does not therefore play a big role as a barrier to labour market access for the Finns who responded to the survey. The embodied cultural capital that they possess may be foreign, but it is similar enough to retain at least some of
its value. I continue by looking at the kinds of careers Finns have found abroad and what kinds of skills have helped them in finding jobs.

5. Explanation 2: International people in international careers

A total number of 299 respondents replied to the open-ended questions of the survey. Out of this number, 96 respondents (32%) write that they work in an international environment, in a multinational company or with international clients or colleagues. As seeking adventure, learning languages and encountering new cultures were a major part of the attraction of moving abroad in the first place, it is understandable that they should prefer jobs that can offer at least some of these qualities. “Jobs that I have enjoyed working in have all been with large, international companies that employ many foreigners, and so everyone is used to foreigners. I did work for a year in an environment where I was the only foreigner and I did not like it,” writes a female respondent, 32, of her experiences in the human relations field in London.

Many of those respondents who write more about the importance of work, rather than focusing on other reasons for moving, such as relationship or quality of life, are making a career in a highly competitive field such as finance or consultancy. They work in large multinational companies that, at least according to the experiences of these respondents, strive to recruit the best possible people regardless of nationality. Being foreign and speaking languages that are rare can give them a certain competitive advantage: “Our company is very international. In my current team there are 18 members who represent 9 different nationalities. Language skills matter, so the more languages you can speak the better,” writes a female respondent, 30, who is working in London with a social science degree.

Adrian Favell (2008a) defines the classical model of migrant’s integration to the new society as follows: international migration -> integration -> renationalization -> membership of host society. Based on 60 interviews Europeans resident in Brussels, London and Amsterdam Favell argues that mobile Europeans who have left their native country in search of ‘denationalized freedom’, are not likely to follow the classical model. They rarely define themselves as ‘migrants’ or their move abroad as ‘migration’. If what they were looking for in the first place was freedom, it is not likely that they would happily accept renationalization as the main goal of living in a certain society.

In a similar vein it can be argued that for the Finns with international careers, working at international workplaces offer the charm of meeting different people, and communicating with people who share their life situation and are also somewhat detached from the constraints of the host society. The situation is similar with skilled migrants working in Finland, as Ödül Bozkurt (2006) has noticed in her study of the telecommunications sector: settling in the office of a large multinational company is easier than trying to integrate into a more national working place, regardless of the other attributes of the work (Bozkurt 2006: 238–240).

Respondents working in London comment particularly often that “everyone is foreign in London”, so national background does not play a role in succeeding in job interviews. Finding the right employment opportunity is more about other things than mere nationality, as one job applicant who recently graduated from one of the top UK universities writes: “The main thing is to select a university from the top of the ranking lists, graduate with good grades and experience as much as possible during your student years” (United Kingdom, female aged 26).

Jonathan Beaverstock and Joanne Smith (1996) argue that global cities are important locations for skilled migrants because of the concentration of banking and specialist employment opportunities of corporate headquarters with their ‘fast-track’ careers and high-salaries. London is Europe’s main global city for law, accountancy, advertising, management consultancy, and many other business sectors. Skilled migration has focused on cities like London because of three interlinking processes: the globalisation of financial capital, the labour practices of investment banking and the individuals’ opportunities to accumulate personal wealth. “The magnetism of London as a working and a living space must not be underestimated – it is where corporate professionals want to work”, they underline (Beaverstock & Smith 1996: 1378–81). Ulf Hannerz identifies the presence of these highly educated, highly professionally skilled, and highly mobile individuals engaged in transnational business and management as a sign of London being a true contemporary world city (Hannerz 1996: 128–129).

Similarly, respondents writing from Brussels explain that almost everyone that they work with are foreign, so there are many jobs available that do not require neither knowledge of the local languages French or Flemish, nor particular integration into the Belgian society. Apart from the work opportunities offered by the EU institutions, also multinational companies, lobbying organisations, law firms, and non-governmental organisations offer jobs that require international and language skills, rather than knowledge of the local labour market. “I work in the head office of a multinational company in Brussels, where being foreign is more a rule than the exception. 80% of my colleagues come from somewhere else than Belgium,” writes a male business administration graduate, aged 34.

Respondents who have tried to compete with local graduates in more nationally based jobs report cases where they have not been taken seriously, or their skills in the local language or the validity of their degree have been put into question. Applying for a job in a big Anglo-American company in Paris proved to be the solution for this respondent, who faced discrimination and felt that she would never be hired in a French company: “In my current job it’s easy to be foreign along with the other foreigners (there are only a few local employees). I have not faced any discrimination here.
Being foreign is not an advantage, other than for the language skills; the language skills of the locals are much worse and that’s why they are not hired to this company” (France, female aged 31).

A perceived or real inability to communicate perfectly in the local language can be a barrier for employment. Choosing to work in an international environment is one way of overcoming this shortcoming at least until the language skills improve. A female respondent living in Germany, aged 35, who has a social science degree writes: “It has been relatively easy to find work, but if I would want a job that would correspond to my degree, it is nearly impossible. (...) There is no demand. I work in tourism business in an English language firm, as my writing skills in German are not perfect.”

Choosing to look for employment in international workplaces has helped survey respondents to succeed well in negotiating the value of their institutionalised cultural capital with prospective employers. They are rather content about their work situation and generally seem to be linguistically and socially able to communicate their skills in a satisfactory manner.

6. Explanation 3: Finnish language experts wanted across Europe

The good language skills of the respondents seem to have worked for their advantage, as many of them work for international companies and organisations. Lack of competence in the local language is not a significant problem for those working in the United Kingdom. At least in the test result statistics of the TOEFL test of English as a Foreign Language Finns regularly score high marks and rank among the best in Europe (TOEFL 2008). Respondents living in Germany, France, Italy and Spain, however, comment on their poor knowledge of the local language as a hindrance in their job search. Yet languages are still important for many of them: out of the 299 respondents who replied to the open-ended questions, a total of 51 (17%) write that they use the Finnish language at work or were even employed because of their skills in the Finnish and/or Swedish language, which all Finns also study at school.

An easy explanation for this would be that most of those who need Finnish at work were sent abroad by a Finnish company. However, when asking for the reasons of moving abroad, only 23 respondents wrote that they were “sent abroad by a Finnish employer”. When calculating together these seconded employees and those who wrote that they need Finnish at work we get a group of 67 respondents. This means that 18 per cent of all 364 respondents of the survey work abroad in an environment where the Finnish language is useful. What kind of jobs have they found that requires the knowledge of such a minor language?

The responses can be roughly classified in four categories. Firstly, there are respondents who work for companies doing business with Scandinavian countries, as one female bache- lor of business, aged 25, working in international sales in Germany states: “Being a Finn (and having knowledge of the language, country and its economy) is an advantage, as the company that I work for has Finnish and Nordic clients.”

Secondly, they have found work as translators or teachers of the Finnish language. “It was easy to find work, as there is demand for the Finnish language,” writes a female respondent, aged 30, who is working as a teacher of the German and Finnish languages in Leipzig with a master’s degree in German as a foreign language.

Thirdly, they work at help-desks or call-centres in businesses that service Finnish clients.

“I work in a multinational company in a role where I need my language skills to do my job. I get to use Finnish at work every day!” writes a female respondent, 26, from Ireland. Even if the actual work would not involve advising Finnish consumers on problems related to information technology over the phone, there are also other jobs available in this sector. One respondent with a humanities degree got her job in the personnel recruitment office of a multinational company based in Brussels because her language skills are needed in recruiting workers from Finland and Scandinavia.

Fourthly, there are respondents who work for Finnish companies, either as employees seconded abroad or recruited locally. Many of them work in banks in London, Luxembourg or Frankfurt or with telecommunications or forestry related businesses. This group also includes a variety of jobs otherwise related to Finland or the Finnish language, such as working in the European Union institutions or as an assistant to Members of European Parliament or for some of the Finnish lobbying organisations in Brussels.

Anja Weiss (2004) argues that the social position of highly skilled migrants is in many respects situated beyond the framework of the nation state. Migration usually leads to the devaluation of original cultural capital when migrants look for work in a new country. Country-specific knowledge, acquired in the early years of life, is usually depreciated also with skilled migrants when they move abroad. This does not necessarily weaken their career prospects, if transcultural capital is valued enough. Also, their country-specific knowledge can give them a competitive advantage (Weiss 2004, 719–724). For the survey respondents, this seems indeed to be the case. Many of them are employed because they have skills in rare languages that have real, even though quite limited labour market value abroad.

7. Explanation 4: those who were disappointed abroad have returned home?

The responses of the Working in Europe survey are a window to the life of relatively young and educated Finns who lived abroad in EU15 countries in 2008. The survey targeted only Finns currently living abroad, so no views from those who have returned to Finland are included. This would have required a different set of questions and retrospective analy-
sis on the part of the respondents, so it was outside the scope of the present study. Because of the limitations of the data collection process it is impossible to be certain that the results are not somewhat distorted by the selection of respondents or by a ‘happiness barrier’ that encourages the respondents to write a success story of their life abroad.

Yet those who had negative experiences and were disappointed by their position in the labour market of the destination country wrote longer answers than those who were happier and more content with their life and work situation. As it was possible to take the survey online anonymously and without any contact with the researcher, one would assume that the tendency to display one’s life situation and choices in the best possible light would not necessarily apply to this case.

Namely, respondents who were disappointed with their life did take the opportunity to complain about negative treatment and discrimination. As a female respondent from Italy, aged 38, who has not found any paid employment that would correspond to her university degree, analyses her situation: “Statistically my situation is the worst possible combination: Southern Italy, educated, woman, foreign.” As her analysis suggests, some common denominators can be found for those respondents who were disappointed with their labour market position.

The EU has regulations on degree recognition and against discrimination based on nationality. Institutionalised cultural capital in the form of academic degrees may be recognised and officially accepted in a relatively trouble-free fashion, but this does not mean that individual employers in the destination country labour market recognise the cultural capital of an individual job applicant. The embodied components of cultural capital can be diminished and seen as being foreign. As the individual’s habitus evolves through a long socialization process in the country of origin, it cannot be easily changed (Nohl et al 2006: paragraphs 17, 33). As a 25-year old female respondent in France with a social science degree puts it: “In every country they favour primarily the own country nationals, this has been my experience in all the countries that I have lived in: Greece, Iceland, and France.”

It seems risky to step outside the beaten track of graduates heading for London, Brussels or the other large cities that host many international job opportunities. Looking for work in the smaller cities of France, Italy, Spain or Austria, for example, makes you compete with the local graduates who have the benefit of having a degree that is automatically recognized, perfect language skills and the necessary local networks for finding employment. As a 40-year old female respondent from Austria writes, “The move abroad was certainly not a good decision for my career and possibly not for anything else either? I believe I am in the wrong country and in the wrong place. The Austrians are very conservative, prejudiced and think they are the centres of the world. A woman in the corridors of an information technology firm is automatically a cleaner.”

It could also be argued that if a Finn who has studied and worked abroad wants to return to work in Finland, she or he might face more discrimination back home than abroad. “When I left I did not understand it would be for good,” writes a 36-year old female respondent living in Belgium who had failed to find a suitable job in Finland after returning from abroad and was forced to move out again. Returning to Finland may not be easy, as also Saarikallio, Hellsten and Juutilainen (2008) found when they compared the labour market positioning of Finnish students with foreign degrees to a reference group of graduates from Finnish universities. Graduates who had returned to Finland from abroad faced prejudices from the Finnish employers, being in a sense more “outsiders” than their colleagues who studied in Finland. They took somewhat longer in finding employment, had a more problematic start in their career, and had more often experienced unemployment (Saarikallio, Hellsten, Juutilainen 2008: 106–9).

8. Conclusion

The respondents of the Working in Europe survey have taken their life into their own hands and have looked for adventures abroad. Those who move to another EU country do not do so because they are pushed abroad by unemployment, for example, but they choose to move because they can. Perhaps their happiness should be no surprise after all. Most of them are content with the life choices that they have made, and in that respect they do not differ from results gained in other studies: all groups of intra-EU movers express a higher level of life satisfaction than comparable samples of nationals of their country of origin (Recchi 2008: 218).

The survey respondents had found several ways in which to communicate their skills and cultural capital in the destination country labour market. These include the first three explanations that were outlined in this article. They are making the best out of being foreign, as being Finnish does not form a barrier to employment but can be more a matter of curiosity or something that makes their CV memorable. They make the best out of the abilities that they have and seek international work places, as they speak more languages than the average university degree holder in UK, France, and Germany. Many, like one information technology professional based in London, say that they “work in a team of 30 people with 14 nationalities” (United Kingdom, male aged 33). Large multinational companies that look for diversity may appreciate Finns as there are not that many of them around. The key to success can also be working with tasks that are related to the special understanding and language ability connecting them to Finland, Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia.

For young, well-qualified, transnationally mobile individuals the Europeanization of the labour market provides new opportunities. The survey respondents had, according to their own estimations, integrated well in the destination labour market and were satisfied with their position. Yet as Verwiebe & Eder write, “Transnational mobility creates new career chances in the upper segments of the labour market,
but, on the other hand, also increases the risks of having to integrate oneself into the lower end of the income hierarchy” (Verwiebe & Eder 2006: 159), so for some respondents, finding employment that would match their education was challenging.

Those respondents who had bad and disappointing experiences and who narrate their experiences in negative light share some common characteristics. Several of them were abroad and in a particular country or location because of their spouse’s career or because they followed a loved one abroad to his or her home country. Many of them live in smaller cities and in regions with high unemployment and no jobs for foreigners, and especially not for educated foreign women. Regardless of being disappointed with their career aspirations, many of them still regard the move abroad as a good decision for their life in general, as career is not the main priority in their life. As a female respondent, aged 29, explains: “Moving abroad was a really bad decision for my career. In Finland I could have finished my studies and now be a qualified teacher. (…) Yet I do not regret the move, as my relationship with my boyfriend is very good and the weather here is nice all year. I do not believe that I will ever find a proper job here; I have a very pessimistic view of the labour market here in Southern France.”

The work opportunities that the global labour market offers for transnational migrants seem to be twofold: firstly there are jobs that require higher education and special skills and offer good salaries and corporate career prospects. On the other hand there are jobs that require cheap, relatively uneducated workers for routine jobs that are no longer desirable for the country’s own nationals (see for example Forsander 2004; Martikainen 2009). Further study is needed to get more nuances to this black-and-white picture of Finns working abroad, and to highlight the process by which these mobile individuals end up in relatively good labour market positions. The limitations of the survey data can be overcome with a set of qualitative interviews that will focus on the issues that remain unresolved by the rather brief open-ended responses of the survey. Will they encounter a glass ceiling at some point, or does nationality really not matter? How has the economic recession affected their career possibilities? It would also be necessary to take a more thorough look at the lives of those individuals who have had negative experiences.

Looking at the working life experiences of the transnationally mobile Finns in the larger context of their life course should prove to be very interesting. Will they continue living their lives abroad with the denationalised attitude that Favell (2008a) describes, or will they return to Finland when it is time to settle down? For many the plan for the next few years resembles this male respondent’s view: “I’ll stay a few years at least here in the UK and then I could transfer to some other country. At least for now I have no desire to return to Finland, because I can easily visit Finland to meet family and friends. Europe is your Oyster!” (United Kingdom, male aged 34.)

Bibliography


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Notes

1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
The Working in Europe online survey was conducted in March-October 2008 and utilised the www.surveymonkey.com -portal. The questionnaire was tested with Finns living abroad and an extensive peer review of the questions, layout and usability was done before the launch of the survey. The survey had 27 questions on the personal and educational background of the respondents, their international experiences, and reasons for moving abroad as well as their labour market experiences both in Finland and abroad. Time required for completion of the survey was approximately 15 minutes and the language used was Finnish. Respondents were found via a method of snowball contact. A request to take part in the survey and encourage friends to do the same was sent to discussion forums of Finns in Britain, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Spain, and to Finnish schools in Italy and Austria. A similar message was posted also on various web-pages that service Finns living abroad, such as www.expatrium.fi and www.ulkosuomalainen.com. A direct message was sent to 30 Finns who write a web-blog on their life abroad and to a number of acquaintances living abroad. A message about the survey was also sent to the members of The Finnish Association of Business School Graduates (SEFE) who are currently living abroad. Respondents were advised to click directly to the survey via a link in the e-mail/web-page, or to take a closer look at the research questions, objectives and research ethics from a web page presenting the study at www.ulapland.fi/EUtyo (in Finnish).

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The share of “Completely agree”-responses was over 50% in all the individual statements that were used for the sum variable. The survey also included a question on the labour market situation in Finland prior to moving abroad. In that question the highest number of “Completely agree” responses was for “I had a job that matched my degree” (49 %) and lowest for “I had a good salary” (11 %).

The survey was conducted in Finnish: the quotes are translated into English by the author.

It is quite common that in meetings of Scandinavian organisations, for example, the different, and related Scandinavian languages are used instead of English. Being fluent is Swedish can therefore be a valuable skill, even though in reality the business communication might be done in English.
Asylum seekers and refugees have mainly been framed as a “problem” either in terms of security risks, abuse of asylum systems or as a burden for social welfare systems in EU member states within the last decade, which was also connected to a rise of xenophobia and racism against these migrant groups. So, their former image as “symbols of freedom” in Cold war asylum policies of Western states was more and more substituted by that of a mass of “dangerous poor”, stigmatised as “economic refugees” and “illegal migrants” in public discourse. With this general shift, also their positive role as civic and political actors for democratisation, in asylum as well as origin countries, got out of sight.

Despite a growing body of comparative research on civic and political participation of immigrants in European countries (Schwenken 2006; Statham and Koopmans 2000; Tryandafyllidou and Gropas 2007; Vogel et al. 2006), the role of asylum seekers and refugees as civic actors remains underexplored. Recent studies have rather focused on the engagement of refugee diasporas or transnational communities in exile homeland politics or post-conflict reconstruction and development activities (Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Kleist 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Van Hear 2004), but rarely consider the engagement of refugees in the field of asylum and refugee policies.

Against the background of the currently developing common EU asylum system, a recently conducted study on which the article is based compared present conditions and practices of civic and political participation of asylum seekers and refugees in selected EU countries and at EU policy level. Case studies were carried out in 2007 in Austria, Czech Republic...
and France, which represent very distinct asylum traditions and policy regimes in the EU. The case studies were based on qualitative field research covering besides participant observation in mobilisations and events (such as demonstrations for refugee rights) 49 semi-structured interviews with representatives and activists of refugee support NGOs and of refugee community organisations (RCOs). The sample included 30 interviewees, half of them women, with a refugee biography and who were founding or active members of migrant and refugee organisations.4

In the first section, we will outline the major characteristics and differences in the Austrian, Czech and French asylum policy context that shaped modalities of refugee participation. In the second part, we analyse the specific role of refugee support NGOs and refugee community organisations and their co-operation within the global asylum regime, which has taken an increasingly multilayered and cross-sector character (including different policy domains), especially in the context of European harmonisation and the expanding external dimension of EU asylum policy.

2. Multilayered asylum regimes and “political opportunity structures” for refugee participation: Austria, Czech Republic and France

The political, legal and institutional opportunity structures for asylum seekers and refugees to organise, to advocate and represent their interests towards and within political institutions, thus to participate in the making and implementation of asylum and refugee policies in the three countries vary with regard to a number of relevant dimensions. These include the countries’ tradition and current policy as asylum country, their EU integration and its impact on national policies, the public and political framing of asylum discourse, the legal-institutional system for refugee reception and integration, the civil society actors and civic participation culture, access to political rights and citizenship, immigrant and refugee community organisations and their involvement in policy processes.

All these dimensions contribute to the political opportunity structures that define refugees’ and asylum seekers’ scope of action, either constraining or encouraging their participation or the representation of their interests.

2.1 Asylum migration patterns and policy contexts

The three national contexts of the cases studies present examples of different types of asylum systems that reflect the highly disparate development of asylum policies and refugee protection regimes that have emerged in Europe along with the political transformations after 1989 and with the process of EU integration.

France has certainly one of the most longstanding asylum traditions in Europe and well developed asylum institutions that were based on a constitutional right of asylum (for “free-don fighters”) and on the Geneva refugee convention since the 1950s. Asylum policies were strongly embedded in its Republican tradition and self-definition as “nation of human rights” going back to the French revolution. From the 1970s onwards France began to receive a larger number of refugees from outside of Europe, above all from South-East Asia and Latin America. Since the 1990s the countries of origin have diversified considerably. New major refugee groups have arrived from Europe (Serbia-Kosovo, Russia, Turkey), Asia (Sri Lanka, China), and from the African continent (DR Congo, Algeria, Mali). An increasing number of asylum seekers (above all from Haiti) have entered French territory in its Caribbean and African Overseas Departments in the past few years.

Austria had an important role as a transit and to a lesser extent, as a definitive asylum country for Cold-war refugees from communist neighbouring countries (from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81). Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Austria’s changing geopolitical position as a frontier state of the Schengen area neighbouring important refugee origin and transit regions (the Balkan region, Turkey, Middle East), made it a major receiving country during the 1990s. Main asylum seeking groups came from Former Yugoslavia and Turkey, Afghanistan and more recently, from Russia (Chechnya).

The Czech Republic transformed from a refugee sending country in the Communist era into an asylum receiving country with the democratic change and finally its EU accession in 2004. However, it remained a marginal asylum country with low recognition rates: the majority of asylum seekers in the Czech Republic since 1990 came from Ukraine (13,000 from 1990 until July 2007), with smaller numbers from Russia, Romania, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Moldavia and India. A rather liberal access to residence permits (labour migration, students) until 2000 also meant that some de facto refugees (such as those from the Former Yugoslavia) never applied for asylum.

At present, the three countries have very distinct positions as asylum countries in the EU:

Both France and Austria remain major destination countries of asylum applicants in the EU (in 2008 France registered the highest number and 17.5% and Austria 5.4% of the total asylum applications in EU 27), whereas the Czech Republic (except from a sharp rise of applications in 2001) continued to receive only small numbers of asylum seekers (see table 1).

The recognition practices in the three countries are heterogeneous, as the global recognition rates of refugees demonstrate and vary also with regard to nationality groups. Practices also differ with view to the kind of protection status granted: whereas in France, most asylum seekers are recognized with a Geneva convention refugee status, in Austria and in Czech Republic a larger proportion of refugees are recognized under a subsidiary (temporary) protection framework.5

The actual refugee population (persons with a recognized UN convention refugee status or another international protection status) forms only a small proportion of the overall immi-
grant population and is 160,017 in France, 37,557 in Austria and 2,110 in Czech Republic, according to UNHCR data (as of January 2009, UNHCR database, http://www.unhcr.org/).

In the 1990s, legal and institutional asylum systems underwent profound changes with the advancing harmonisation of EU policies, EU enlargement and a parallel reinforcement and shift of migration control to (and beyond) external borders. During the first stage of intergovernmental harmonisation of national asylum policies from 1999 to 2005, minimal common standards for reception conditions, asylum procedures and qualifications for refugee status were set up. Also the Dublin system, a mechanism to exchange information and determine the competence for processing asylum applications among EU member states, was established in this period. In the second phase, the Hague programme fixed further steps to create a Common European asylum system (CEAS) until 2010 (now postponed to 2012) in order to establish a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection, and to strengthen practical co-operation between national asylum administrations. To this aim, a European asylum support office is currently being established.

EU integration processes have had an important impact on asylum policies and institution building or reform, albeit in different ways. In France and in Austria domestic policy agendas and the politicisation of immigration and asylum issues by conservative and extreme right wing (government) parties has led to numerous immigration and asylum law reforms undertaken during recent years, most of them focussing on control and security.

<table>
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Total 656 710 335 034 87 937

Notes: The figures for France include all first applications without reexamination claims and without minors (accompanying asylum seekers)

Sources: Annual statistics Office français pour la protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA); Austrian Ministry of the Interior (BMI); Czech Ministry of the Interior

UNHCR 2009 (for years 2007 and 2008 - Austria and Czech Republic)
Since the 1990s, the French asylum system has undergone major legal and institutional changes. In recent years, the conservative UMP government has reformed the asylum act several times (in 2003, 2006, and 2007), which has considerably extended the scope for accelerated asylum processing, above all with the introduction of a list of safe countries of origin in 2005. New forms of temporary protection (territorial asylum 1998, substituted by subsidiary protection status according to the EU directive in 2003) were introduced besides the Geneva Convention refugee status. And also the reception system for asylum seekers became more decentralised and saw its capacities expanded in response to an urgent crisis of accommodation facilities.

Austria’s EU accession in 1995 made it a precursor in implementing restrictive asylum policies in the EU. Numerous asylum law reforms since the early 1990s (in 1991, 1997, 2003, 2005 and 2009) introduced a series of regulations (“safe third country concept”, accelerated procedures, extensive powers of detention etc.) that restricted the rights of asylum seekers (Langthaler 2007). Austria was among the first European countries to introduce new temporary protection systems in the event of a large inflow of war refugees from the Former Yugoslavia. Since 2004, the decentralised reception system has been further developed according to the EU reception directive.

In the Czech Republic EU integration has been a major driving force for the introduction of a Geneva Convention based asylum and reception system since 1990; the first asylum law of 1990 created the framework for a relatively liberal asylum policy, but legal reforms aiming at adaptation to EU requirements in relation to asylum and migration have shaped more restrictive asylum practices later on.

2.2 Legal and institutional framework for the civic and political participation of refugees

When compared to other EU member states, the three countries under study do not offer the most favourable legal and institutional frameworks for the civic and political participation of third country foreign residents (Niessen, Huddleston and Citron 2007). This is mainly due to the fact that the three countries figure among the 12 EU countries\(^8\) which exclude third country citizens from active and passive voting rights in local, national and EU elections (Groenendijk 2008). Although the Czech Republic has in principle since 2001 allowed foreign nationals to vote in local elections on the basis of reciprocity agreements with migrants’ countries of origin, no such agreements have been concluded so far. In France and Austria, legislative initiatives to introduce local voting rights for foreign residents have failed.

*Freedom of association and institutional immigrant participation*

Freedom of association of foreign residents is not constrained legally and guaranteed on equal terms for citizens and foreign nationals alike in Austria and France. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic foreigners (without permanent residence status) could until recently\(^9\) only register associations when their board included at least three Czech citizens. Furthermore, membership in political parties is denied for foreign citizens (which is not the case in France or Austria).

All three countries have introduced a range of models of institutional immigrant participation (consultative councils, integration councils for foreigners), above all in the context of local (municipal) integration policies. Refugee representatives participate in such general immigrant councils, but none of the three countries have established councils specifically aimed at the consultation and involvement of refugees in local or national (refugee) politics (see Černík 2007; Kraler and Sohler 2007; Schuerkens 2007).

*Access to citizenship*

As voting rights are reserved for citizens, the access to political rights for refugees depends on citizenship integration and policies. This is particularly important for refugees, since in contrast to other immigrants they are also deprived of any political and civil rights in their former countries of origin.

Access to citizenship for refugees is least problematic in France, which has a generally liberal citizenship regime, based on jus-soli principles for the children of immigrants born in the country and on the toleration of dual citizenship. Naturalisation of recognized Geneva Convention refugees is facilitated by exempting them from the condition of five-year minimum residence period for the application for citizenship. Also, for long-term residents (minimum of 15 years) and aged refugees (over 70), the requirements concerning language knowledge are suspended (Weil and Spire 2006).

In Austria, where the naturalisation of refugees is also less complicated compared to other immigrants, the barriers for the naturalisation of Geneva Convention refugees have been heightened with the latest citizenship law reforms by extending the minimum residence period required for application (from four years up to six years; for other immigrants, the minimum period is ten years). Refugees with subsidiary protection status are disadvantaged as they can only apply for citizenship after fifteen years of residence.

In the Czech Republic refugees still face high barriers for naturalisation, and are subject to the same conditions as immigrants in general. After five years of stay with a permanent residence status (a permit which is issued after five years of residence) – which means in practice at least after ten years of residence – it is possible to apply for citizenship.

2.3 Stratification of rights and integration conditions

The multiplication of legal status and protection regimes has implied a stratification of social, economic and civic rights for different legal categories of refugees. These status regimes
shape the reception and integration conditions of asylum seekers and refugees.

Asylum seekers

Status and rights of asylum seekers during the processing of their claim differ according to procedures (regular procedure, exceptional or fast-track procedure, Dublin procedure).

During the asylum procedure – which can retard for several years – asylum seekers cannot access services supporting integration (such as language or professional training) or work permits (up to one year in the asylum procedure). Such difficult living conditions are aggravated through long-lasting asylum procedures or limited freedom of movement, detention or segregation in asylum accommodation facilities.10

In France, an increasingly large group of asylum seekers, whose applications have been processed through exceptional, accelerated procedures or through the Dublin procedure have been excluded from the state reception and accommodation system.11 Many of them are therefore homeless and depend on the assistance of humanitarian associations or community networks. Detention (for removal) of asylum seekers during the processing of the asylum used to be applied less frequently in the past, but has been on the increase in fast-track procedures.12 As the social and humanitarian problems of asylum seekers became more visible in public space, like when homeless asylum seekers squat in abandoned buildings, solidarity organisations have mobilised to facilitate better housing and reception conditions and access to asylum rights.13

In contrast, detained asylum seekers are made invisible to the society and framed in terms of security and problems of public order, partly because access to these asylum seekers by civil society organisations is generally very restricted, which forms an obstacle to the mobilisation of broader support for these groups.

This is especially the case in Austria, where asylum seekers are frequently held in administrative detention already during the asylum processing or the Dublin procedure.14 A high number of asylum seekers are going through long-lasting asylum procedures (for longer than three years)15 which causes deskilling and psychic health problems. An additional problem is the accommodation of asylum seekers in remote, rural areas and small villages, which hampers their access to health services, including psychotherapy, education institutions, asylum support NGOs and also participation in migrant community organisations and activities.

In the Czech Republic asylum seekers are generally guaranteed social assistance during the whole procedure, although their freedom of movement is restricted during the first screening phase in asylum reception centres. In 2007, powers of detention of asylum seekers were expanded significantly, and asylum seekers (including minors) are frequently detained in relation to Dublin procedures (Sona Aujeska/OPU 2006).

In the initial period, language barriers and unfamiliarity with bureaucracy as well as mistrust towards state authorities often constitute an insurmountable obstacle for building formal organisations to most of the newcomers. While in Austria and in the Czech Republic, refugee groups have to overcome serious language barriers to get access to institutions and organisation facilities, these hurdles are less important for certain francophone refugee populations coming to France from former French colonies in Africa. The fact of having been socialised in a French education system has facilitated direct, immediate civic participation for them.

Recognized refugees

Also for those with a recognized refugee status, conditions and rights have become more stratified with the introduction of further protection categories besides the conventional refugee status. Refugees with conventional status are granted a permanent residence permit (and protection from expulsion), equal rights as citizens with regard to social security, access to labour market and education, and specific integration assistance. In contrast, the subsidiary protection status confers only a temporary, insecure residence permit (one year permit that has to be renewed and can be revoked when risk of persecution in home country is no longer given), and restricted access to social rights, mobility rights or naturalisation. With regard to EU internal mobility and residence rights recognized refugees are so far not granted the same rights as other long-term foreign residents.16

Humanitarian status

Another category of de facto refugees is composed of asylum seekers that are denied a refugee status, but can nevertheless not return or be expelled to their home countries for security reasons, humanitarian or integration reasons (e.g. children born and integrated in the asylum country). Exceptional regularisations on humanitarian or integration grounds were hardly applied in the Czech Republic and rather restrictively in Austria,17 but more frequently in France in the course of collective regularisation programmes and individual case by case regularisation on discretionary basis (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009; Sohler 2009).

2.4 Active citizenship, political culture and civil society mobilisations

The legal framework is insufficient to explain the actual practices and meaning of citizenship. Different historically developed citizenship concepts, national political cultures and modes of collective mobilisation also have a great impact on the political engagement of immigrants and refugees.

In French political culture, collective protests by pressure groups are an important form of political dispute (Sommier and Crettiez 2002). Within the new social movements that developed after May 1968, migrants’ and asylum seekers’ rights associations developed alongside immigrants’ and refugees’ own organizations. Immigrants participated in trade
unions, in migrant youth movements (second generation of Maghreb immigrants) and anti-racism movements, and the Sans Papiers movement emerging in the 1990s (Ireland 2000; Laubenthal 2007; Withol de Wenden and Leveau 2001). In the political system, citizens with immigrant background or second generation migrants still remain strongly underrepresented as politicians on local and national level, although they represent a growing number of candidates and representatives in municipal councils, EU parliament and lately also in the conservative UMP government.

NGOs have operated in the asylum field for a long time, emerging in different periods, political contexts and sectors, such as traditional human rights and antiracist organisations (LDH, MRAP), Christian humanitarian (Cimade, Secours Catholique) and immigrants’ and asylum rights organisations developing in the 1970s. Only a small number of specialised refugee and asylum rights associations established in this period, above all France Terre d’Asile (created in 1971 by former members of the Résistance). The involvement of associations has strongly shaped the institutional development of the national reception system (Dispositif national d’accueil) with the arrival of refugees from Chile and South-east Asia in the 1970s. France Terre d’Asile held a key role in coordinating the reception system in co-operation with other associations until 2001, when this function was again transferred to the governmental migrant integration office ANAEM.

Since early 1990s the mobilisations for regularisation of refused asylum seekers has become a key issue in the context of the emerging Sans Papiers movement and citizens’ solidarity networks (as RESF Network Education without frontiers), in which refused asylum seekers have become involved on a broader basis. In 2006 and 2007, major protests against immigration and asylum law reforms rallied broad support among NGOs and migrant associations.

In Austria, a consensus-oriented political culture shaped by the social partnership was dominant for a long time, which has contributed to the fact that extra-parliamentary political mobilisation has been rare. The first refugee solidarity organisations developed as part of the 1980s new social movements and within the milieu of internationalist left wing student organisations. In the 1990s, refugee and immigrant support associations were formed against the background of intensive anti-immigration mobilisation of the extreme right wing Freedom party (FPÖ) and the parallel tightening of asylum and immigration laws by the then Social Democrat - Conservative government coalition.

Until the late 1990s, the political participation of migrants and refugees in such movements remained marginal. Since then, political participation of the immigrant population has received more attention in political debate as the number of naturalised immigrants has increased. Migrants and refugees still remain underrepresented in the political system (only recently the first MP with a Turkish immigrant background was elected to the Austrian national Parliament).

The domestic politicisation of the asylum issue has contributed to xenophobic and racist stigmatisation of asylum seekers, who were portrayed as criminals and as a major security threat in the political discourse and tabloid media. Native Austrians and politicians regularly opposed the accommodation of asylum seekers. This general political climate triggered civil society mobilisation against xenophobic politics and the criminalisation of asylum seekers, so with campaigns against the detention of asylum seekers (“Flight is no crime”) or antiracist campaigns (like the one triggered by the death of the Nigerian asylum seeker M. Omofuma caused during his expulsion in 1999; or reactions against the extreme right wing parties FPÖ and BZÖ-run election campaigns that stigmatised asylum seekers in 2006). Only recently, a national campaign for the regularisation, “right to stay,” of asylum seekers who have resided in the country for a long time but whose application has been refused has emerged from local citizens’ protest mobilisations. These movements started in 2006-2007, mainly in the villages of Upper and Lower Austria. The campaign has sought to achieve regularisation in individual cases of families of refused asylum seekers that should be expelled to their home countries after long-term residence and integration in Austria.

The generally weak political participation and mobilisation of Czech citizens has its origins partly in the experience of coerced participation in state organisations during communism (Howard 2003), which has provoked reluctance to organise. Asylum issues are marginalized in public discourse and only raised in the context of necessary EU requirements, irregular immigration or abuse of social benefits. In the media, asylum seekers and refugees are generally portrayed in general as helpless victims (Muhič Dizdarevič 2009).

The present Czech NGOs in the asylum and refugee sector, – Counseling Center for Refugees PPU, Organization for Aid to Refugees OPU, SOZE, Counseling Center for Integration PPI, and Center for Issues of Migration COM – were set up in the democratic transition period after the Velvet Revolution, but were not embedded in a broader civil society movement and have not had wider support in the society. After the initial rise of NGOs in the years after the Velvet Revolution the influence of civil society actors has steadily declined (Frič 2004).

Their advocacy was above all shaped by and focussed on EU policy agendas, legal petitions against the tightening of asylum legislation and awareness-raising campaigns among native populations about immigrants and refugees. They also aimed at countering stereotypes and xenophobia. Due to the general invisibility of and indifference towards asylum issues in Czech society, such political mobilization has remained limited to a narrow circle of civil society organizations active in the field and a few political representatives (especially within the Green party).

3. Role of NGOs and RCOs in the field of asylum policy

Asylum seekers and refugees are civic and political actors with little resources and political power to influence their liv-
3.1 Role of NGOs

An increasingly professionalized NGO sector assisting refugees has developed in all three countries, composed of human rights organisations (influential in France), humanitarian Christian organisations (important players in Austria and in France) and refugee and migrants’ rights organisations emerging from new social movements. These NGOs are active in providing legal and social assistance for asylum seekers, and some of them are involved in the management of reception and accommodation facilities for asylum seekers, as well as in integration programmes for recognized refugees. These include for example language courses and employment coaching. With the expansion of reception and integration systems and available public subsidies, these NGOs have further developed and specialised their support services and organisational structures. This has considerably enlarged the scope and activity fields of NGOs, but also made them more dependent on state subsidies and political pressure.

NGOs function as gate-keepers by promoting the participation of refugees in their own organisational structures and activities as staff or volunteers, the support for self-organisation and self-advocacy of refugees, or building networks and co-operation with refugee community organisations. In general, practical co-operation between professional NGOs and refugees’ community-based associations is not very tight, but tends to remain on an ad hoc and informal basis.

The field of professional legal counselling and advocacy is generally dominated by NGOs. Refugees’ own organisations have rarely developed professional infrastructures of refugee assistance. Because of the increasing demand of (inter-)cultural and linguistic competence, a growing number of refugees and migrants have been employed as staff in the expanding NGO sector of refugee assistance. However, they are still not found in higher management positions. NGOs have not adopted particular policies to integrate refugees in their associations, and have very different internal organisational cultures concerning refugees’ participation.

Nevertheless, several NGOs promote the volunteering of refugees and migrants as a means to improve integration, especially during longer periods of unemployment within the asylum procedure. In France, recently created residents’ councils have promoted the participation of residents in asylum accommodation hostels. Refugees are also from time to time involved in public awareness-raising activities of NGOs. An initiative that involves refugees in information activities on a more regular basis is Radio Quasimodo20 of the French NGO France Terre d’Asile, a weekly radio program on asylum and migration issues produced by refugee journalists.

Only few capacity-building projects for refugee organisations have been implemented in the three countries, although such projects have been initiated by EU programmes. Examples of such pilot refugee advocacy training projects were the Share project in Austria and the “Advocacy Training for Refugee Communities” (ATRC) project in the Czech Republic in 2005. In France, refugee self-organisation has been promoted in the framework of a recent Equal partnership project.21 These initiatives do not seem to have succeeded in consolidating partnerships between NGOs and RCOs after the end of project funding, partly because there are no comparable funding schemes and policies for refugee community development and self-organization in the national contexts. However, in the case of several Austrian refugees participating in such capacity-building projects, the impact on individual engagement has been important in regard to further network building and follow-up initiatives at the level of EU advocacy.

Co-operations between NGOs and RCOs were also hampered because the majority of them ignored the existing refugee community organisations, and scepticism against ethnic community based social work (as practiced in other countries) persisted among many of these professionals. In particular, French NGO representatives are concerned about maintaining an independent position in relation to the political self-organisations of refugees.

3.2 Role of refugee community organisations (RCOs)

Community organisations are often the first contact point for asylum seekers, thereby facilitating access to the asylum procedure by providing information, translation and orientation in the applicant’s mother tongue. Their role is not institutionalised and interactions with authorities take place mainly on an informal level. In the asylum procedure representatives from refugee organisations also assume an informal role as “advocates” for their members, for example to testify for their partisan political activists, or as information resource persons for authorities, providing information for example on the situation in the country of origin. In Austria, this kind of expertise is more widely acknowledged than in France of the Czech Republic.

Legal assistance and representation of asylum seekers is less assumed by RCOs themselves, instead they recommend professional NGOs or lawyers. RCOs provide more personal social support for their members than NGOs can do because of time and staff limitations. In that respect, RCOs form a complementary self-help network responding to the personal needs of refugees and seeking to overcome the shortcomings of the institutional reception system for asylum seekers.

However, the role of RCOs as asylum advocacy and interest organisations for their members is weakly developed
in the three countries under research. Asylum rights advocacy is mainly done by big NGOs and their advocacy networks. RCOs have not been represented as formal members of these coordination and advocacy networks. Also, refugees have seldom been associated in active or leading roles in asylum-related national political campaigns, initiated and run by NGOs.

Refugee communities are more often involved in local mobilisation and precarious protests of asylum seekers concerning their accommodation situation or against possible expulsion. Community leaders of RCOs sometimes assume an important role as mediators in conflict situations with the local population or authorities. An example of this were the protests of Chechen asylum seekers against their bad accommodation conditions in Matrei, province of Tyrol, Austria, in May 2005 (Langthaler and Trauner 2009: 139f).

RCOs share many similarities: they are mainly small organisations operating on a voluntary basis and on a local level. In none of the three countries were RCOs connected to transnational or local refugee networks or interest organisations. Co-operation and networks between different (national) refugee community organisations are rare, except within the broader framework of immigrant integration platforms. This results partly from the fact that in contrast to the UK (Ngendahayo 2009), explicit funding policies for refugee community organisations are not implemented in any of the countries studied.

RCOs receive only very limited resources from their members to develop associative activities, since most refugees are in a difficult economic situation for long periods of time. They have access to local and municipal funding schemes for associations working in the domain of migrant integration or on cultural, women, or health issues, as well as education. A major constraint is that asylum seekers are generally excluded from integration programmes and related funding opportunities. Funds for development activities are available only in France, an engagement so far ignored in Austria and the Czech Republic. Large-scale, governmental funding programmes for refugee integration, in the framework of the European Refugee Fund, are inaccessible for these community organisations, as they lack necessary infrastructures, know-how (project management) and also “mentoring” of NGOs for project-partnerships.

Partnerships between NGOs and RCOs were weakly developed apart from the few pilot projects for capacity building of refugee self-advocacy structures mentioned above. Among the reasons for this, interviewees pointed to certain mistrust, competition over resources, or the different organisational cultures between voluntary community organisations based on group solidarity relations and professional NGOs based on client relations. The “interiorisation” of legal discourse and bureaucratic norms (related to professional legal support for refugees) within NGO culture may also provoke interest conflicts with refugee communities that advocate for their constituencies on broader terms, such as social justice or human dignity.

Activities of refugee organisations often respond to the particular needs of exiled, sometimes traumatised persons who find themselves in a situation of dependence, destitution or with limited rights. Such associations also aim to create a space for meetings and activities during the long period of insecurity typical of the asylum procedure and the particular difficulties of integration, like language barriers or health and psychological problems due to traumatisation or loss of family. Many interviewees perceived the RCOs to have an important role in providing security and psychological support for their members to reconstruct their lives.

Building professional networks is another important dimension that refugee associations try to address. Situations of deskilling are most problematic for high-skilled refugees working as journalists, university teachers, artists, etc. before their emigration. Many of them cannot practice their former profession because of language barriers, difficult and long procedures for the recognition of diploma and qualifications, or discrimination of foreign nationals with regard to access to certain professions and public sector employment (as is the case in France). Several RCOs, for example Journalistes Africains en Exil and The Association Centre Culturel Franco-Tchétchène (in Paris), or Radio Afrika International in Vienna have been actively working to overcome hurdles for professional integration.

Many of the longer established communities have shifted their activities to support integration or to maintain cultural practices and identities, especially in the realm of the socialisation of younger generations, for example by organising mother-tongue language teaching for children. To the extent that refugee populations are becoming increasingly female, specific activities to support refugee women and women’s organisations have been developed. Such organizations also attempt to promote gender equality within their own communities.

A multiplicity of advocacy strategies and “collective identities” are mobilised in organisation processes, reflecting the increasing diversity of refugee populations in regard to status, gender, age, class, education, and countries of origin. With the stigmatisation of refugees, many also avoid “negative” self-definition, and instead put forward cultural community identities (“Afghan cultural organisation”) or political identities (exiles, Sans Papiers).

In the case of cultural minorities (such as Kurds or Tamils) these strategies are closely associated to their political combat as national minorities in their home countries, and maintaining an ethno-political consciousness in the emigration context (and as part of a transnational diaspora) has remained a fundamental basis for their political representation.

In the Czech Republic the process of refugee organisation is still at an early stage and mainly informal because asylum migration is a relatively recent phenomenon and the number of refugees is very small. In contrast, the diverse groups and several generations of refugees in France and Austria have developed a large number and variety of socio-cultural community or political organisations (Langthaler and Trauner...
In the Austrian institutional framework such cultural or religious minority strategies have found more resonance, whereas in the French context political identities that transcend communities of origin (such as exiles and Sans Papiers) have been more legitimate within a Republican integration model that does not recognize cultural minorities as political actors.

## 3.3 Transnational refugee networks and advocacy

### 3.3.1 Engagement of RCOs in home countries

Supporting political and social transformation in the home countries by way of political lobbying, human rights or humanitarian engagement is a strong motivation and focus of activities for many refugee organisations. Political engagement in refugee communities is often characterised by exile opposition party organisations struggling for support and influence among refugee communities (as for example the former Kurdish workers’ party, PKK, influential in Austrian Kurdish community organisations, or the Tamil Tigers, influential in the Tamil refugee community in Paris; Etiemble 2004). Partisan politics is subject to criminalisation and state security surveillance, which can be an obstacle for RCO co-operation with associations or public institutions that seek to support asylum seekers and refugees.

On the other hand, refugees also actively support the civil society in their country of origin, which is only possible from a distance due to the lack of democratic freedom in their home countries. They play an important role in monitoring the political and humanitarian situation in their countries of origin as well as informing the public and raising awareness about it, for example through demonstrations or websites. In this respect, transnational practices have provided an important basis for the broadening and diversifying of refugees’ networks with political parties and politicians, human rights organisations, churches, trade unions, international solidarity organisations or media in the asylum country. Thus political engagement related to the home countries has enabled and facilitated civic and political integration in the asylum countries, as the biographies of the interviewed refugee activists suggest.

Many RCOs in France and Austria initiate and support aid projects in their countries of origin, such as the construction of schools in Afghanistan and support for orphan homes in Chechnya. Transnational activities are only encouraged in France by public funding targeted at immigrant associations’ development activities (so called co-development24), and also by the low barriers for acquiring citizenship and the toleration of dual citizenship.

### 3.3.2 European RCO networks

Some communities have brought their concerns onto a European level. These initiatives have emerged in relation to EU asylum policies that have affected refugee communities in different manners. Such advocacy builds on community-based, political or cultural transnational networks of refugee diasporas across Europe, which are connected by personal and family ties between active members in different European asylum countries. The Dublin system contributed to this dispersal of refugee groups coming from the same country and separation of family members in multiple asylum countries (ECRE 2006; 2008). The developing EU asylum regime and its negative repercussions on refugee protection and living conditions have also encouraged transnational mobilisation of RCO actors.

Two community-specific organisations can highlight such dynamics. They address the issues of forced return of refugees and the negative impacts of the Dublin system on asylum seekers from Chechnya. The Afghan communities in Europe (with the largest communities residing in Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark) became more active in their support of refugees in order to organise protests against the forced return of Afghan refugees in a few EU member countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. This resulted in several cross-national mobilisations and closer collaboration in European organisation structures. On the initiative of the Afghan refugee community association “Austrian Afghan Cultural association”,25 a European network with members from 12 countries named “Solidarity society of Afghan refugees in Europe” was formed in 2007. Its focus is on the integration of Afghan refugees in Europe and the coordinated action against involuntary return of refugees to Afghanistan.

More recently, also Chechen refugees have begun to organise, with the strong support of citizens’ solidarity associations like the European-Chechen society in Austria and the Chechen Committees in France and Belgium.26 The main focus of Chechen refugee activism is on exile partisan politics and on human rights politics in Chechnya. Their activities include demonstrations, petitions and legal action, particularly cases filed at the European Human Rights court. The foremost objective is to influence EU foreign policies towards Russia, rather than national policies. They have also advocated for refugee rights in the EU parliament,27 especially concerning the application of the Dublin regulation on Chechen refugees, the unequal treatment and protection of Chechen refugees in different EU countries,28 or expulsions of asylum seekers to Russia.

### 3.3.3 ERAD as a new player in EU advocacy for refugees

At the EU level, major policy changes have influenced the possibilities and strategies of the asylum advocacy of civil society actors, NGOs as well as refugee self-organisations.

The decision-making procedures have been reformed with the communitarisation of asylum policies. Since 2005 the EU parliament together with the Council participates in asylum and migration legislation (co-decision procedure), which used to be the exclusive realm of the EU council.
Intergovernmental harmonisation of asylum policies during the first stage was generally characterised by a democratic deficit, where civil society actors were only consulted marginally and on ad hoc basis in the policy process. The democratisation and increased transparency of EU decision-making on asylum has implied a more active role for civil society actors in awareness-raising in public debates on the issue. An example of this was the EU Return Directive, which was the first test case of co-decision by the European Parliament and the Council and was well covered by the media. As decision-making processes are becoming more public, NGOs have also been encouraged to include “refugee voices” more actively in their campaigning and awareness-raising work. NGO representatives have considered the parliamentary process as more responsive in regard to asylum and human rights issues and the expertise of NGOs, than the national policy context where asylum agendas are more polarised and exploited in electoral competition. This changing policy-making context has also provided new opportunities for refugees to participate in EU policy-making, for example in civil society consultation processes, and in particular in the recent consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper on the future common European asylum system.

Until 2007, refugees’ organisations were absent from EU advocacy in the field of asylum policies. Neither were they represented at EU level within NGO advocacy networks, nor consulted in a structured manner as stakeholders in EU asylum policies. The capacity building projects of European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) have played a crucial role in promoting the self-advocacy of refugees at EU level. Furthermore, ECRE has sought to facilitate RCO access to EU funding and to promote membership of RCOs in its own organisation. However, at present only one RCO, the Ethiopian Community Centre in the UK, is a member of ECRE.

The initiative for a refugee-led advocacy organisation at EU level was advanced in 2005 by several committed refugee activists, who had participated in capacity building pilot projects funded by the EU under the lead of ECRE. In 2007, the European Refugee Advocacy Organisation (ERAD) was officially launched in the EU parliament, with the support of ECRE and MEPs from the Green party and the Social Democrats. It had nine refugee organisations as founding members. In the meantime, the first national ERAD-branch association based in Austria (Graz) has been registered. Its principal aim is to promote the self-advocacy of refugees by acting as broker between local refugee grass roots organisations in diverse member states and EU institutions. As ERAD coordinator Zemikael Habte-Mariam emphasized, an important aspect of ERAD’s work consists of the empowerment of refugees to advocate on their behalf.

ERAD has faced challenges in regard to the lack of advocacy structures and the fact that refugees often have little experience in political advocacy because of their political exclusion on the national level, which also hampers their organisation at the EU policy level. A major obstacle for an EU wide refugee umbrella organisation is that national umbrella organisations fail due to the fragmentation or political divisions among organisations. Nevertheless, ERAD as a transversal (cross-community) and EU wide refugee self-organisation is perceived by its members as an opportunity to stimulate the creation of national umbrella organisations to represent refugees’ political interests in member states. Another obstacle is the heterogeneity of EU policy agendas and national agendas, and also the fact that community-specific problems and concerns diverge greatly, so that it is not easy to define advocacy issues common to all refugees. The most important common advocacy themes that ERAD has envisaged to address concern fair asylum procedures and integration matters (above all, issues related to professional opportunities and recognition of qualifications), although integration policies are so far formulated in the national domain and depend on EU action only to a limited degree. By providing case studies, representatives of ERAD also want to communicate the human rights violations and injustices that refugees are subject to in diverse national contexts in the EU policy sphere. Both NGO representatives and ERAD members see their role as complementary to the already established advocacy NGOs in Brussels.

4 Conclusions

We have observed a twofold process structuring refugee participation: on the one hand, the downgrading of status rights and integration conditions for an increasing proportion of asylum seekers and refugees as a consequence of restrictive asylum policies has had a negative impact on their resources and capacities for participation in social, economic and political life.

The stratification of status regimes that govern residence as well as access to citizenship and political rights has also contributed to a fragmentation of common interests and advocacy claims of refugee populations. On the other hand, the formation of transnational networks of refugee actors through personal and professional relations or the creation of media and associations has facilitated strategies of political representation of settled, highly educated and mobile (naturalized) EU citizens with a refugee background. These transnational networks allow them to mobilise further resources at European level.

The weakly developed representation of refugees’ interests in local and national policies is a major stumbling stone for building effective advocacy networks at EU level. While new opportunities were opened for refugee self-advocacy on the EU level, effective political representation suffers from the lack of representative structures at national level, the weakness of sustainable co-operation structures between civil society actors (NGOs and refugee communities), and a missing coherent policy framework to promote empowerment and participation of refugees.

Albeit marginalised as political actors, refugee community organisations provide an important social self-help network for asylum seekers and refugee populations, and thus can play a pivotal role as vehicles for enhancing democratic participa-
tion in countries of asylum as well as home countries. Taking into account the experience and practical knowledge of refugees themselves in refugee policy-making will be crucial to the reform of the protection system, particularly in regard to effectively guaranteeing refugees’ human rights, preventing their double “victimisation” and last but not least, building more democratic societies, both in Europe and in refugees’ countries of origin.

Bibliography


Notes
1 The term of “diaspora” in the sense of a specific form of “transnational community” has been more widely used to classify refugee communities, as this concept was originally associated with forced emigration and displacement (war refugees), exile and the maintenance of a collective memory of and identity based on the homeland, often including a return project (Van Hear 2004; Wahlbeck 2002).
2 The project “Civic participation and representation of refugees and asylum seekers in the EU” was funded by the national research programme “New Orientations for Democracy in Europe – NODE” of the Austrian Ministry of Research. It was carried out between September 2006 and February 2008 in partnership with institutions and researchers in Austria (Asylkoordination Österreich, Vienna; Centre for Social Innovation, Vienna), France and in the Czech Republic (Charles University Prague). The case studies are published on the website of Asylkoordination Austria: http://www.asyl.at/projekte/node.htm
3 The term is used in the British context and closely related to the British integration policies, which promote the self-organisation and empowerment of refugees via community organisations. We use this term to characterize self-organisations in which refugees form the main constituency (in the majority organized on the basis of cultural or national origin) that seek to provide solidarity and self-help for their community members and advocate for their interests in the public sphere.
4 These organisations included in France (Paris) : Journalistes en Exil (JAFE), Centre Culturel Franco-tchétohène, Accueil des médecins et personnels de santé réfugiés en France; Comité Tchétohène, Maison d’Haiti, Centre Kurde Ahmed Kaya; In Austria (Vienna, Graz): Gesellschaft unabhängiger Iränischer Frauen GIF; Afghanscher Kulturverein, Afghanische Frauenorganisation, Europäisch-tschetschenische Gesellschaft, Afrikanet, Chiala ‘Africas; Ætiopisch Community, Kurdisches Zentrum, FEYKOM, African Community Graz, Radio Afrika, LEFO (Lateinamerikanische Emigrierte Frauen in Österreich); In the Czech Republic (Prague): Association of Refugees in the Czech Republic, Berkat – InBáze (social centre of migrants), Humanitas Afrika, Slovo 21.
5 These two terms convey a distinction in legal status: asylum seekers are persons seeking protection within the asylum system and refugees are those granted a (permanent or temporary) protection status.
6 In 2008, 85% of all recognized refugees in France had a convention refugee status and 15% enjoyed subsidiary protection; in Austria, in addition to the 3753 recognized conventional refugees, 1628 persons (30%) were granted subsidiary protection (in 2008). In the Czech Republic recognitions with humanitarian and subsidiary status exceed those with conventional refugee status (180 vs. 170 in 2008).
The Dublin II system is based on the Dublin II regulation that replaced the earlier Dublin Convention of 1990 and came into force in September 2003. It confers the responsibility for examination of asylum claims to the EU member state that has allowed entry or through which the asylum seeker has first entered EU territory (these are often member states at the EU periphery where asylum seekers enter across land and sea borders). The Dublin system abolished the free choice of the asylum country for asylum seekers and intends to inhibit multiple asylum applications within the EU. In this respect it operates in conjunction with EUROPADAC (operative since 2005), a central database containing the fingerprints of all individuals lodging asylum applications or having entered illegally in the EU.

The 12 states that do not allow any local voting rights are Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, and Romania.

Previously, associations of foreigners were regulated by a special law, which required approval by governmental bodies. Since the amendment of the relevant act (n. 116/1985 Col.) foreigners’ associations have been registered on equal terms and by the same law as associations of Czech citizens (act n.83/1990 Col.). In essence, this means that foreigners’ associations must merely go through the registering procedure and do not need any further approval by the government.

The reception facilities in France have been further regionalised and the traditional concentration of asylum seekers in Île-de-France and Paris has diminished (in 2006, 45% of asylum seekers lived in Île-de-France). Other departments in the South of France (Rhône Alpes, Provence Alpes-Côte d’Azur) have become important reception regions for asylum seekers. Austria introduced a dispersal policy of reception quotas in its nine provinces, where asylum seekers were often accommodated in private hotels in villages. In the Czech Republic there are nine accommodation centres across the country.

The proportion of asylum seekers whose applications were processed in exceptional shortened procedures (so-called priority procedures with a processing delay of 15 days in first instance) has risen since 2003: in 2006 30.7% (10,698 applications) and in 2007 28% (8,376) of all asylum procedures were examined in such priority procedures. In addition, we also need to count those asylum seekers who have been subject to a Dublin procedure and therefore neither admitted to the asylum procedure nor entitled to the general subsistence benefits and accommodation for asylum seekers.

Detention is not applied during the regular procedures (only in shortened priority procedures), also because the maximum detention period (for expulsion) is limited to 32 days. In 2006 there were 1,604 asylum seekers (in 2007: 1,864) in detention during the examination of their claim (OFRPA 2006; 2007).

For example the support collective of Exiled of the 10th district (in Paris), a solidarity initiative for homeless migrants and refugees (mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq). The members are transit migrants living on the streets of Paris and in the Calais region since the Sangatte refugee reception centre was closed down in 2002.

From January to September 2006 2,080 asylum seekers were detained. The maximum detention period to enforce expulsion is up to ten months (Forum Asyl 2006: 9).

At the reference date of 28th January 2007 more than 14,000 asylum seekers were in the asylum procedure for longer than three years (Source: Ministry of the Interior BMI, in response to parliamentary question 343/AB XXIII. GP)

Refugees with international protection status are not guaranteed the same rights of free movement and residence within the EU as other long-term resident third country nationals (after 5 years of residence), since they were exempt from the application of the Council Directive (2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003) concerning the status of long-term resident third-country nationals. In 2007 the Commission presented a proposal to amend the directive and to extend its application to refugees, but the issue remains undecided (Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/109 to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection, COM (2007) 298).

More than 6000 humanitarian residence permits have been issued between 2002 and 2007 (Kraler and Reichel 2009:181).

A regularisation programme in 1991 addressed the situation of such refused long-term asylum seekers (whose asylum procedure had taken over three years) and has been so far the only collective regularisation focussing on refused asylum seekers, although the regularisation programme of 1997 among many others also included this group. One third of the applicants (15,000 persons) could get their residence status legalised.

The Austrian social partnership is known as a system of corporatist co-operation between employers’ and labour interest organisations and the government that has been institutionalised since the 1950s. Social partners have played a crucial role in social and economic policy making, including labour immigration policies, through informal negotiation and compromise (instead of class conflict), close links and personal overlaps of functions in social partner interest organisations and within political parties and government. They have thus contributed to the stability of the Austrian political system, although power relations among the major players have shifted considerably.

It is produced in co-operation with asylum-seeking journalists living in the Maison des Journalistes (an asylum home for journalist refugees in Paris). It has been broadcasted weekly since June 2007 and informs on asylum and migration related topics. See http://www.france-terre-asile.org/ and http://www.maisondesjournalistes.org/

The Advocacy Training for Refugee Communities (ATRC) project (2005) was carried out by an NGO partnership in 8 countries (the UK, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, the Netherlands) to develop advocacy training courses for a capacity building programme, which have been attended by individual refugees and representatives from RCOs. See reports at: http://www.eerc.org/projects/strengthening_refugee_participation_in_european_policies_and_programmes

The Advocacy Training for Refugee Communities (ATRC) project (2005) was carried out by an NGO partnership in 8 countries (the UK, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, the Netherlands) to develop advocacy training courses for refugee communities. See reports at: http://atrc.dejahu.hu/


In all three countries NGOs collaborate in national networks to coordinate their advocacy: in Austria in the Forum Asyl and Asylkoordination, in France in the Coordination Française pour le Droit d’Asile (CFDA), and Consortium of Non-governmental Organizations Dealing with Refugees in the Czech Republic. These networks also co-operate with UNHCR and some of their member NGOs are organised in European networks, such as ECRE. See websites: Asylkoordination www.asyl.at ; CFDA http://cfda.rezo.net/; (Czech only): http://www.konzorcium.cz/cz/o-nas.php

At the time of our research only one explicit refugee organisation could be identified, the Association of refugees in the Czech Republic that united (mostly naturalized) refugees from diverse countries of origin.

As a particularity of the French context, also activities of migrant associations related to development projects, remittances and
transfer of competences in their countries of origin are promoted with specific funding schemes in the context of “co-development” policies. They are implemented through bilateral migration agreements with African immigration countries. Projects of migrants in developing countries of origin are also subsidised in collaboration with a federation of migrant organisations (FORIM), set up with governmental support to promote such activities.

25 See http://akis-eu.com
26 See http://www.eu-tg.org; See http://www.comite-tchetcheniac.org
28 The chances for recognition of Chechen refugees vary greatly in EU countries: In Austria Chechen refugees had very high recognition rates (in 2005 90%, in 2006 and 2007 over 80%), which declined considerably in 2008 (to 49.5% in the first three quarters of 2008; source: UNHCR 2009). In contrast the recognition rates for refugees from the Russian Federation (80% Chechens) were considerably lower in France (in 2006 and 2007 only 18%; source: OFPRA annual reports).
29 For example with the ECRE project “Refugee voices”, http://www.ecre.org/refugeestories/
31 They included the two SHARE projects (from 2002 to 2005) and the project Reinforcing the Voices of Refugee Community Organisations (from February 2005 until March 2007). The latter included several advocacy training workshops for refugees from diverse EU countries aiming to build an EU advocacy network (ERAD).
32 The founding members included Afrika Zentrum Chiala’Afriqas (Austria), Flemish association of Russian speakers (Belgium), The refugee advice centre (England), Hakunila International Organisation (Finland), Association pour la défense des réfugiés Africains de France (France), Internationaler Menschenrechtsverein (Germany), Mesopotamia Iraq Association (Greece), Arewa Association of Rwandan Refugees (The Netherlands), and the Internet platform www.afrikanet.info (Austria based). See: www.erad-network.org
In 2008, The EU Project “Health Care in NowHereland” started to work on the issue of health care for undocumented migrants. Undocumented migrants gain increasing attention in the EU as a vulnerable group that is exposed to high health risks and challenges public health. National regulations often severely restrict access to health care for undocumented migrants. At the same time, right to health care has been recognized as human right by various international instruments ratified by European Countries (PICUM 2007a, Pace 2007). This opens a paradox for health care providers: if they give care, they may act against legal and financial regulations, but if they don’t give care they violate human rights and exclude the most vulnerable. This paradox cannot be resolved on a practice level but has to be managed in a way that violates neither human rights nor national regulations. In this research report, we present a conceptual model of health care provision for undocumented migrants as management of a paradox with different strategies on policy and practice level: “Functional Ignorance”, “Structural compensation” and “Informal solidarity.”

Definitions

The Glossary of Migration defines irregular migrant as “Someone who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe a country’s admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country (also called clandestine/illegal/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation)” (IOM 2004: 34).

Other sources define undocumented migrants as: “foreign citizens present on the territory of a state, in violation of the regulations on entry and residence, having crossed the border illicitly or at an unauthorized point: those whose immigration/migration status is not regular, and can also include those who have overstayed their visa or work permit, those who are working in violation of some or all of the conditions attached to their immigration status: and failed asylum seekers or immigrants who have no further right to appeal and have not left the country” (UWT 2008: 19). The CLANDESTINO Methodological Report defines five groups of irregular migrants:

1. Illegal working EU-citizens
2. Persons with seemingly legal temporary residence status (e.g. “working tourists”)
3. Persons with forged papers, or persons who have assumed false identities with real papers (they may live a regular life unless the falsification is discovered)
4. Persons with pending immigration status (e.g. application for regularisation is pending and application papers prevent expulsion, third country nationals who have submitted an asylum claim, persons who have failed a request for status prolongation but still wait for a decision by the time that their limited residence permit runs out)
5. Persons who are without residence status in the country, but with knowledge and toleration of the authorities (toleration does not legalize or change the unlawful presence of the tolerated alien) (see Jandl et al. 2008: 6-7).

What becomes visible through these definitions is the heterogeneity of this group and also the difficulty to find a common terminology. The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, PICUM, recommends the term “undocumented migrants”, as the use of the term “illegal” has a connotation with criminality (see PICUM 2007a). The authors follow this recommendation.

Numbers

Because of the nature of undocumented migration, exact numbers are missing and only estimates are available. For Europe, these estimates vary between 1 – 4 % of the domestic population (OECD/SOPEMI 2007, Fernandes et al. 2007) or total numbers of 4.5 and 8 million, “with an estimated increase by 350 000 to 500000 per year” (European Commission 2007).
“Carriers”

Ways to become undocumented are defined as endogenous – with a legal entry into a country and a fall out of the legal status, for example by overstaying or not leaving when ordered – and exogenous, for example when crossing boarders undetected (SOPEMI 1989). It is estimated that more than half of undocumented migrants are endogenous (Levinson 2005: 2).

Ongoing work on undocumented migration in Europe

Undocumented migration and its implications for health have become important issues in the discussion of European and national health policies. Several European projects approach this phenomenon from different angles, trying to improve the methodology of data collection, investigating policy approaches and examining ways to improve access to and quality of services for undocumented migrants. The EU-project ‘CLANDESTINO Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends across Europe’ provides an inventory of data and estimates on undocumented migrants (numbers and flows) in selected EU countries. The project’s aim is to improve knowledge, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, of undocumented migration (europa.eu/research/fp6/ssp/clandestino_en.htm, accessed 07.02.2009).

‘AMAC – Assisting Migrants and Communities: Analysis of Social Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities’ is a EU-project that reviews key health concerns of migrant populations in the context of social determinants of health. The project also serves as a platform for exchange for European projects concerned with migration and health (http://www.belgium.iom.int/page2.asp?Static_ID=10, accessed 07.02. 2009).

The ‘Averroës Network – Improving Access to Health Care for Asylum Seekers and Undocumented Migrants in the EU’ aims to improve the health status of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers by encouraging the elaboration and implementation of binding community regulations. For this purpose it created a NGO network covering 19 EU member states, which will carry out research, field surveys, and awareness-raising activities at national and EU levels (http://www.mdm-international.org/spip.php?article103#, accessed 07.02.2009).

The ‘COST Action IS0603 – Health and Social Care for Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Europe HOME’ brings together an international group of experts to further the development of research and good practice concerning migrant health. In three working groups on social and policy factors, migrants’ state of health and its implications on health care for migrants and improvements in service delivery, the project consolidates and reviews work carried out so far, identifies blind spots and persistent problems and recommends ways forward to yield new insights into the causes of ill-health through a cross-national perspective (http://www.cost.esf.org/domains_actions/isch/Actions/HOME, accessed 07.02.2009).

These initiatives, together with recent studies concerned with issues of health and migration, name undocumented migrants as an especially vulnerable group, whose insecure status leads to a higher health risk and at the same time, impeded access to health care services (Fernandes et al. 2007, Mladovsky 2007, Padilla & Pereira Miguel 2007). They ask for “greater transparency in countries’ approaches to responding to health and health care utilization inequalities experienced by this population, within the framework of human rights” (Mladovsky 2007: 5). It is pointed out that the lack of data not only stems from methodological and technical problems but is also a sign of a “policy dilemma,” as undocumented migrants play an important role in informal and flexible labour markets that despite all ideals are part of European economic reality (Schierup et al. 2006, in Mladovsky 2007).

Access to health care

A recent report from PICUM (2007b) gives insights into 11 European member states concerning regulations on access to health care for undocumented migrants. It is pointed out that access to health care for undocumented migrants in Europe depends on national competence; regulations are heterogeneous and sometimes confusing. There is a range of providing health care for undocumented migrants on a payment basis only (e.g. in Austria) to full access to health care (e.g. in Spain, Portugal). In some countries, like Germany, reporting regulations are in place, and health care providers are obliged to report encounters with undocumented migrants. Main access points are clinics established and run by NGOs and emergency care units. In general, NGOs take over an important role in providing health care and giving support to migrants in navigating through the system.

The report also points out that even when there is full access to health care, barriers arise due to lack of translators and cultural mediators, lack of information both within health care organisations as well as among undocumented migrants, uncertainties on the side of providers and fear and anxiety on the side of undocumented migrants. This is underlined by recent EU reviews that highlight the lack of knowledge about the health care system and mistrust of service providers as serious obstacles to access (Mladovsky 2007).

What these studies indicate is the combination of higher health risks due to hazardous living and working conditions and a worse access to health care for undocumented migrants. This threatens the health of this specific group as well as that of the rest of the population. Higher risks for public health associated with irregular migration arise mainly from transmissible diseases like tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, the control of which is additionally hindered (PICUM 2007b).

Health care in NowHereland: a European project on health care services for undocumented migrants

Among the recently started European initiatives mentioned above is the project ‘Health Care in NowHereland: Improving Services for Undocumented Migrants in the EU’.

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on the necessary improvement of the level of knowledge on legal and financial frameworks, on the health status and health status determinants of this group of migrants, on ‘reasonable’ organisational behaviour in the given context and hence on sustainable and practical solutions within the EU-27. The running time of the project is January 2008 to February 2011. Findings are publicly available on the project website (www.nowhereland.info).

“Health Care in NowHereland” starts from the point of uncertainty that becomes evident in the literature: there is a “Nowhereland” within Europe, a land that is unknown, but at the same time part of a European present. As public awareness of undocumented migration increases, the lack of knowledge on this topic becomes accentuated. There is no research-based information on the extent of undocumented migration, on the specific health problems of undocumented migrants and their strategies to cope with health problems, and no shared experience of health care providers on how to cope with the situation. How does health care provision become possible in this NowHereland, who are the main stakeholders and what are the main challenges for policies, practices and people are central questions raised in this project.

The project has three general objectives on the levels of policy, practice and people:
1. To draw a European landscape of the different legal and financial frameworks within the 27 member states under which health care organisations, which are confronted with undocumented migrants, act.
2. To collect existing practices of health services in 17 EU member states and to identify models of good practice to support transfer and sustainability. These models are to be contextualised (that is, related to regulations and to clients’ needs).
3. To gain an overview of undocumented migrants’ health problems and of their strategies to get access to health care services in 17 EU member states.

The results and findings will be summarised and made available to a wider public in fact sheets on policies, practices and undocumented migrants’ needs and strategies.

In the course of the project, a database on European health care practices will be compiled. Case studies on models of contextualised, good practice of health care for undocumented migrants will be assessed and described. When assessing these case studies, we will take into consideration policy frameworks as well as undocumented migrants’ needs and strategies. In this article, we describe the conceptual framework developed so far and exemplify it with our first empirical findings. We begin with a paradox on the policy level.

**A paradox on the policy level**

To begin our analysis we look at the policy level, where a particular contradiction becomes evident (see also Zanfrini & Kluth 2008): the dilemma between national regulations that control national borders and define citizenship and different entitlements to stay within a country on one hand, and the universal approach of human rights on the other. Access to health care is defined as a fundamental human right (Pace 2007) and thus as a right that does not depend on one’s legal status or financial capital. This definition should protect socio-economically disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (ECHR 1950). All EU member states do recognise this human right (see PICUM 2007a; Pace 2007). At the same time, national regulations restrict access to health care in different ways and guarantee access to certain basic services, for example emergency care, to different degrees.

This is a paradoxical situation for health care organisations and their personnel. They have to cope with contradictory demands: if they give care, they may act against legal and financial regulations, but if they don’t give care they violate human rights and exclude the most vulnerable. This paradox cannot be resolved on the practice level but has to be managed in a way that neither human rights nor national regulations are violated. To develop a concept of organisational and individual behaviour under such conditions, “management of paradox” seems to be appropriate. It is a concept that gained increasing attention within organisational theory (see Leybourne 2007; Simon 2007). Management of paradox is quite a common situation that emerges when contradictory goals are pursued. A common example is the car industry, where constructing cars follows at least two goals: to make them fast and to make them safe. One solution to handle this is to install two different organisational departments: the department for developing a technology of speed, and the department for developing a technology of safety. This strategy works by creating areas that are not stressed by paradoxical demands, so that the departments can concentrate on one goal at a time. To construct a car, the findings of these two departments have to be combined.

Unfortunately, for health care provision, the idea of constructing departments that follow state demands and others that follow a humanitarian approach seems to be more demanding. A person is not a car, and from a professional perspective of the Hippocratic Oath as well as from a policy perspective of human rights, the former of these has no right to exist, while from the state’s perspective, it is undocumented migration that should not exist.

So how is the management of paradox organised in the practice of health care for undocumented migrants? In this article, we begin to answer this question by describing NowHereland in Austria, the coordinating partner in the European project “Health Care in NowHereland”.

**The NowHereland in Austria**

Undocumented migrants in Austria

As for all European countries, only estimates on the number of undocumented migrants are available for Austria. These estimates range between 17,000 (Biff 2002a and b; IOM 2005) and 100,000 people staying in the country without official entitlement (BMGF 2003). In recent debates, these estimates
have been criticized: “On the basis of the available evidence, no serious quantification of irregular migration in Austria is possible” (Kraler et al. 2008: 2).

Legal regulations

Health care provision in Austria is primarily regulated by the Federal Ministry of Health, Family and Youth (BMGFJ 2008). Nine federal states are responsible for the enactment and implementation of the legislation, as well as for the financing and provision of inpatient care (BMGF 2005). The main source for funding in the Austrian health care system are contributions to the social health insurance, which cover approximately half of the total health expenditure. The other half is financed through tax subsidies from federal governments, communities and private households, one quarter each (BMGF 2005; Hofmarcher & Rack 2006). In 2007 around 99% of the population was covered by the social health insurance (Hauptverband der österreichischen Sozialversicherungssträger 2008). This compulsory insurance under an obligatory scheme by law is financed through income-related contributions and is based on occupation. The insured are entitled to a broad spectrum of benefits within a legally defined framework. Coverage is extended to co-insured affiliates. For specific groups who are not covered by the compulsory insurance (e.g. marginal employed workers) the possibility of self-insurance is provided. Migrants who have a recognised status for humanitarian reasons like refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to health care and their services are covered by health insurance. Most of the registered persons without health insurance are unemployed without entitlement to benefits or asylum seekers who are not accepted into the federal care system (e.g. in case of leaving Austrian territory or being arrested or judged for a criminal offence). A study of the Federal Ministry of Health and Women (BMGF 2003) noted that in 2003 around 160.000 people aged 15 or older were living in Austria without any registered entitlement in case of illness.

If somebody without insurance makes use of the public health care system, in principle this works on a fee for service basis. In any case and despite the financial aspects, through the Austrian Federal Hospitals Act every hospital is committed to providing first aid in case of emergencies (KAKuG 2008). In cases where people are unable to pay for their treatment, or the identification of the patient is not possible, hospitals have to cover the expenses out of their own budget (IOM 2005).

Health care for undocumented migrants

There is no specific regulation for health care provision for undocumented migrants in the Austrian legislation. It can be said that on the regulatory level, undocumented migrants do not exist. In practice, undocumented migrants belong to the small group of people without health and social insurance, and with a high likelihood, are unable to pay expensive treatment costs.

In general, opportunities to receive medical treatment without being insured or able to pay for it directly are highly limited. The services offered mostly depend on sporadic agreements with doctors who offer medical treatment at a lower cost, or organisations that offer specific services (e.g. gynaecological examinations, child birth) free of charge. But there are also some established organisations that provide services for people that have fallen out of the health and social insurance system. Two main actors in the field of health care provision for this marginalised group can be distinguished: Hospitals and NGOs.

Hospitals

Access to hospitals is the least complicated option for undocumented migrants in the public health system in Austria. As there is no gatekeeper system like e.g. in the Netherlands, everybody can directly access the outpatient units at any time. As mentioned, in case of emergency providing treatment is mandatory. Starting from this obligation, a window of opportunity opens for undocumented migrants to get treatment beyond an actual case of emergency. E.g., medical professionals can ‘turn a blind eye’ by applying a wider definition of emergency, providing services knowing that they will not be paid and/or accepting false identities.

Some specific hospitals with a confessional background offer treatment free of charge for people without insurance. The most prominent example in Austria is the private order hospital of the Barmherzigen Brüder (“brothers of mercy”), founded in 1614, which has become one of the most important contact points for undocumented migrants in Vienna (PICUM 2007b; Karl-Trummer & Metzler 2007). Every year around 20.000–30.000 patients without insurance get treatment there, of which 1.000–5.000 are hospitalised. With the guiding principle of the so-called ‘new hospitality’, the hospital grants every patient the best possible nursing and medical care. There are no restrictions on service provision, and the whole range of outpatient and inpatient services is offered for undocumented migrants. The hospital is DRG-(Diagnosis-Related-Groups) funded by a provincial health fund and additionally financed by donations (www.barmherzige-brueder.at, accessed 21.01.2009). This organisation is both a public hospital and as such part of the regular health care system and at the same time, a NGO acting as a private welfare institution. This leads to the important role of NGOs in health care provision for undocumented migrants.

NGOs as intermediaries and as direct providers

A number of NGOs act as intermediaries providing guidance and practical assistance on accessing medical services. A prominent example in Austria is the “Verein Ute Bock” (www.fraubock.at, accessed 21.01.2009) or “Asyl in Not” (www.asyl-in-not.org, accessed 21.01.2009). The “Verein Ute Bock” offers accommodation, legal advice, consultation – including information about accessing health care, the pos-
sibility to name the address of the association for registration and a postal address, as well as education and training for asylum seekers and refugees. The initiative is based on volunteer work and financed through donations. “Asyl in Not” offers legal and social advice on various issues, including health insurance, in several languages.

Other NGOs provide direct medical care for people without insurance. The two largest organisations throughout Austria are AMBER-MED and the Marienambulanz (AMBER-MED 2008; Ambulatorium Caritas Marienambulanz 2008; Sprenger & Bruckner 2008).

**AMBER-MED**

Since 2004, AMBER-MED, a joint project of the refugee service of Diakonie Austria and the Austrian Red Cross has provided outpatient treatment, social counselling and medication for people without insurance coverage in Vienna. The services offered are free of charge and anonymous and include for example general medicine, gynaecological examinations, paediatric care and diabetes care. In 2007, 889 patients, the majority of whom were asylum seekers, refugees and homeless people, made use of AMBER-MEDs services, and the number of patients is increasing. The work of this organisation is made possible by volunteering doctors, nurses and interpreters – the team consists of 3 employees and 31 volunteers – as well as by the support of a large network of medical specialists and institutes. Until 2006, AMBER-MED was financed exclusively through donations. In 2007, the organisation started receiving subsidies from the Federal Ministry of Health and the Fund for Social Affairs in Vienna (Fonds Soziales Wien), and since 2008, also from the Vienna Health Insurance (Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse) (see AMBER-MED 2008, Diakonie Flüchtlingsdienst 2008).

**Marienambulanz**

Since 1999, the Marienambulanz in Graz, Styria, has provided primary health care for people without insurance coverage and for other marginalised groups. The organization responsible for Marienambulanz is the Caritas Austria. An outpatient department offers general medicine care as well as target group oriented care (e.g. diabetes, hypertension, psychiatric disorders). Furthermore, there is a mobile unit that visits different places in Graz once a week to provide medical and psycho-social care and counselling. The team consists of 5 employees and 31 voluntary workers who are covering a wide range of disciplines, cultural backgrounds and languages. In 2007, 7,954 documented contacts and 1,250 patients from 72 nations were treated and counselled in the outpatient department. About the half of the patients were without insurance coverage. The Marienambulanz co-operates closely with health authorities and institutions and has established itself in the health care system as an expert in the medical treatment of socially marginalised groups. It is financed by the Federal Ministry for Health, Family and Youth, the “Land Steiermark – Gesundheitsfonds Steiermark und Sozialressort”, the Municipal Health Authority Graz and the Caritas. Since 2006, the ambulance has had a contract with the Styrian Health Insurance Company. In 2007, the Styrian Health Platform unanimously nominated the Marienambulanz as a measure that disburdens hospitals, which opened the possibility for further funding (Sprenger & Bruckner 2008; Marienambulanz 2008).

**Management of paradox in practice**

From these empirical examples central strategies for the management of the paradox can be identified on the level of policies as well as in organisational and individual behaviour. These are

1. **functional ignorance and structural compensation as a policy strategy to neglect the demand of policy development and as an organisational strategy to open a paradox-free space for action**
2. **informal solidarity as an individual strategy to follow humanitarian values without violating state demands**

**Functional ignorance and making paradox-free space for action**

In Austria there are no organisations which explicitly provide health care for undocumented migrants. Undocumented migrants are not mentioned as a target group, but they are included in the definition of socially disadvantaged and especially vulnerable people. For hospitals, the criterion for providing health care in the case of emergency is when the patient’s health is in serious danger. For NGOs, the criterion for providing health and social care is the status of (social) indigence. In both cases, organisations do not ask for information on the patients’ legal status, like residence permits or other documents. This ignorance of patients’ legal status, like residence permits or other documents. This ignorance of patients’ legal status, like residence permits or other documents. This ignorance of patients’ legal status can also be detected on the policy level. As shown in the example of AMBER-MED and the Marienambulanz, NGO services that prove to be successful in providing care to people that are excluded from the health and welfare system, are recognised as a relief. They provide a structural compensation for a health care system that does not offer services to undocumented migrants within mainstream health care structures. Delegating the challenge of health care provision for people without health insurance to private actors makes it possible for the public system to ignore the existence of undocumented migrants on a policy level. This seems to benefit these alternative health care providers, as their successful practice seems to be rewarded by increasing support from legal health care financiers. This is shown by the example of the Marienambulanz:
In its first years, the diocese of Graz Seckau was responsible for the Marienambulanz and the medical organisation was taken over from the non-profit association OMEGA. The organization established co-operation with volunteer medical specialists. Originally the ambulance was authorized just for 6 months to assess the demand for a low threshold medical service. Moreover, it relied on the goodwill of the medical association, the Municipal Health Authority and the federal state of Styria. The project has continued due to large and steadily growing demand, predominantly financed by Caritas and supported by the social services department of Graz, which was responsible for the payment of the outstanding hospital bills before the Marienambulanz was founded.

The proportion of public funding for the Marienambulanz has grown along with its success – a growing number of patients, its contributions to studies on marginalized groups, national and international media interest in the organization. In 2002 and 2003 the social department of Styria (Land Steiermark – Sozialressort) and the Municipal Health Authority were attracted as supporters and since 2005, the ambulance has received a subvention from the Federal Ministry of Health, Family and Youth. Since 2006 the service has had a contract with the Styrian Health Insurance Company. The service no longer depends on private donations, although it remains a private service.

**Informal solidarity**

On the level of individual behaviour, a successful strategy to cope with the paradox is “informal solidarity”. It can be observed within the mainstream services as well as in the NGO sector and informal private networks.

Professionals working in mainstream services in hospitals have some space for interpreting access regulations, for example in defining a case of emergency where giving treatment is mandatory or in accepting people whose entitlement to health insurance and ability to pay are unclear. This kind of informal solidarity is highly limited and each patient’s case needs to be considered individually, as the personnel cannot rely on supporting structures on organisational level. The most visible arena for informal solidarity is the paradox-free space provided by structural compensation, when health care professionals join NGOs as volunteers and give treatment to people who do not have access to regular services. As can be concluded from the high proportion of volunteers in NGOs, informal solidarity is important in enabling functional ignorance and structural compensation. Without the engagement of individual health care professionals, NGOs would not have the personnel necessary for providing services.

In both cases, this solidarity is informal and depends on the activities of individual people and a structural setting that promotes such activities. Such structures can exist in the hospital as long as the hospital administration accepts unpaid bills, or in NGOs that manage to attract donations and/or the goodwill of public financiers.

**Concluding remarks**

The project NoWhereLand has only begun to develop its central concepts. In the course of the project, empirical evidence from EU member states will be collected and used as the basis for further development. What has already become evident is that in many cases health care for undocumented migrants relies on private investments in a twofold way:

1. Health care provided within the welfare system, organised by established NGOs like Caritas and Diakonie, who provide structures and services that are not accessible in mainstream health care services.
2. Health care provided by individuals, e.g. health care professionals (medicals, nurses) who join structures provided by NGOs following a rationale of informal solidarity.

On the basis of the Austrian example it also can be concluded that these private investments help to keep up functional ignorance on policy level: As long as structural compensation works properly, there is no need for a reflection of policy approaches.

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Notes

2 For the difficulties of data collection and estimates see also the EU-project ‘CLANDESTINO’.

3 Main coordinator: Center for Health and Migration, Danube-University Krems; Associate partners: Belgium: PICUM/Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, England: University of Brighton, Italy: AUSL di Reggio Emilia, Portugal: CIES/INSA, Sweden: University of Malmö, Scientific Consulting: Switzerland: University of Geneva; Collaborating partners: ICMPD/International Centre for Migration Policy Development, IOM/International Organization for Migration, HOPE/European Hospital and Healthcare Federation, University of Vienna/Institute for Nursing Sciences, WHO European Office for Integrated Health Care Services, United for Intercultural Action; 60 % are funded by DG Sanco, 40 % are financed by national funds of the project partner organisations.

4 The following member states will be included into the research project: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Slovenia, United Kingdom.

5 The description of the concerned groups doesn’t say if the data also covers an estimated number of undocumented migrants.
Finnish immigrant integration policy emphasizes labour market participation. This has long been recognized: researchers have criticized the narrow focus and lack of attention to alternative ways of inclusion (e.g. Suurpää 2002: 208–213). While we wait for the new Immigrant Integration Act to be presented to the Parliament later this year or in 2010, policy papers and reports produced by the Ministries of Labour and the Interior can guide us in our reflections about the future of the immigrant policy in Finland. In this essay, I discuss the ways in which political participation is addressed in a selection of policy documents, and argue that the Finnish immigrant policy mainly promotes modest forms of political activity. Studying the institutional structures within which the policies are produced, I claim that, although somewhat neglected in integration policy, the participation of immigrants seems to be receiving attention within the general policy of civic influence.

This text is a part of my ongoing Ph.D. project. Comparing policy discourses in Finland and Denmark, I will aim at discovering what is expected of immigrant citizenship; which roles and positions are made/not made available to immigrants as potential political actors in these societies; and how culturally specific, dominant citizenship ideals translate into immigrant participation policies.

The importance of political inclusion

In contrast to the often narrow usage of the concept ‘immigrant integration’ in many public discussions, academic research generally employs the concept to denote processes in various spheres of life through which an individual or a group becomes a part of a whole. Studies aspiring to assess immigrant integration are thus expected to cover different fields: economic, social, and cultural, as well as political (see e.g. Integrationsministeriet 2007; MIPEX; Säävällä 2008). Within the political sphere of life, Martiniello (2005: 2–3) distinguishes four layers of integration: 1) identification with the new society of residence, 2) adoption of democratic norms and values, 3) political rights and 4) actual participation and representation. My focus in the following is on participation.

Equal participation of citizens of different ethnic backgrounds in all areas of life is usually accepted as a valuable societal goal. Grounds for asserting this objective vary – it is for example defended as a question of justice and as of instrumental value to deliberations processes (Phillips 1995: 27–56). Furthermore, researchers disagree about how to establish the political participation of all citizens. Some argue for rethinking and rearrangements in the political systems to enhance the representation of members of disadvantaged groups (see Phillips 1995; Young 1995), while others favour channelling immigrant participation through the existing systems without adapting them (Barry 2001; Benhabib 2006). Democracy, in its current forms in the global North, presumes a certain level of political inclusion of those ruled through the system. If immigrants and their descendants do not participate in the political system, they challenge its sustainability. In Finland, the absence of eligible foreigners from the ballot box influences the total voter turnout to some extent: in Helsinki, the effect was -1.8 percentage units in the 2004 municipal elections (Tilastokeskus 2006).

Low electoral turnout amongst foreign nationals may not alone be interpreted as a particularly strong indicator of a need for policy measures in the area. Not everyone needs to vote or stand for elections to keep democracy going. Neither is it always necessary to actually participate in order to experience a sense of political inclusion. Especially when things are going one’s way it is easy to feel that one’s wishes have been heard, even though one has not personally advocated those issues on a political forum (see Bäcklund 2007: 82). Moreover, it has been found that newcomers participate less than those who have lived in the country a longer period (see e.g. Lyso 2004) – one can thus argue that time, at least to some extent, will cure immigrant political passivity. The finding that many members of the new ethnic minorities in the Helsinki metropolitan area were not aware of their electoral rights in the early 2000s (Rihelä 2005: 143), however, brings the aspect of citizen rights into the discussion. If immigrant integration policy includes measures to increase...
Central administration: immigrant integration policy

2. Government Migration Policy Programme (2006) and two reports that are linked to it as parts of the process of creating a Framework Programme for Integration PUIKOT

Central administration: General civic participation policy


Municipal administration

1. Integration programme of the City of Helsinki (Maahanmuuttajien… 1999)
2. Integration programme of the City of Tampere (Kaikem paree… 2006)

I found that democracy and political participation are not systematically treated as parts of immigrant integration and that references to them are relatively vague. However, the number of participation-related topics has increased in the more recent texts, as for example the Midterm Report of the Framework Programme process (2008) does refer to the EU’s common basic principles and, among them, participation to democratic decision-making. Another significant feature of the Framework Programme process papers is the strengthened employment of the concept of two-way integration. Yet again, it is not possible to conclude on this basis alone that the democratic participation of immigrants would have genuinely entered the integration policy as it remains to be seen which parts of the relatively extensive midterm report are prioritised and included in the actual programme.

Those text fragments that refer to democracy and participation portray a few different approaches and highlights: grass roots interaction, immigrant associations, formal rights, political participation and specified participation. On the top of these, the absence of references to participation can be seen as a feature in itself.

Grass roots interaction. It is seen as desirable in the documents that immigrants engage in the resident democracy in their neighbourhood (Implementation Report 2002: 65) and participate in the activities provided by NGOs supported by the majority population, “such as sport, youth and culture as

From little to modest attention to participation

Progressive legislation does not inevitably go hand in hand with progressive policy measures or discourses. In order to find out how participation is addressed within the policy framework established in written documents, I studied a selection of the recent policy papers by the Ministries formally in charge of immigrant integration (Ministry of Labour until 31.12.2007, Ministry of the Interior from 1.1.2008 onwards), complemented by a few earlier documents of different types and by different institutions. As an initial groundwork for further research, I conducted the analysis either by strategic word searches and selective reading (in the case of lengthy papers) or by closer inspection. The body of texts consisted of the following documents:

Finland fares extremely well in the MIPEX due to a full score for electoral rights and political liberties. Even the other two dimensions seem to be neatly covered (Niessen et al. 2007: 62–67). An index only serves as a “rough guide” to the relevant situations in a given country, and even the best European practices can be seen as inadequate (from a radical or emancipatory point of view). It can, nevertheless, be safely concluded that many formal structures are in place to facilitate active citizenship for the still comparatively few immigrants in Finland.

Awareness of the rights and responsibilities of an individual living in Finland, it is natural to expect even political rights to be included in such awareness-raising.

There is plenty to inform the newcomers about. Legislation on the political rights of resident foreigners was adjusted in the early 1990s to enable all foreigners to participate in municipal elections and to gain membership in political parties. Immigrants from Nordic countries had enjoyed such rights since the 1970s. With these adjustments in place, Finland became one of the European countries with the most open legislations in this field of political participation. The EU-25 average in this policy area being 43 %, Finland reaches by 81 per cent the highest standard defined by the MIPEX. The target levels for policy areas covered by MIPEX are constructed on the basis of European Commission Directives, Council of Europe Conventions, EC Presidency Conclusions, proposals by European-wide stakeholders and recommendations of research projects (ibid.: 5). The assessment of policies for political integration is based on four variables:

1. Electoral rights
2. Political liberties (such as whether resident foreigners are free to join a party),
3. Consultative bodies, and
4. Implementation policies (such as whether the government actively informs the foreigners about their rights or if the state grants funding to immigrant associations).

From little to modest attention to participation

Progressive legislation does not inevitably go hand in hand with progressive policy measures or discourses. In order to find out how participation is addressed within the policy framework established in written documents, I studied a selection of the recent policy papers by the Ministries formally in charge of immigrant integration (Ministry of Labour until 31.12.2007, Ministry of the Interior from 1.1.2008 onwards), complemented by a few earlier documents of different types and by different institutions. As an initial groundwork for further research, I conducted the analysis either by strategic word searches and selective reading (in the case of lengthy papers) or by closer inspection. The body of texts consisted of the following documents:

Central administration: immigrant integration policy

2. Government Migration Policy Programme (2006) and two reports that are linked to it as parts of the process of creating a Framework Programme for Integration PUIKOT

Central administration: General civic participation policy


Municipal administration

1. Integration programme of the City of Helsinki (Maahanmuuttajien… 1999)
2. Integration programme of the City of Tampere (Kaikem paree… 2006)

I found that democracy and political participation are not systematically treated as parts of immigrant integration and that references to them are relatively vague. However, the number of participation-related topics has increased in the more recent texts, as for example the Midterm Report of the Framework Programme process (2008) does refer to the EU’s common basic principles and, among them, participation to democratic decision-making. Another significant feature of the Framework Programme process papers is the strengthened employment of the concept of two-way integration. Yet again, it is not possible to conclude on this basis alone that the democratic participation of immigrants would have genuinely entered the integration policy as it remains to be seen which parts of the relatively extensive midterm report are prioritised and included in the actual programme.

Those text fragments that refer to democracy and participation portray a few different approaches and highlights: grass roots interaction, immigrant associations, formal rights, political participation and specified participation. On the top of these, the absence of references to participation can be seen as a feature in itself.

Grass roots interaction. It is seen as desirable in the documents that immigrants engage in the resident democracy in their neighbourhood (Implementation Report 2002: 65) and participate in the activities provided by NGOs supported by the majority population, “such as sport, youth and culture as

**Immigrant associations.** The 2008 Implementation Report gives considerable attention to what are known as immigrant associations. Municipalities have welcomed immigrant associations as partners in implementing municipal efforts for immigrant integration (Pyykkönen 2007a), and the representation in the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations is chiefly based on associations. A registered association seems to be the preferred form for civic activities by immigrants – but there is little evidence that these associations have political goals directed at the polity of residence (Pyykkönen 2007b; Saksela 2003: 260–261), or that municipalities would especially encourage them to develop such goals.

**Formal rights.** In my selection, two different types of documents address political rights at some length. Recommendations by FNBE for the content of the integration course for adults (2001 and 2007) explicitly interpret the definition set by integration law to include membership in the Finnish society and equal participation in political life (amongst other areas). There are no significant differences in recommended topics for instruction between the 2001 and 2007 documents. The “Welcome to Finland” brochure is clearly directed at refugees. Many in its focus group have fled for political reasons, and the brochure gives a number of examples of political rights in the new home country. Democracy is, however, rather simplistically defined as the right of the people to “choose their leaders from candidates put up by the various parties” (p. 4), but later on even the right to organise demonstrations is mentioned.5

**Political participation.** In contrast to grass roots involvement and NGOs, which are mentioned relatively often, there seems to be no coherent way of treating political participation and parties in immigrant policy texts. Parties are included in the list of associations in one document, and not in another from roughly the same period. Low immigrant turnout in municipal elections is noted in the 2008 Implementation Report, and it also highlights the need of increased communication about societal issues in a broader set of languages. Sometimes, however, the primary motivation behind including political participation does not seem to be the exercise of rights, access to influence or input into the political process, since electoral participation is referred to under adaptation to Finnish culture (Impact and Measurement…2007), and “the participation of immigrants in the democratic decision making process through political parties or organisations” is simply presented as furthering their “commitment to society” (Government Migration Policy Programme 2006: 15).

**Specified participation.** The integration programme of Helsinki (1999) includes in its goals that immigrants participate in the planning of immigrant-related affairs. It is a legitimate assumption that those who have immigrated should have special interest in influencing policies directed at immigrants, but this assumption excludes other areas of interest that the immigrants may have. Following a similar logic, the online discussion forum for policy planning Otakantaa.fi does not publish comments in languages other than Finnish and Swedish, unless the discussion is defined as of special interest to speakers of other languages and therefore opened for them. The tendency to encourage participation only in issues that are directly connected to the participant’s life has also been detected in the context of youth participation (see Haikkola 2003; L 72/2006 § 8).

**No explicit references.** The fact that it is possible to find documents about integration without any explicit references to participation in the municipal/state democracy and politics further supports my argument about the incoherence of the Finnish integration policy in this respect. The integration programme of the city of Tampere (2006) fails to address participation, despite the fact that the city is participation-oriented in other respects, especially through its “Municipal Democracy Unit” since 2004. The newer of the two information brochures analysed defines integration in the following way: “Integration means adjusting to life in the home country and the possibility to have independent means of livelihood” (Finland Your New Home, p. 5).

Relying on an analysis of a few central and recent policy documents, I conclude that the Finnish immigrant policy may now pay a little more attention to civic activity as a part of integration than it did before. Political integration in a stronger sense is, however, addressed only sporadically. At most, the texts mention political parties and elections when describing or assessing integration – democratic representation and civic/political influence receive practically no attention.

**A separate policy for participation**

Taking part in working life and supporting the welfare state construct an important part of the general Finnish ideals of good citizenship (Anttonen 1998; see also Nordberg 2006: 529). The evident labour market focus of the Finnish immigrant policy can also be attributed to the great economic depression of the early 1990s, which coincided with the reception of the first larger groups of asylum seekers (Lepola 2002). In the 2000s, the partly experienced and partly anticipated labour shortage in certain fields has turned the political attention to labour integration. At the same time, the very high unemployment of certain ethnic groups, especially those with refugee background, has raised concern.

The emphasis on labour market integration may leave little space for other aspects of integration, but could there be other reasons for the slight negligence of politics in the policy documents? Is vague language around the political merely a standard feature of policy and administrative texts as a genre? Is it connected to an understanding of citizenship bound to Finnish ethnicity (see Lepola 2000)? Does it have to do with the fact that many traditional forms of political participation are tightly connected to political parties – and it may then not be considered appropriate of public policies
to instruct parties in matters that are perceived to be their internal issues?

It may also be the case that political integration is expected to follow naturally as a “second stage” of integration after the acquisition of language and labour market skills, now that the rights needed are in place and at least those attending the integration course are educated about their political rights (see above). One can argue, of course, that language learning, which is thought to be essential for labour market integration, is even more crucial for civic awareness and political participation. This way, policies for labour market integration intersect policies for political integration. Furthermore, employment may lead into labour union membership (see Alho 2008).

I am not able to answer the questions above and explain the inattention to political integration which I observed in the texts. The structural division of labour in the political system may, however, have something to do with it. In the following, I will describe a few features of the structures that relate to policies for immigrants’ political integration.

On the one hand, the electoral participation of foreign citizens is, with the exception of elections of the European Parliament, restricted to the municipal level. It is especially in the municipal context that the residents’ civic rights to direct participation are enhanced (L 365/1995). Following this logic, then, it should perhaps not be necessary for the state to create a special policy for immigrant participation. In practice, however, this line of thinking does not seem to have been enforced on the side of the municipalities: the City of Helsinki and Tampere programmes analysed have almost completely omitted the topic.

On the other hand, political participation and immigrant integration are placed in different ministries (see table 1). While immigrant integration is covered by effect from the beginning of the year, by the Ministry of the Interior and previously, by the Ministry of Labour, the responsibility for elections and other forms of political participation lies with the Ministry of Justice.

It seems that the Ministry of Justice has started to take a more active role in immigrant participation. When informing foreign citizens from other EU countries about the municipal and European parliamentary elections became compulsory at the end of the 1990s, Finnish authorities decided to include all foreign citizens into their municipal elections information mailing list (Korhonen 1.7.2008). The number of foreign languages in which the information is available has in the latest elections been increased to 10 (Tiedote vuoden 2008…). Russian speakers were one of the focus groups in a campaign for electoral participation in the parliamentary elections of 2007. Furthermore, the Advisory Board for Civil Society Policy (Yhteiskuntapolitiikan neuvottelukunta) has, according to the Implementation Report (2008), chosen immigrant participation as one of its thematic foci.

Conclusion: What to expect of the new policies?

At the moment of writing, February 2009, the new Integration Act is being drafted at the Ministry of the Interior. What can we expect of the policy that follows this renewed law with respect to political participation? The reports and policy papers analysed here suggest that policy-makers have begun to pay more attention to immigrants’ societal and political participation – yet in very modest forms. The organisation of cooperation where the central actor responsible for civic and political participation, Ministry of Justice, is not represented in the Advisory Board for Integration and Reception of Refugees (A 1392/2007) perhaps hints that participation will remain a field of its own. This way, the understanding of integration in the policy field dedicated to it risks remaining biased in favour of labour market participation and language acquisition.

The division of labour between the “integration and participation regimes” may, however, entail important advantages. It may benefit the mainstreaming of immigrant participation in contrast to “specified participation”. The Ministry of Justice is faced with a situation where not only the new ethnic minorities but also the majority population may need support and encouragement in societal participation (for examples, see Borg 2006: 123). Within this task area, immigrants can be approached as one of the policy target groups. The inclu-

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<tr>
<th>CIVIC AND ELECTORARY PARTICIPATION REGIME</th>
<th>IMMIGRATION &amp; INTEGRATION REGIME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Head: Ministry of the Interior (–Jan 2008 the Ministry of Labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections Unit</td>
<td>Others: Ministries of Employment and the Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy Unit</td>
<td>Education Social Affairs and Health</td>
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<td>Local Government Act (365/1995)</td>
<td>Advisory Boards</td>
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<td>Ethnic Relations (ETNO, 1998–)</td>
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<td>Minority Issues (2001–)</td>
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<td>Civic Integration and Reception of Refugees (2006–)</td>
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sion of the Ministry of Interior in the Advisory Board for Civil Society Policy (A 269/2007) exemplifies a link between integration and participation policies.

The winter 2008–2009 witnessed a surge of public and media discussion on asylum, refugee and integration policies. It was revealed how ill-prepared many professional politicians were for this debate. The situation opened possibilities for a few local politicians with immigration background to voice their opinions in the media, but the lack of politicians in significant positions who combine personal immigration experience with interest in these policy areas, was also noticeable. The sharpened tones may mobilise immigrant associations to participate in public discussions, but their resources for political agency may not always be adequate for them to be taken seriously as equal discussion partners. Here, immigrant policies can play an important role.

Pyykkönen (2007a) has found that municipal funding to immigrant associations favours a certain type of activities and projects that are in line with the notion of integration established in the law. This implies scarce support for activities of civic influence. Nevertheless, it has been concluded that immigrants’ participation in associations of any kind correlates positively with voting – (Wilhelmsson 2007). Consequently, support for any associations that host new ethnic minority members can indirectly contribute to their political mobilisation. As far as access to public and political discussions are concerned, however, political parties enjoy a privileged position. Research conducted in Sweden has also illustrated how internal party structures, practices and priorities condition the access to political influence of members and activists with immigration background (Soininne & Etzler 2006).

It can thus be concluded that while it is not realistic to expect any highly coherent and ambitious approach to political integration of the future integration policy in Finland, the elements currently treated in the policy documents, such as voluntary associations, carry a potential for civic education that leads to participation. What I would see as beneficial for the policy texts, however, is an explicit and systematic treatment of the various sides of political participation and political inclusion.

Policy sources, laws and statutes


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Notes

1 The text is based on a presentation at the seminar “Reshaping Europe: Migration and Its Contexts” organised by the Academy of Finland and Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research, 4–5 September 2008. I am grateful to Professors Peter A. Kraus and Johanna Kantola as well as University Lecturer Camilla Nordberg for their comments on previous versions of this paper.

2 See laws L 1331/1989 and L 1718/1991; about the electoral standard. Amendments to the Citizenship Act are being prepared at Population Register Centre Timo Korhonen [timo.korhonen@vrk.fi] to Marjukka Weide [marjukka.weide@helsinki.fi].

3 It is noteworthy, however, that access to citizenship is not included in the dimension of political integration but stands on its own. Here, Finland only gets halfway to best practice: the current eligibility and acquisition conditions fail to reach a high standard. Amendments to the Citizenship Act are being prepared at the Ministry of the Interior that are supposed to enhance access to nationality especially for those who have taken a degree in Finland (SM129/00/2008).
has previously been limited (Saksela, forthcoming; Weide 2008). With the establishment of the Immigration department (Maahanmuutto-osasto) in 2007, however, an employee was eventually recruited to attend to the cooperation between the municipality and associations. Discussion forums have been organised to bring together civil servants and NGOs (see Helsingin kaupunki, Henkilöstökeskus). The City of Helsinki is in the process of creating a new strategy for integration, and it remains to be seen whether political participation will be given a more significant role than before.

4 For the brochures, no years of publication are given, presumably 1999 and 2006.
5 The brochure has, however, not been updated after the change in law that abolished the need to apply for permission to hold a demonstration and established the obligation to inform the authorities about one.
6 The text slightly misleadingly refers to the turnout of eligible foreign citizens as the turnout of immigrant voters (pp. 42, 60).
7 It is, however, debatable how effectively the City of Helsinki has actually pursued this goal. At least the involvement of immigrant associations in the municipal decision-making structures
The Centre for Research on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM) arranged its fifth annual conference in collaboration with the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) at the University of Surrey, UK with them aim ‘to examine the past and present impact of diasporas and migration on nation, community, identity and subjectivity, culture and the imagination, place and space, emotion, politics, law and values.’ During the fully packed two-day event, 250 delegates from 31 countries were inspired by these objectives and reflected upon them in their papers and posters. The two plenary sessions as well as the four keynote speakers, Ien Ang (University of Western Sydney, Australia), Ato Quayson (University of Toronto), Peggy Levitt (Wellesley College) and Robin Cohen (University of Oxford/University of Warwick) addressed thought-provoking issues related to the study of diasporas and migration. Robin Cohen, for example, explored in his presentation the concept of creolization, which he argued to be crucial for achieving an understanding of cultural globalization. As Cohen pointed out, the term has a long and complex history and is strongly related to the work of linguists, who studied the emergence of new languages out of a mixing of two or more prior languages (www1). In other words, creolization implies a mixing and blending that creates something new. But why prefer this term over others, such as hybridity, for instance? Responding to this question, Cohen reasoned that creolization has at its center the idea of people as active creators. Hybridity, on the contrary, is an analogy taken from biology and implies the idea of mixing two pure things (see also Tomlinson 1999: 143 for the same critique).

Therefore, Cohen argued, creolization is a much more precise term, which can be used to understand “diversity, complexity and overlapping cultures”.

Youth and family in relationship to migration and identities

The first paper of the panel entitled “Youth, Generational Issues and Diasporas” was given by two members of a research group that included Joe Cook (University of Stirling), Petra Aigner and Louise Waite (University of Leeds). The presentation was based on research conducted amongst African migrants who have been living in the UK for more than 5 years.

The focus of this paper was on the question how migration disrupts and reshapes intergenerational transmission of family practices, culture and traditions. In this context, the presenters pointed out that migration often brings new challenges and interdependencies to families as the process of settlement can vary significantly across generations. Language skills as well as visits to the country of origin play an important role in successful intergenerational transmission of cultural traditions. As the research group’s findings suggest, the process of transmission includes agency, when parents choose which values of their cultural background they want to transmit to their children. Also, young people seem to negotiate which aspects of their parental cultural traditions they want to accept and to what extent.

The second paper, “Polish migrant identities: the case of families” was presented by Anne White from the University of Bath, based on her study conducted in Poland and the West of England in 2007-09. White argues that before 2004, it was rather normal that Polish parents would leave their children behind when migrating, which was experienced as a sort of self-sacrifice. Today, however, Polish migrants prefer to migrate as a close-knit family unit, relying on the help of family or friends. Once they have arrived in the UK, they often
have to face conflicts caused by constraints of material livelihood and by the question whether or when to return to Poland. These predicaments can in some cases lead to marital breakdown.

The last paper of this panel was presented by Raksha Pande (Newcastle University) and focused on the issue of arranged marriage among British Asians. Pande’s intention was to correct the prevailing perception which equals arranged marriage to forced marriage. This is a stereotypical view, fueled by the British media. In semi-structured interviews, her informants defined arranged marriage in four different ways: As a sort of matchmaking, as a semi-arranged marriage, as love cum arranged marriage and as arranged marriage. In other words, the term “arranged marriage” hosts a variety of different meanings, which reflect the diversity of Asians living in the UK.

I want to thank the City of Helsinki Fund for providing me the great opportunity to take part in this stimulating conference.

Bibliography


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A fair bit of research has been carried out on migration in the European Union (EU). Samantha Currie’s book Migration, Work and Citizenship in the Enlarged European Union adds a new perspective to this body of literature by looking into migrants’ work opportunities and issues of citizenship within the enlarged EU. Currie addresses the existence of transitional mobility restrictions, which contradict the EU’s established policy of promoting internal labour migration.

According to Currie, the main purpose of the book is to explore the legal status and experiences of migrant workers from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) accession states during the operation of the transitional arrangements. Furthermore, as the right to free movement is closely associated with the notion of citizenship under EU law, the second objective is to analyse the relevance of the Union citizenship status for this group. CEE nationals occupy a unique status under Community law. They may be Union citizens by formal definition but, in practice, their repertoire of rights is limited.

By juxtaposing the formal legal status and migrants’ practical experience throughout the various chapters Currie seeks to represent the overall status and employment experience of CEE accession migrants. She argues, however, that the aim is not only to critique the specific status granted to the migrants, but also to reflect more generally on the notion of Union citizenship as expressed formally in the EC Treaty.

Currie bases her discussion on empirical research carried out between 2004 and 2007. The research draws on primary and secondary sources. Currie focuses on the status of EU8 migrants in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement, and particularly on the specific context of the legal framework put in place in the UK to regulate immigration following the EU8 enlargement. In this respect, the research attempts to challenge and move beyond the media-projected images of EU8 workers (Polish in particular) that have dominated the debate in the UK since the decision was taken by the government to extend labour market access rights to EU8 nationals in 2004. The study is based on semi-structured, qualitative interviews and focus groups with Polish migrants working in the UK. Further qualitative interviews were carried out in Poland with return migrants who had moved to the UK but who had since returned to Poland. The main secondary source is the Accession Monitoring Report, which details the statistical data connected to the operation of the UK Workers’ Registration Scheme (WRS). The findings from the empirical research are drawn upon throughout the book to highlight particular experiences of Polish migrant workers in the UK, and to emphasize how the legal framework and the formal status they are granted shape these experiences.

In the seven chapters of the book, Currie paints a rather grim, yet realistic picture of the migrant workers’ situation and status in the UK by a profound analysis of the literature and data. She also provides the reader with many citations from the interviews, and plenty of EU materials and community legislation. The structure of the book is clear and logical. In the introduction, Currie gives an overview of the EU’s membership transformation from a club of 15 ‘western’ European countries to an alliance of 27, which also encompasses ten post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. In the second chapter, Currie introduces the transitional rules in the accession treaties and national implementation throughout the EU. In chapters 3-4, she discusses the EU8 migrants’ access to the UK labour market during the transitional period, and clarifies the migrants’ de-skilled and devalued labour market status and experiences in the UK. Chapter 5 argues the process and salience of facilitating family life in the aftermath of post/accession migration to the UK. In chapter 6 the issue of citizenship in the context of EU enlargement is taken into account. Finally, in chapter 7 Currery reflects respectively on the analysis at EU level, at national (UK) level, on the methodological approach, and finally presents future implications.

Currie found out that the labour mobility rights of CEE accession nationals are shaped by two tiers of regulation: the detail of the Accession Treaty provisions, and the varied implementation of the mobility restrictions by the older Member States. Self-interest is said to cover both levels of regulation. This is explained by the transitional arrangements, which are designed, by their very nature, to protect the interests of the older member states. They have complete discretion over whom they admit to their labour market. The tendency of the EU15 member states has been for their policies towards the EU27 to be either as restrictive, or even more so, as they are in relation to the EU8. Also, restrictions on the mobility of a large group of EU citizens is paradoxical given that at the
same time, the EU publicized jobs opportunities and encouraged EU15 nationals to work in other Member States.

Considering EU8 migrants’ access to the UK labour market during the transitional period, it is apparent that the complexity of the system and related bureaucracy, including the registration process, have added to the difficulties faced by migrants. As a result it seems that individual EU8 nationals have been denied the opportunity to claim benefits despite being employed, if they have not complied with the registration requirement. A general lack of awareness on the part of the employers and migrants, can lead to further uncertainties. One of the respondents formulated the viscous circle as follows:

For registration we need a letter from an employer but when you go to a coffee shop looking for work sometimes people don’t know about it and they think if you don’t have certificate already then you don’t have permission to work so they don’t want to speak with you … You can’t start work because you’re not registered but you can’t register because you’re not in work (sic).

As a result migrants have looked to agencies, employers and networks of fellow migrants in order to find work and make sense of the regulatory framework. Consequently, relying on others, agencies and employers in particular, has resulted on some occasions in migrants inadvertently failing to comply with the legal requirements of the WRS.4

The grimness of the CEE migrant workers’ situation comes to a climax in chapters 3 and 4, when Currie explores the notions of de-skilling and de-valuing (brain drain versus brain gain, and brain waste). Currie illustrates migrants’ experiences of disadvantage, gendered or other discrimination and exploitation with heartbreaking interview excerpts. The various ways in which EU8 migrants have facilitated and sustained family life are also central to these experiences. Family reunification has not been accessible to all migrants as various constraints, social and legal, can work together to prevent the family from joining the worker.

Studying citizenship in the context of EU enlargements and CEE migrants as Union citizens, Currie claims that the role assigned to nationals of the CEE member states is not at all similar to that suggested by Everson (1995). Everson argues that the European market citizen is the “role which nationals of the Member States have been expected to play” to help achieve the “legal and practical realization of the internal market.” Currie argues that it should not be forgotten that EU citizenship was introduced to increase the EU’s legitimacy and bring Europe “closer to its citizens,” but the very existence of transitional arrangements on free movement suggests that Europe does not desire to be close to all of its citizens – or, at least not as close to some as it is to others.

According to Currie, it is very unlikely that enlargement, and by extension, transitional arrangements will disappear from the EU agenda. She foresees that analogous arrangements will certainly apply to Croatia and Turkey in the longer term.

To conclude, I agree with Currie that this research, an in-depth investigation into the status and experiences of a group of migrants subject to mobility restrictions, can help to predict the potential impact of future transitional arrangements. Moreover, it can prove useful as a method of informing future policy to accompany the implementation of transitory free movement restrictions. Also, recognition of some of the pitfalls associated with migrants’ reliance on agencies should be taken into consideration when implementing future EU programmes. Therefore, this book is highly recommended to EU legislation workers who may not have applied knowledge in the field.

While informative, the book may not be an easy read from the perspective of other disciplines. The style is factual with a fair amount of examples from the qualitative study. These illustrations definitely make the book easier to digest. For readers like myself with little knowledge on EU legislation, getting through the book requires some perseverance. Although a list of EU materials and community legislation including treaties, agreements, EC regulations, and EC directives is presented, and a list of abbreviations has been provided, it is rather tedious to go back and forth, which may be a weakness. However, these lists are an absolutely essential part of the book without which the reader could not follow the text.

Currie’s book is definitely recommendable for EU policy makers who would like to get a deeper insight into the realities and problematics of migrants’ work opportunities and issues of citizenship within the enlarged EU.

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Notes
1 The Central and Eastern European Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia).
2 The Member States that formed the EU prior to 1 May 2004 (Benelux, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK).
3 The CEE Member States that acceded to the EU in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria).
4 Workers’ Registration Scheme
In this book, Kathleen Valtonen sets herself the ambitious task of filling the gap in the knowledge base of critical approaches to social work. In general, the book is well placed in the international context of migration, especially with regard to the human rights and citizenship rights approaches to social work practice. Reference is made in particular to social work and settlement practice in relation to refugees, calling for change in institutional and social structures in order to create social conditions in which settling groups can fully exercise their social citizenship.

Valtonen approaches social work from a critical structuralist orientation positing the aim of social work as the facilitation of the types of settlement processes that bring about equity in the life conditions of immigrants and refugees. This critical approach sees the society in terms of systems of oppression and struggle for liberation and freedom. “Critical social theory offers a frame for analysing conditions of systemic-level and institutional-level exclusionary patterns which affect integration processes negatively” (p. 35).

On her agenda is a necessity for social workers to deal creatively with the challenges of settlement work and to expand the boundaries of existing practices. She is critical of what she sees as a weak-response by social workers to the hostile government attitudes towards immigration (p. 4-5). Although she sees the professional mandate of social workers as being defined by policy and institutions, she identifies a basic discrepancy between the belief in the universality of entitlements for all humans and the typically governmental beliefs about the particularity of entitlement based on nationality. Hence, aside from developing suitable practices, Valtonen calls for more emphasis on policy advocacy by social workers in order to improve policies and to facilitate integration and settlement processes.

In the first chapter Valtonen discusses the phenomenon of migration in general terms and more specifically looking at the implications of immigration for social work. Here a section could have been added reflecting on how social work practice with different migrant groups needs to unfold in light of the current migratory flows. Continuing, Valtonen defines immigration as a two-way process in which the newcomer is required to develop skills to deal with the new society but also in which the host society has to acquire the capability to incorporate and accommodate immigrants. She portrays the front-line role of the social worker as pivotal in dealing with the immediate and on-going aspects of immigration-related problems.

In the second chapter Valtonen discusses various theoretical approaches to immigrant social work practice. She includes such approaches as the human rights, the citizenship and the culturally-sensitive approaches as well as the critical social work approach. A more in-depth treatment of the links of these theoretical macro level approaches to social work practice could have benefited the practitioners functioning between the policy frameworks and individual immigrants. In relation to these three approaches, the tensions between immigration and integration policies with regard to the eligibility criteria of various migrant groups and the impact of this to social work practice could have been discussed more in detail. Social citizenship and the citizenship rights approach can be heavily influenced by nationalistically minded political parties and the immigration policies they create. Therefore, political aspects impact on how integration and other social policies are implemented. Only a limited discussion on how social services to migrant groups can expand or restrict to reflect these political values is presented.

Because immigrants and refugees do not always fall under the policy paradigm of human rights and citizenship approaches to social work, Valtonen identifies immigrant social work as pioneering in many ways. She advocates the need to keep the citizenship and human rights approaches as frameworks for the standards of justice and equality to be achieved. But in addition, she advises to combine these approaches with a critical inspection of the built-in barriers to integration in society, which are contributing to persistent patterns of inequality for immigrants in various sectors. For a structuralist approach, a more in-depth presentation of the critique towards all the three approaches could have been advantageous, outlining in each case the kinds of barriers and contradictions that prevent inclusion. Although Valtonen clearly prescribes a pragmatic criticism by social workers, to guide them in this task a more critical analysis and a more thorough explanation of the role social workers play in supporting migrants to get certain rights could have added to the practical value of the chapter.

Despite some culturally sensitive passages, a heavy emphasis on human rights seems to be suggested in the instances
where social workers need to deal with immigrant communities. Bearing this in mind, what this chapter could have benefited from is a discussion of the role of ‘cultural defence’ in social work practice, which is increasingly challenged by feminist literature. The incorporation of this conflict between the human rights approach and the culturally-sensitive approach in a critical immigrant social work approach would have been welcome. Again, practical examples of situations that social workers may need to deal with could have been included, for example, cases of forced marriages in Britain. After the UK High Court decision that parents taking their children abroad to marry them against their will shall be deemed guilty of child abduction, it has been noted that the police and the social workers were often reluctant to challenge ethnic minority families because of the professionals’ fear of intruding in other people’s religious beliefs or cultural norms. Of course, in this context, it has to be remembered that this risks reinforcing the images of minority (often immigrant) cultures as illiberal and pre-modern, therefore these critical approaches need to be carefully considered in social work practice. A strong emphasis on the anti-discriminatory practice currently present in social work education may diminish such dangers in the future.

In the third chapter Valtonen examines the newcomers’ relations with the state, the market, the civil society and their transnational connections by discussing the various ways in which the settlement process is linked to these four dimensions. The role of the social worker in helping to negotiate these relations could have been more fully verbalised. In the fourth chapter Valtonen charts down the theoretical perspectives to the settlement and integration processes elaborating on acculturation, integration and assimilation as well as multiculturalism as a policy answer to immigration. Valtonen understands assimilation as a somewhat natural tool of analysis, and in line of the structuralist approach she criticises multiculturalism for its over-emphasis of the cultural aspect of integration. Instead, Valtonen proposes an integration model of immigrants as stakeholders. “The idea of stakeholding reinforces the positioning of immigrant constituencies as active members with commitment to engage and confirms the aspect of contribution by all parties”, she writes (p. 71).

Chapter five explains the various dynamics, analytical tools and policy conceptualisations related to varying aspects of inclusion and exclusion. Valtonen discusses the functioning ‘logic’ of discrimination and speaks for equity promotion and positive action by business management to overcome the gap between professed principles and the reality in employment markets and institutions. More practical links to social work and policy advocacy could have been spelled out when discussing these background notions to the market conditions of employment, for example by including more comprehensive examples from different countries’ immigrant employment situations and conditions.

Chapter six is dedicated to the discussion of macro, meso and micro level roles of social workers in settlement practice. Firstly, Valtonen identifies advocacy as the most important macro level role of the social worker elaborating on the various aspects of and the skills required in advocacy work. On the meso level Valtonen speaks for a culturally-sensitive role of the social worker that is inclusive and works in cooperation with the possible immigrant community’s informal welfare enhancing systems. On the micro level, she draws attention to the roles that tradition and religion can play in the individual immigrant’s life and how these individual choices contribute towards the overall change on the macro level in the host society. She also gives an overview of the ecological, social capital and power-related theoretical approaches to micro level social work.

Chapter seven continues the discussion on the micro level by focusing on the role of the immigrant family in settlement and on the due consideration of its role for social workers. Although Valtonen addresses the acculturation pressures that immigrant families come under, in this context, we would have liked to see a more robust discussion of the more critical literature in relation to a gendered approach to citizenship in multicultural societies and how the receiving society engages with different needs of ethnic groups through its social work practice. Often a mere human rights approach is not sufficient to overcome the cultural and structural hindrances that some immigrants are faced with. Minority groups are not always as homogenous as they may seem, and hence a more nuanced approach distinguishing group rights from individual rights is needed. This has been discussed by Anne Philips in her recent book Multiculturalism without Culture (2007) and subsequent articles (see below). Phillips (2007, 2008) specifically highlights the lack of voice for certain vulnerable groups within minority communities (particularly women) that are overshadowed by lead members (often men) that ‘represent’ their ethnic group when dealing with local authorities. Phillips (2007) argues that ‘culture’ is a contentious term, potentially obscuring differences between women and men, young and old, in the interpretations of a supposedly shared culture. This understanding of cultural representation threatens to solidify the interpretations of a dominant cultural group. Yet all too often, it is the men within each community who become to be recognised as the spokespeople for its culture or cultural traditions, often justifying practices that are at odds with gender equality, human rights and justice. A discussion of how these aspects are related to the structuralist desire to fight for freedom and liberation would have added an interesting angle to Valtonen’s analysis.

Chapters eight, nine and ten see a wholesome and more pragmatic discussion of social work practice and policy. Chapter eight is dedicated to the second generation and the continued integration problems it may face. Some of the previous theoretical discussions are reintroduced in the context of prolonged settlement. Chapter nine returns to the questions related to policy advocacy and presents some multiculturalist policy approaches to immigration in various countries. Other types of policy examples could have been presented also. Chapter ten charts down some ethical considerations relevant for practical immigrant social work, focussing particu-
larly on respect, self-determination, social justice and professional integrity.

On the whole the book is a good overview of the various theoretical views around settlement practice offering a pathway to finding out more about the approaches that other disciplines can offer to immigrant social work. The ambitious goal of the book could have merited a lengthier presentation, and each of the chapters in this book could have been a topic of a book in itself. Therein lay the possible shortcomings of this book. Had the book been lengthier, more detailed discussions of the different theoretical approaches presented could have been carried out. As it is, choices have had to be made and the treatment of the various approaches and their relation to social work is at times somewhat superficial and because of the number of discussions overviewed, also partly a little outdated. As has been seen, parts of the book could have benefited from a deeper development of the links between the theoretical approaches and the settlement practice. In order to build a more balanced presentation, maybe a narrower focus on the aspects of the theoretical approaches could have helped.

The large scope of the theories discussed can possibly have drawn attention away from the presentation of the stated critical structuralist approach. As Valtonen defines it, critical approach sees the society in terms of systems of oppression and struggles for liberation and freedom. However, at times when obvious possibilities for criticism arise the voicing of these is neglected. For example, in the presentation of Bourdieu’s (pp. 116-121) and Fraser’s (pp. 161-162) theories, we would have expected to hear a clearer verbalisation of the hindrances to integration that their theories highlighted rather than a prescription to follow the paths that Bourdieu and Fraser critically analysed. This would have given a fuller picture of the structuralist impediments to integration. Hence, with the choices of frameworks presented, in many instances, the approach seems to be more aligned with the republican citizenship approach rather than with the critical approaches as such. Although Valtonen is mindful of cultural differences, at times the obligations imposed on the immigrant could have benefited from a more fully spelled out critique. At times Valtonen seems not to have fully reconciled the culturally different and communal ways of integration that she also supports with her structuralist emphasis on integration and citizenship. This is a contradiction in many critical approaches themselves. This tension in critical theory could have been more fully elaborated on to lay a more robust ground for the situations that the practitioners will face when dealing with immigrants and refugees.

The bulk of this book is formed by the presentation of the theoretical approaches from other disciplines, and in this sense the book fills the gap that it proclaims to do by introducing many approaches. Besides the chapters eight, nine and ten, the social work practice is discussed only in various passing occasions and there is a creeping undertone of a lack of familiarity with current professional social work standards and practices. Inclusion of more up to date references and practical examples could have helped in preventing this impression. Overall, we recommend this book for those wishing to gain an overview of this field. This book is valuable as an introduction to the underlying approaches relevant to immigrant social work and the problems of settlement practices for undergraduate students and even those in later stages of their education in social work. It could also function as an exam book or lecture reading for the macro context of social work and immigration. It would also be beneficial to read the book in union with the following recently published chapters and articles compensating for the lack of the discussion of the gender aspects of social work and immigration.

Further literature


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*Paths of Integration* is a brilliant example of historical research, which has strong relevance to discussions of contemporary social problems. The main idea of this book, according to the authors, is to show that geographical mobility has been a part and a structural element of European history.


The editors’ background in the discipline of history is quite visible in the content of this book, which is a collection of articles mostly related to migration policy and the status of migrants in historic and comparative perspectives in different European countries and the USA. The book is divided into four parts (one of these being the conclusion), encompassing an introduction and 14 chapters by different authors. Although the name of the book is *Paths of Integration*, the majority of the chapters address differences or similarities in the migration policies of large European countries such as Germany, France, the UK, and the USA. The main method is historical, focusing on analyses of different statistical and official documents and programs related to migration.

The main themes that arise from this book are the positive evaluation of integration processes in Europe through historical parallels and experiences, and reminders of the long history of transnationalism and different paths of integration. The number of chapters related to integration is very small. One of these is Dorota Praszałowiczs’s “Polish Berlin: Differences and Similarities with Poles in the Ruhr Area, 1860-1920.” The chapter presents good examples of the integration of Poles in Berlin – though they simultaneously continued to be in contact with the Polish areas of the German Empire. Praszałowicz shows how a “transnational” dimension was already visible in the 19th century. She also emphasizes the importance of Polish organizations in Berlin to the political and social integration of the Polish population in the German capital. Praszałowicz also discusses some German integration initiatives that ended in a fiasco because of Polish patriotic uprising and also because of discriminative praxes.

Another chapter addressing integration is Barbara Schmitter-Heisler’s “Trade Unions and Immigrant Incorporation: The US and Europe Compared.” Schmitter-Heisler analyzes different ways of including and excluding migrants in regard to the labour market and political activities through participation in trade unions. She also shows that trade unions can influence the formation of migration and integration policies. Analysing trade unions’ policies in France, Germany and the US, Schmitter-Heisler concludes that positive changes in integration can result from trade unions’ activities. Schmitter-Heisler shows how good and useful some trade union practices can be – e.g. the promotion of equal income for local workers and guest workers, or providing opportunities for guest workers or other migrants to hold leading positions.

Barbara Dietz’s chapter “Aussiedler in Germany: From Smooth Adaptation to Tough Integration” deals with the phenomenon of Aussiedler – ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Dietz discusses differences between official policy and local population’s attitudes towards Aussiedler before and after 1989. She also pays attention to German integration politics, which is still built on the postulate that Germany is non-immigration country – and in the context of this postulate Aussiedler are accepted (officially) as German, although they have different cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. Ditz shows how German authorities try to eliminate differences between Aussiedler and other Germans on the one hand, and between Aussiedler and other foreigners on the other hand with special measures such as easily obtainable German citizenship, social services, encouragement to use German language, and support for unemployed Aussiedler. Ditz’s chapter contains a lot of information about changes in the political process, demography and so on, which have had influence on the integration of ethnic Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is important to note that this chapter is also a critical discussion of the economic integration of Aussiedler, of segregation, and language.

“Poles and Turks in the German Ruhr Area: Similarities and differences” by Leo Lucassen is a comparison of old (Poles) and new (Turks) migrant groups in the Ruhr area. Lucassen explores the process of migration and integration by looking at stereotyping and stigmatisation, housing and segregation, labour market positions, schooling and social mobility, mixed marriages and associational life. Lucassen’s main conclusion is that integration of different groups depends on the histori...
France, Germany and the UK have attracted migrants for quite a long time, but today it is also necessary to pay attention to small nation-states with ethnically homogeneous populations.

While I would have appreciated a clearer focus on policies of integration: how have different Western European countries been able to manage the multidimensional process of immigration, full of conflicts and dilemmas, I can recommend this book to people who are interested in migration and integration in the globalised world. Paths of Integration contains many valuable ideas and can be used as a source of information and inspiration.

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